BRIDGE AT THE EDGE

BOYE BROGELAND & DAVID BIRD

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& DAVID BIRD

MASTER POINT PRESS . TORONTO, CANADA

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Master Point Press 331 Douglas Ave. Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5M 1H2 (416)781-0351

Email: info@masterpointpress.com Websites: www.masterpointpress.com www.teachbridge.com www.bridgeblogging.com www.ebooksbridge.com

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Brogeland, Boye

Bridge at the edge [electronic resource] / Boye Brogeland and David Bird.

Electronic monograph. Issued also in print format. ISBN 978-1-55494-174-2 (PDF).--ISBN 978-1-55494-433-0 (HTML)

1. Contract bridge. I. Bird, David, 1946- II. Title.

GV1282.3.B75 2011a 795.41'5 C2011-906225-9

Editor	Ray Lee
Copy editor/interior format	Sally Sparrow
Cover and interior design	Olena S. Sullivan/New Mediatrix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In bringing these deals back to life, we are indebted to those who chronicle our great game. Foremost in our minds is Jon Sveindal, who described many of them in his splendid bridge column for the Oslo newspaper, Aftenposten. Many thanks to him! For several years now, the excellent website Bridge Base Online has broadcast — free of charge to users — the world's finest championships. Nikos Sarantakos maintains the records of these broadcasts on his excellent VuGraph Project website:

http://www.sarantakos.com/bridge/vugraph.html

We retrieved the details of many deals from this source and thank Nikos warmly. We acknowledge also the annual world championship books, edited by Brian Senior and a prerequisite of any bridge lover's library. Finally, our thanks go to Christian Vennerød, who wrote some emotive articles in English on Norway's win in the 2008 European Championship.

David Bird and Boye Brogeland

PHOTO CREDITS:

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Foreword

One of the privileges open to a bridge writer is the chance to co-author a book with a world-class player — to delve inside their bridge mind and perhaps discover a secret or two on how they have achieved so much success. I have been fortunate to do this with some of the world's best players and it has always been a rewarding experience.

Boye Brogeland is an exceptionally bold and adventurous player, following his instinct and taking risks that few others would contemplate. Most unusually, he is very happy to publicize his failures as well as his successes. During the 2010 European Championship he and Svendsen bid to a small slam, missing the ace and king of trumps. I emailed him, 'Can you explain the bidding on that spade slam against Germany? Obviously we won't use the deal in the book, but I'd like to understand what the bids meant.' Boye responded, 'Of course you must put it into the book! It was a very interesting bidding problem.' You will find the deal on page 214.

This book contains some 190 deals played by Boye at championship level. They illustrate the thrilling highs and depressing lows of top-level championship bridge. Boye and I have done our very best to convey the buzz and excitement of playing 'bridge at the edge'. Have we succeeded in this task? Only you can say.

> David Bird September, 2011

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INTRODUCTION

What is it that gets your juices flowing playing bridge? Is it a neatly timed elimination and throw-in, a perfectly executed double squeeze, or thirteen rounds of relays to get to the optimal spot? Maybe it's wielding the axe on your opponents and collecting a big number? All that stuff gets me excited too, but I find it even more thrilling to make a bid, a lead or a play — successful or not — that no textbook will ever recommend.

'Avoid big penalties' is a common maxim, especially playing IMPs or rubber bridge. Sensible as it may seem, I will go out of my way to help partner to find the right lead; I open light third in hand, I overcall on decent four-card suits, and I double Stayman or a transfer bid with any suit — long or short — that screams for the lead. If this means I look stupid from time to time when my opponents catch me speeding, so be it. In the long run I believe it is the right approach.

'Never underlead an ace against a trump contract' is another adage that bridge players are familiar with. Well, going against the mainstream can be extremely effective. No declarer expects it, and faced with a king-jack choice in dummy at Trick 1 he is almost certainly doomed. As long as you (and your partner) can stomach finding the occasional stiff king in dummy, underleading an ace is far less dangerous than most people think.

'Don't risk your contract trying to make an overtrick' is sound advice for IMPs and rubber bridge, but don't bank on it. There are situations when the likelihood of an overtrick is so high that you should play for it even though you risk going down in a cold contract. Math is a better guidance than the rule of thumb you were once taught. You have to bear in mind, though, that you have to explain to your teammates when you call out minus 100 at the comparison.

My most memorable 'minus 100' happened in the final of the Bermuda Bowl in Paris in 2001. I was declarer in a 3NT contract that had nine top winners after the lead. Rather than securing the contract and keeping my partner and teammates at ease, I tried for an overtrick since only a really unlucky lie of the cards would put me in any danger. Rose Meltzer and Kyle Larsen were happy to be given the chance to collect the next five tricks. Down one. And USA went on to win a close final.

In Shanghai in 2007 it was déjà vu. Norway was in the Bermuda Bowl final against the USA. I was declaring 3NT on the last board of a segment and had nine top tricks. I cashed eight of them and was left with the ace-queen of spades and a couple of diamonds in dummy. Based on my opponents' discards I was pretty sure that the king of spades was onside. Should I play it safe to avoid a possible disaster like six years ago, or should I follow my instincts?

My adrenalin was pumping. I asked myself how it would feel to lose the final by one IMP, knowing that an overtrick on this very hand could have made the difference. To me, that would be the worst case scenario, so I couldn't chicken out. I took the finesse.

Zia Mahmood, who has been my idol ever since I read his Bols Tip, 'Roll Over Houdini', won the king of spades and literally stood up to cash a winner. Now I was down to a guess — which two cards Michael Rosenberg had left. I was lucky: I got it right, I made the contract and we went on to win Norway's first Bermuda Bowl.

Don't play it safe. Play at the edge.

Boye Brogeland

BOYE BROGELAND'S PARTNERS



Erik 'Silla' Sælensminde. Boye met Erik when he was a student at the Norwegian School of Economics in Bergen. They adopted the Precision system and first made their mark in national events during 1993. Three years later they represented Norway in the Nordic Championships. The Rhodes Olympiad followed and then six consecutive European championships, where they collected one silver and four bronze medals. In five Bermuda Bowls they won one gold medal, one silver and one bronze. After the Bermuda Bowl triumph in Shanghai (2007) Boye and Erik decided to end their partnership on a high after fifteen years together.



Espen Erichsen. Espen and Boye were teammates in the Norwegian junior team that won the European championship in 1996 and were runners-up in the World Championship in 1997. In 1999 Espen moved to London to play in TGR's rubber bridge club. Espen and Boye have played together in five Cavendish Invitationals in Las Vegas, twice finishing in the money.



Espen Lindqvist. Boye and Espen formed a partnership in 2008 and just three months later topped the Butler scoring in the European Championship, where Norway took the gold medal. This was the first win for Norway in the event, following seven consecutive victories by Italy. In the 2009 Bermuda Bowl, Boye and Espen came second in the Butler scoring and Norway reached the quarter finals, where they played China. Trailing by 47.5 IMPs with 16 boards remaining, Norway finished strongly and took the lead 3 boards from the end. A swing on the penultimate board gave China victory by 2.5 IMPs.



Øyvind Saur. A dentist nowadays, Saur was Boye's partner from 1995 to 1999. They were the anchor pair in the Norwegian junior team, winning the Nordic Championships in 1995, the European Championships in 1996, and two Youth Bridge championships in the Netherlands. In 1997 Norway lost a hard fought final against Denmark in the World Junior Championships played in Canada. Saur is an inventive player with great card sense. Never missing a chance to take a backwards finesse, he is also the man behind the Peanut Butter Coup; when a Belgian declarer played the ace from a trump holding of A-x-x-x opposite Q-x-x-x, Saur dropped the king from K-J-10! Persuaded that trumps were 4-1, declarer then went one down.



Odin Svendsen. Odin and Boye were selected to play for Norway in the 2010 European Championships in Ostende. Norway, the defending champions, finished in a disappointing 14th place. Odin and Boye had a satisfactory tournament, finishing as the 6th-ranked pair in the Butler scoring.

Svendsen captained the Norway ladies team when they took 4th place in the 2000 Olympiad in Maastricht.



Tonje Aasand Brogeland. Tonje and Boye met as students in 1994 and have been together since 1997. She soon became a keen bridge player — mentored by Boye's partner, Øyvind Saur. In the European Open in Tenerife (2005), with their son Anders only two months old, Tonje and Boye won the Mixed Teams, together with Helen and Espen Erichsen, Gunn and Tor Helness. They have reached four European championship mixed pair finals, with a 5th place in San Remo (2009) their best result.

THROUGH THE BACK OF THE CARDS

How does a skilled declarer read the lie of the cards? He gathers evidence from a variety of sources: bids made by the opponents, bids not made by the opponents, the opening lead and defensive signals. He may also draw inferences from the chosen line of defense. Sometimes he will place a particular card or cards with one defender because the contract cannot be made unless that is the case. This assumption may lead him to conclude that the other defender holds some other vital missing card.

In this chapter we will look at some deals where Boye managed to read the cards successfully. We start with a deal where declarer has to find the \blacklozenge J to make his contract.



Playing with his wife-to-be, Tonje, Boye ended in 3NT. When West led ace and another club, East won with the \clubsuit K and cleared the club suit, her partner throwing a diamond. All now depended on declarer scoring four spade tricks, to go alongside four hearts and one club. Since East had started with six clubs to West's two, the initial odds suggested that West would hold more spades than East. In that case a finesse against the \clubsuit J would be necessary if the card did not fall on the first two rounds.

Before playing spades, it is natural to seek some clues by cashing four rounds of hearts. The suit breaks 3-3 and let us suppose that West discards another diamond while East throws a club. How should declarer read the spade suit?

If East's hand is something like

♠72 ♥1083 ♦A5 ♣KJ8543

she can afford to discard a club, while still keeping enough clubs to beat the contract. Would anyone actually discard this way when they had the useless \blacklozenge 5 to pitch? If you judge it unlikely, you should read East for the hand that she actually held and therefore play for the drop on the third round of spades.

What happened at the table, then? Er, well... when East cleared the club suit she had the chance to give a suit preference signal. Rather than indicate the A clearly, with a low club, she actually attempted a deception by signaling an entry in spades. This caused West to discard a spade on the last round of hearts, so Boye was never actually faced with the spade guess. However, he did reassure the

distressed defenders that he would have read the spade suit correctly if West had not made the fatal spade discard. (What a gentleman!)

Boye has never won the prestigious Norwegian Pairs, although he is determined to do so one day. In 1996 he and Erik Sælensminde racked up a sensational score but still finished behind Geir Helgemo and Lasse Aaseng. Boye's consolation was to win the Best Played Hand award, for reading the cards well on this deal:



Erik Sælensminde's double showed some values, around 5 points or more. How would you tackle 5 when West makes the rather strange lead of the Φ ?

Even if trumps break 3-3, which is less likely than normal after West's preempt, you will still need to avoid three losers in the red suits. Boye won the first trick with the AK. West presumably held seven spades, so the A9 lead was suspicious. It suggested that he was void in one of the minor suits and was trying to put East on lead to deliver a ruff. Boye saw that there was no point in trying to ruff a diamond in dummy. Even if the ruff passed by without accident, he would have no entry back to his hand. A club to the ace would surely be ruffed by West.

Boye continued by playing three rounds of trumps. The suit broke 3-3, he was pleased to see, and East won the third round with the queen. Boye won the low club return with the ace, West throwing a spade. The only chance of making the contract was an eventual squeeze and his next move was a low diamond towards the dummy. West does best to rise with the $\diamond 10$ and play a spade, killing the entry to dummy before declarer can make use of it. He chose to play low instead and East won dummy's $\diamond 9$ with the $\diamond J$. These cards remained:



At this stage East could break the squeeze by returning a diamond. He preferred a 'safe' \clubsuit K and that was curtains for the defense. Boye ruffed, played his remaining trumps and crossed to dummy with the \bigstar A. On this trick East had no good discard available from \blacklozenge Q85 and the \clubsuit Q. He threw a diamond and Boye then scored three diamond tricks for the contract.

The key to the next deal was reading the lie of the trump suit. Would you have reached the same conclusion that Boye did?



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Gillis		Brogeland
			1♦
pass	1♠	2♣	2♦
pass	3♣	dbl	3♥
pass	4♥	all pass	

The heart fit was located and West led the AQ, won with dummy's AA. Boye led a low trump and East rose with the ace, continuing with the AA and AJ. How would you play from this point?

With a certain spade loser to come, Boye had to avoid a second loser in the trump suit. East would need to hold the $\mathbf{V}Q$, obviously. If East started with $\mathbf{V}AQ9$, declarer would have to ruff the third club with the $\mathbf{V}8$; he could then ruff a diamond and pick up the trump suit with a finesse of the $\mathbf{V}10$. There would still be a likely loser in the diamond suit, however.

East surely held six clubs to West's two and was likely to be shorter than West in the trump suit. Boye therefore ruffed the third round of clubs with the $\P10$. He then led the king of trumps, picking up East's bare queen. Before drawing the last trump, he cashed the AKQ, throwing dummy's spot cards in spades. He then crossed to the \PJ , drawing West's last trump, and claimed the contract. East would score the AKQ for the defenders' third trick.

Play at the other table started the same way but declarer ruffed the third club with the ♥8. An overruff and an eventual spade trick put the contract one down. Boye's team, captained by Simon Gillis, went on to win the event.

Much as one of the present authors dislikes part-score contracts, every bridge book should surely contain at least one of them. Here it is: a 2 \blacklozenge contract where the opponents were the Katz team from the USA. As you will see, the point of interest lies in reading the lie of the club suit.



Three rounds of diamonds forced Boye to ruff. He played a trump to the king and a second trump to the ten, queen and ace. West returned his remaining trump, won in the South hand, and this was the position:



How should declarer play the clubs? He can afford to lose two tricks in the suit but he does need to establish two winners, so that he can discard a heart loser from dummy.

Suppose you play a club to the jack. East will win with the queen and return the \forall J. If you win in the dummy and continue with the \clubsuit K, West will win with the \clubsuit A and his remaining \clubsuit 95 will restrict you to only one club trick.

Perhaps it is better, as the cards lie, to play a club to the eight? Let's see. East wins with the $\mathbf{P}Q$ and returns a heart to dummy's ace. West wins your $\mathbf{P}K$ with the $\mathbf{P}A$, leaving your club holding blocked, and plays another heart to remove the entry to the South hand. One down!

Only one play is good enough and Boye found it — a club to the king. When he continued with the \clubsuit 8, East's \clubsuit Q was expended on thin air. The heart switch was won with dummy's ace and the \clubsuit J then cleared a trick for declarer's \bigstar 10 while the \clubsuit K remained as an entry.

How did Boye read the club position? Nothing was known of the heart situation but he thought that East would have ventured 34 on the second round with something like:

♠ 107 ♥ J 1085 ♦ AKQ64 ♣ A6

It was therefore more likely that West held the \clubsuit A.

When you are trying to read the lie of a suit, you should pay full attention to the spot cards that fall early in the play. Would you have read the trump suit correctly on the next deal?



Boye's 2NT rebid was artificial and game-forcing and he ended in 4♠. West led the ♥10 to East's queen and declarer won with the ace. When he led his singleton club, West rose with the ♠A and crossed to partner's ♥K to receive a heart ruff.

It did not escape Boye's attention that this ruff was taken with the \blacklozenge 9. He ruffed West's club return and had to decide how to play the trump suit. Four trumps were still out and many players would have crossed to the \blacklozenge A to run the \blacklozenge Q, hoping to find East with \blacklozenge Kx. This could be the case only if West had chosen to ruff with the \blacklozenge 9 from a trump holding of 9-7-4, 9-7-2 or 9-4-2. It was possible, yes, particularly in a world championship semi-final. Still, how many defenders would falsecard in this way?

Boye decided it was more likely that West had begun with \clubsuit K9 and had been forced to ruff with the \clubsuit 9. Instead of crossing to dummy for a trump finesse, he played the \clubsuit A from his hand. Wonderful sight! The \clubsuit K fell from West and he made the contract.

Show this hand to some of the players at your club and they may disagree with declarer's line. 'West could easily be falsecarding,' they will tell you. 'I would take the percentage line of crossing to dummy for a trump finesse.'

Our advice is that you will do far better in the long run to assume that a defender is not falsecarding. Another piece of evidence on this particular deal is that good players do not particularly like leading doubletons. They are more likely to choose such a lead when they hold the ace or king of trumps; they may then gain the lead with this card and have a second chance of scoring a ruff in the suit that was led.

At the other table Tor Helness led ace and another club. Declarer ruffed and crossed to the A for a trump finesse. He could hardly play the contract otherwise with two almost certain heart losers staring him in the face.

The next deal will give you a chance to test your own card reading. Take the South cards here:



Andrew Robson led the $\mathbf{\Psi}A$, Rita Shugart signaling discouragement with the $\mathbf{\Psi}10$. How would you plan the play when West switches to a trump?

When you have decided, take a look at the whole deal:



The early play has been: ♥A, East discouraging, and a trump switch.

The opening lead has given you a tenth trick. If East holds the A, it will be a simple matter to lead towards the K for the eleventh trick. Boye placed West with the A, after his overcall, and aimed to endplay him. He played six rounds of trumps, throwing two low clubs, and continued with the AKQ. With the South hand reduced to the KJ and K, he intended to exit with the K, hoping that West would win with the A and lead into the heart tenace.

Robson, whose last four cards were $\mathbf{V}Q5 \mathbf{A}10$, still had to make one discard. In an attempt to evade the throw-in, he discarded the $\mathbf{A}A$. This would have beaten the contract if East held the $\mathbf{A}K$ instead of the $\mathbf{A}QJ$. As the cards lay, Boye was able to score the $\mathbf{A}K$ and $\mathbf{V}K$, making his game.

On the next contract Boye read the lie of the clubs on the very first trick:



How would you play when West leads the $\clubsuit7$ to East's \clubsuitQ ?

Your first task is to determine how the clubs lie. When an unbid suit is led after the defenders have found a fit, you might normally suspect that the lead is a singleton. Boye discounted this possibility because East would surely have bid 4♥ if he held a 5-5 hand. It was unlikely that West had led from ♠K107 in an unbid suit, so Boye more or less placed West with ♠74. How could the contract be made in that case?

Playing for a 3-3 diamond break is not a promising line because East's shape would then be 1-5-3-4 and the 4-1 trump break would be troublesome. Suppose you win with the A, draw trumps in three rounds and cross to a diamond honor to lead a club towards the jack. East will rise with the Q and with only one entry left to your hand, you will not be able to establish and enjoy the thirteenth club.

Boye tried something different — he allowed East's $\mathbf{A}Q$ to win the first trick. East cashed two hearts and switched back to clubs. Boye finessed the $\mathbf{A}J$ successfully, drew trumps in three rounds and played the $\mathbf{A}A$. The suit divided 4-2 but this presented no problem now. He ruffed a club in dummy, establishing a long card in the suit, and still had a trump entry to his hand.

Before we move on, did you spot any further point on that deal? East could have defeated Boye's line by playing a third round of hearts, giving a ruff-and-sluff! It would no longer be possible to establish the clubs with a ruff and then return with a diamond ruff to score the long club.

On the next deal Boye read the cards successfully after drawing clues from various sources. Would you have found the winning line?



West leads the $\mathbf{A}Q$ against your diamond game. How will you tackle the play when East overtakes with the $\mathbf{A}K$ and switches to the $\mathbf{A}Q$?

Boye won with the \bigstar and drew trumps with the ace and king. After ruffing dummy's last spade and taking a successful finesse of the \forall J, he played the \forall AK, discarding a club. When he led the \forall 2, East produced the last heart. What would you do on this trick?

If East had started with 5-4-2-2 shape and ♣QJ, the contract could be made by ruffing the fourth round of hearts and exiting with a club; East would have to concede a ruff-and-sluff after winning with the ♣J. Could the clubs lie like that, though? The red-suit distribution was known from the fall of the cards. The defenders' spade bidding and West's double of 5♣ made it a near certainty that East had started with 6-4-2-1 shape. Boye therefore discarded another club on the fourth heart, allowing East to win the trick. Like it or not, East had to exit with a spade. Away went South's last club and the trick was ruffed in dummy. Eleven tricks had been made!

No doubt West is still regretting his double of $5\clubsuit$. Had he passed instead, it is at least possible that Forrester would have left it there. It is difficult to avoid two club losers when clubs are trumps!

We will end the chapter with a deal where Boye had to seek the game-going trick from one of the black suits. Choose a line of play yourself:



Espen Erichsen's 2NT was an extension of the Lebensohl convention, suggesting a hand in the 0-7 point range. On most hands partner would then bid $3\clubsuit$, allowing the 2NT bidder to pass with clubs, or correct to one of the red suits. Here, Boye was very strong and therefore declined to bid $3\clubsuit$. How would you play $4\heartsuit$ when West leads the \bigstar A and switches to the \blacklozenge Q?

When you have decided, look at the full deal:



West's first two leads had already revealed good values in spades and diamonds, so it was quite possible that East held the \clubsuit K. Before relying on a favorable club position, Boye tried to build a spade trick. He won the diamond switch and led the \clubsuit Q, covered by the \clubsuit K and ruffed in the dummy.

The ♥AK brought the news of a 2-2 break and Boye now had to read the lie of the spade suit. If East had begun with ♠J43, a ruff of the ♠7 would bring down the ♠J and establish the ♠10 as the game-going trick. If instead, East had started with ♠843, Boye would need to lead the ♠10 to pin the ♠8. Which should it be?

Boye reasoned that in the dangerous case where East held the AK, West might need the AJ to make up his opening bid of 1A. With only 10 points, he might not have been willing to open when vulnerable against non-vulnerable. Boye therefore continued with the A10.

If West had covered with the \bigstar J, declarer would ruff in the dummy; East's \bigstar 8 would be pinned and the \bigstar 7 would be good. West defended more strongly, playing low on the \bigstar 10. Reading the position, Boye threw a club from dummy. He could then ruff his last spade in dummy for a tenth trick.

SLAM BIDDING MECHANICS

One of the most important skills in bridge is slam bidding. What methods do you need to achieve accuracy in this area? A complex relay system, perhaps? A host of conventions, each targeted at a particular situation? Not at all. As we will see in this chapter, it is possible to bid a great majority of slams accurately using only cuebids, Roman Keycard Blackwood (RKCB) and a small number of other gadgets.

ROMAN KEYCARD BLACKWOOD

There is sometimes a right and a wrong member of the partnership to use Roman Keycard Blackwood. When one player has good playing strength, perhaps with a long side suit, and the other holds the bulk of the controls, it is the first player who should ask for keycards. Look at this deal:



Erik Sælensminde's 2• was an artificial game-force, similar to fourth-suit forcing. When Boye showed his excellent spade support, it was clear to Erik that a spade slam was available. Many players would then have bid RKCB on the South cards but this would be a mistake. Erik preferred to cuebid 4• (a bid of 4• would have been a slam try in clubs) and Boye could now bid RKCB from his side of the table.

Roman Keycard Blackwood

4NT asks for keycards (the four aces and the trump king):

- 5♣ 0 or 3 keycards
- 5 1 or 4 keycards
- 5♥ 2 keycards, no trump Q
- 5♠ 2 keycards + trump Q

South's 5• response showed one or four keycards. Unlikely as it was that South held only one keycard, Boye made a disciplined sign-off in 5•. He knew that his partner would continue bidding if he had four keycards rather than one. (The situation would have been the same if South had responded 5• with three keycards instead of zero.) Since Erik had four keycards, and nothing else to show, he raised to 6•. Knowing now that he was facing all four aces, Boye was able to bid

the grand slam. He could visualize five spade tricks, five or six clubs, three winners in the red suits and perhaps a heart ruff. Tricks to spare!

It may seem an easy grand to reach but let's see the French auction:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Helgemo	Multon	Helness	Mouiel
	1 🛧	pass	1♠
pass	2♣	pass	3♥
pass	3♠	pass	4♣
pass	4♦	pass	4NT
pass	5♦	pass	57
pass	64	pass	64
all pass			

Asking for the trump queen

A bid in the cheapest nontrump suit asks for the trump queen:

sign-off: no trump queen

new suit: trump Q + side king

5NT: trump Q and no king.

Here it was South who bid RKCB. When partner showed the missing key card (the \bigstar K) he bid 5 \checkmark to ask for the \bigstar Q. North's $6\clubsuit$ showed the trump queen and the \clubsuit K. Mouiel could not be sure of a parking spot for all his heart losers and signed off in $6\clubsuit$, Norway gaining 11 IMPs. You can see how valuable it was for North to bid RKCB rather than South.

5NT TO ASK FOR SIDE-SUIT KINGS

When the 4NT bidder bids 5NT on the next round, this asks for side-suit kings. In the old days, partner would merely indicate how many such kings he held. It is better to indicate which king you hold, showing the lower king when you hold two. Suppose hearts are trumps. A 6 \clubsuit response would show the \clubsuit K and a 6 \checkmark sign-off would deny any side-suit king.

There were several instructive points during the bidding of this deal:



The key bid was Boye's 4Φ response to the takeout double. (At the other table North bid just 3Φ and South's 3NT ended the auction.) If South has a minimum double of 3Ψ , he will hold four cards in spades. With five-card spade support and two useful kings, the North hand is therefore worth a positive move.

Erik Sælensminde asked for keycards. 5NT confirmed that all keycards were held and asked for specific kings. When Boye showed the ◆K, Erik could count eleven tricks. Since two extra tricks in either black suit would bring the total to thirteen, he bid the grand slam in notrump rather than spades. (Suppose West held ◆J9xx. You would still make 7NT if clubs were 3-3.) When the spade suit broke 3-2, 7NT was easily made.

5NT asking for kings

Following a RKCB 4NT with 5NT asks partner to identify a side-suit king. Six of the trump suit will deny any. Otherwise he will bid the suit of his king (the cheaper king if he holds two). At another table, North ended in 7⁺ and West ventured a Lightner Double. South should surely have headed for 7NT after this warning. No, he stuck his ground and the defenders scored the first four tricks, cross-ruffing in hearts and clubs for 1100!

On the deal we have just seen South held two of the three side-suit kings. It therefore did not matter whether partner's response to 5NT identified which king North held or merely stated that he held one unspecified king. On the next deal Erik Sælensminde needed to know which king, if any, Boye held.



Boye's 5 \uparrow response showed two keycards and the \blacklozenge Q. Erik could now visualize a grand slam if South held the \clubsuit K. He continued with 5NT, asking for specific sidesuit kings and was happy to hear the 6 \clubsuit response. Six spade tricks, three top clubs and the red aces would add up to eleven. A diamond ruff or two, not to mention extra club tricks, would surely carry the total to thirteen. He bid 7 \clubsuit , as did Katz and Jacobs at the other table, and the contract was easily made.

Suppose Boye's response to the 5NT enquiry had been 6 \blacklozenge , showing that he held the \blacklozenge K but not the \clubsuit K. North would then be nowhere near to counting thirteen tricks; he would have signed off in 6 \clubsuit . How about a 6 \checkmark response? The \clubsuit K would not be quite as useful as the \clubsuit K because the prospect of extra tricks would be slightly less in that suit. It would still be a good bet to bid the grand slam. Two diamond ruffs, or one ruff and a seventh spade, would again bring the total to thirteen.

ITALIAN CUEBIDS

A few decades back, players made a cuebid only when they held the ace (or void) in the bid suit. 'Otherwise you might end in a slam with two aces missing!' they would say. The Italian Blue team was happy to cuebid on aces, kings, singletons and voids. A big advantage of this method was that a player denied any control in a suit that he bypassed when cuebidding. It became easier to identify when the defenders had two cashable winners in a side suit. On most auctions you can follow such cuebids with 4NT, to check that two aces are not missing.

The bidding on the next deal contains two cuebids, both made on shortages:



Boye offered partner a choice of slams by bidding $6 \blacklozenge$. If partner's diamond cuebid was based on the \blacklozenge A and he held only three low spades, it was possible that diamonds would be a safer slam. How would you play $6 \blacklozenge$ when Geir Helgemo leads the \clubsuit K?

Boye ruffed the club lead and played the ace and jack of trumps, pleased to see a 2-2 break. When he led dummy's $\blacklozenge 6$, Tor Helness defended strongly by following smoothly with a low card. (If he rose with the ace, declarer could throw three hearts

Italian Cuebids

When trumps are agreed, a bid in a new suit (usually at the four-level or higher) is a cuebid, showing interest in a slam. In the popular method known as Italian cuebids, such a bid shows the ace or king of the suit, sometimes a singleton or void. When a suit is bypassed, the bidder shows no control there. from dummy on the established diamonds. He would then ruff two hearts in dummy to bring the total to twelve.) Boye won with the \diamond K and ruffed a diamond. Now came the first big chance of making the contract — the heart finesse. He ran the \blacklozenge Q, losing to West's \blacklozenge K. Boye ruffed the club return and now had to establish the diamonds with only one trump left in dummy. Should he lead the \blacklozenge Q for a ruffing finesse through West or try to ruff down an original \blacklozenge Axx with East?

East was more likely to have held up the A than West, who was sitting over declarer's honors. A bigger clue was available. West had declined to open the bidding and had already shown up with the Kand KQ! Boye ruffed a diamond in dummy and — lo and behold — the A fell from East. Twelve tricks were his.

In slam auctions a problem may be caused by the fact that the control-showing cuebid has to fulfill two roles. It shows a control in the suit bid, yes, but it is also used to tell partner that your hand is suitable for a slam. Do you see why this can cause a problem? If you show a control when your hand is minimum, partner may assume that you have a strong hand. If you do not show the control, he may think there is no control in that suit.

The next deal illustrates one aspect of this dilemma. South does not have a particularly useful hand but he does hold a key control in hearts.



How should South react to North's splinter bid of 4^{R} ? Some players would mutter to themselves: 'My AK is wasted opposite the splinter bid and that leaves me with a virtual 7-count. I have poor trumps too, so I am going to sign off in 4^{R} .'

There are several reasons why this would be a wrong assessment. Firstly, it is generally right to cuebid an ace when you will not be raising the level of the contract. Here you can cuebid 4^{\heartsuit} without carrying the bidding past the game-level. If you held the \P K instead, you would be entitled to decline to cuebid in the suit. Secondly, your \blacklozenge Q may well prove to be a precious card, filling out partner's main suit. Thirdly, your \clubsuit K is not necessarily a wasted value because it may provide a discard from partner's hand if East holds the \clubsuit A.

Erik Sælensminde did cuebid 4 and this was encouragement enough for Boye to bid the slam via RKCB. As you see, the $\diamond Q$ was a very useful card in the play. On some lies of the cards the \bigstar K would have been useful too, providing a heart discard.

REDOUBLING A CUEBID

When you cuebid, alert opponents may take advantage by doubling to suggest a good opening lead. This is not a one-way gain for them since you or your partner will then have the chance to redouble. The meaning of such an action depends on which player redoubles. Look at this deal first:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Grøtheim	Brogeland	Gromov	Sælensminde
	1♦	pass	1♠
pass	1NT	pass	2♦
pass	2♥	pass	3♦
pass	3♥	pass	4♠
pass	5 +	dbl	pass
pass all pass	rdbl	pass	6♦

Redoubling a cuebid

When your partner's cuebid has been doubled, during a slam auction, you can pass to allow him to define his bid more closely. A redouble will indicate first-round control (ace or void). Any other continuation will imply that the control was second-round (king or singleton). When you hold first-round control in that suit, you can redouble yourself. The 1NT rebid showed 12-14 points and Erik Sælensminde's 24 was a game-forcing check-back bid. South's subsequent leap to 4 showed an excellent suit and was a suggestion to play there. Boye did not pass, however. He knew that his partner would not have introduced his diamond support unless there was at least some chance of a high contract in that suit. Since he held three keycards in a hand limited by the weak notrump rebid, it was clear to take one more look at a diamond slam. When Boye cuebid 54. East doubled for a lead. Two passes followed and Boye then redoubled, to tell partner that he held first-round (rather than second-round) control of the club suit. This was enough to persuade Erik to bid the

successful 6◆. If Boye had denied first-round club control, by bidding 5♦ instead of redoubling, this would have ended the auction.

Let's see an example of a redouble by the other player, the cuebidder's partner:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Liggins	Sælensminde	Fawcett	Brogeland
		pass	1♦
pass	1 🎔	pass	2♠
pass	3♦	pass	3NT
pass	4♣	dbl	rdbl
pass	4NT	pass	54
pass	6♦	all pass	

Erik Sælensminde was still interested in a diamond slam over partner's 3NT. His bid of 4⁺ was more informative than 4⁺ would have been, telling partner of his club control. When Fawcett made a lead-directing double of 4⁺ Boye redoubled to show his first-round control. Roman Keycard Blackwood then led to the par contract of 6⁺. How would you play the slam when West leads the 6?

After winning the club lead, Boye made the safety play of cashing the A. This gave up the best chance of picking up the trumps without loss but it avoided the unpleasant second-round guess that would arise if a finesse of the Q lost to the K. Cashing the ace first does not cost you anything if East holds KJx because you can lead towards the Q on the next round.

5NT TELLS PARTNER ALL THE KEYCARDS ARE PRESENT

When you use 5NT to ask for side-suit kings, the contract is already destined for the six-level, at least. The intention behind 5NT is to investigate a grand slam and this implies that all six keycards must be present. When the responder has an unannounced source of extra tricks, he may take up the reins and jump directly to a grand slam. That is what happened on this deal:



Since a rebid of $2 \blacklozenge$ from North would be natural and forcing (a reverse), $3 \blacklozenge$ becomes available as a mini-splinter. In other words, it shows a raise to $3 \clubsuit$ that includes at most one card in diamonds.

With excellent trumps and the ace opposite partner's singleton, Boye showed slam interest with a cuebid of 4♦. Not only did this show the ♦A (he would not cuebid the ♦K opposite a known shortage), it also denied a first- or second-round control in both hearts and clubs. North's 4♥ therefore promised a control in clubs as well as hearts.

Boye continued with RKCB, revealing that North held the two missing aces. His 5NT continuation asked for side-suit kings and also carried this important meaning: 'We hold all the keycards (the four aces and the trump king-queen); feel free to bid a grand if you have a source of tricks.'

Øyvind Saur now had no need to worry about his seven-high trumps. He held both the missing side-suit kings and there was a good chance that the clubs would provide some extra tricks. He leapt to 7, which was easily made. (Two diamonds were ruffed in dummy and the thirteenth club provided a discard for the heart loser.)

SEEKING THE QUEEN OF A SIDE SUIT

Now we will look at another way to investigate a grand slam, following Roman Keycard Blackwood. Below the level of six of the trump suit, you bid a side suit where you are looking for a supporting queen.



RosenbergBrogelandZiaSælensmindepass1♥pass2NTpass3♥pass3NTpass4♥pass4NTpass5♥pass6♦pass7♥all pass	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
pass1♥pass2NTpass3♥pass3NTpass4♥pass4NTpass5♥pass6♦pass7♥all pass	Rosenberg	Brogeland	Zia	Sælensminde
pass2NTpass3♥pass3NTpass4♥pass4NTpass5♥pass6♦pass7♥all pass			pass	1 💙
pass 3NT pass 4♥ pass 4NT pass 5♥ pass 6♦ pass 7♥ all pass	pass	2NT	pass	3♥
pass 4NT pass 5♥ pass 6♦ pass 7♥ all pass	pass	3NT	pass	4♥
pass 6♦ pass 7♥ all pass	pass	4NT	pass	5♥
	pass all pass	6♦	pass	7♥

Boye responded with Jacoby 2NT and Erik's 3^{\heartsuit} showed a minimum hand. 3NT asked for cuebids and 4NT was RKCB, discovering that South held the \heartsuit AK. Boye decided that the \blacklozenge Q in partner's hand would be enough for a grand slam. He passed this message by bidding 6^{\diamondsuit} . Holding the precious \blacklozenge Q, Erik duly bid 7^{\heartsuit} and the contract was easily made.

At the other table the Norwegian East-West disrupted proceedings with an opening bid on the East cards:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Aa	Deutsch	Grøtheim	Soloway
		2♦	pass
37	3NT	all pass	

Glenn Grøtheim's 2◆ opening showed a weak hand containing a major suit of at least four cards. West could tell that North-South almost certainly had a slam somewhere. He responded with a pre-emptive 3♥, asking to play in partner's suit at the three-level. This posed quite a problem for Seymon Deutsch in the North seat. Who can blame him for bidding 3NT? This ended the auction and Norway gained 16 IMPs.

PICK-A-SLAM 5NT

On the next deal heavy bidding from the opponents left Boye short of space to investigate the best slam.


East opened with a 'weak multi'. Espen Lindqvist doubled and West redoubled, asking partner to show his suit. Boye had no good bid to make on the first round. When the bidding returned to him, the opponents had climbed all the way to 4. What could he bid now?

It was not the moment to worry about whether partner held a spade control. For one thing, there was a fair chance that East-West held ten spades between them. Boye chose a 'pick-a-slam' 5NT, just in case partner held a side suit of clubs, and the auction came to a halt in 6.

Allan Livgård led the \clubsuit 6 and Lindqvist misguessed; he rose with dummy's \clubsuit Q, covered by the king and ace. How would you continue?

Lindqvist played all five rounds of trumps and continued with the A and A. East showing out on the second round. West's remaining cards were: J O A B. Lindqvist played the AK and threw West in with the J to give two club tricks to the dummy. A neat recovery!

The pick-a-slam 5NT is a valuable convention, worthy of another example. Boye sat North on this deal:



Boye and Erik frequently upgrade a good 14-point hand to a 15-17 point 1NT opening. The North hand merited such treatment, with its strong five-card suit, two aces and two tens. Erik's 3 was a natural slam try and Boye signed off in 3NT. When Erik persisted with 4 , showing a second suit, Boye was willing to play at the slam level. Uncertain which minor would make the better trump suit, he bid a

pick-a-slam 5NT. Holding six diamonds and only four clubs, it was easy for Erik to bid 6^{\bullet} .

There was some interest in the play, although the favorable lie of the cards meant that any line would succeed. Erik won the spade lead with the ace and played a trump to the ten and ace. After winning the spade continuation with the king, he played the \blacklozenge J. He then reached his hand with the \clubsuit K and played three more rounds of trumps. When he crossed to the \clubsuit A, no \clubsuit J appeared. A third round of clubs to the queen revealed the 3-3 break, so no heart finesse (or heart-club squeeze) was required.

EXCLUSION BLACKWOOD

How can you ask for keycards when you have a void in your hand? The answer is to use Exclusion Blackwood. By bidding a suit at the five-level (instead of 4NT) you show a void and ask partner for keycards not including the ace of your void suit. Boye and Erik used that method here:



Diamonds were agreed as trumps and Erik's leap to 5^{\clubsuit} carried the message: 'I have a heart void. How many keycards do you hold outside hearts?' If Boye had shown one keycard (5NT, showing the A), a further keycard enquiry of 6^{\clubsuit} would have allowed Erik to locate a possible A in the North hand and bid the grand slam. As it was, Boye denied the A and the bidding came to a halt in 6^{\clubsuit} .

RESCUE OPERATIONS

One good measure of a bridge player is how he or she reacts when things go wrong. Perhaps the auction goes adrift and the final contract is a dubious one. Maybe the trump suit or a key side suit breaks badly. In this chapter we will see how a skilful declarer can sometimes manage to survive such hostile circumstances.

We start with an early memory from Boye's bridge career, a 6NT contract that led to a pretty end position:



West led the \mathbf{P} 10, won in the South hand. When Boye played the \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{K} , the 4-1 break came to light. How would you have attempted to rescue the situation?

Boye finessed the \blacklozenge Q successfully and cashed three more heart tricks, West throwing a club. These cards were left:



A club to the queen at this stage, followed by a second spade finesse, would produce only eleven tricks. Instead, Boye led the $\clubsuit K$. West won with the $\clubsuit A$ and could not safely play a diamond or a club. When he chose to exit with the $\bigstar 10$, Boye won with the $\bigstar J$ and played the $\bigstar A$ to squeeze West in the minor suits.

Sometimes a contract seems impregnable until you draw the first round of trumps. An opponent shows out and you then have to make fresh plans. That was the case on this spade game:



Juliano Barbosa was able to lead a heart, despite East's three-bid, and a useful dummy hit the table. Unless trumps broke 4-0, a heart could be thrown on the

third diamond winner and there would be at most three losers: two clubs and a heart. Boye won the first trick with dummy's ♥A and played a trump to the ace, East discarding a heart. How would you continue after this piece of bad news?

With apparently certain losers in both trumps and hearts, it may seem that you will need East to hold the $\mathbf{A}Q$ (he is unlikely to have opened $\mathbf{3}\mathbf{V}$ with a void spade and the $\mathbf{A}A$). Boye saw that he had nothing to lose by playing four rounds of diamonds, hoping that West held four cards in the suit. The Portuguese West duly won the fourth diamond as Boye discarded both his remaining hearts. West now had to choose a black-suit exit. Judging that South was likely to hold the $\mathbf{A}K$, he exited with a trump, conceding a trick in that suit. This would have beaten the contract if East held $\mathbf{A}J10xx$, since West could draw a further round of trumps each time a round of clubs was conceded. Boye's clubs were robust enough to survive this well-intentioned defense and the spade game was made. Only five out of fourteen declarers in the open event managed to make the spade game.

Suppose that Boye's diamond play had misfired, with East holding four diamonds. He would still have been able to make the contract if East held the \blacklozenge Q. For example, he can discard his last heart on the fourth round of diamonds, ruff the \clubsuit K high and continue with queen and another trump. If West rose with the \blacklozenge J and exited to dummy's \blacklozenge 10, this would squeeze East. Needing to retain the \clubsuit Q to guard against North's \clubsuit 5, he would have to reduce to \clubsuit Qx and a single club finesse would then suffice.

It is rare to see a 3 contract in a bridge book, so you may now consider yourself privileged indeed to witness back-to-back 3 contracts! Boye ended in the wrong trump suit on the first one:

E-W Vul.	🕈 AQ1	084	2002 Cap Gemini	Invitation
Dealer South	♥ KQ8 ♦ A85 ♣ K	6	The Hague, Nethe	rlands
 ◆ KJ963 ◆ J54 ◆ K643 ◆ 4 	 <i>N</i> <i>W</i> <i>E</i> <i>S</i> <i>Q</i> J 10 <i>Q</i> J 10 <i>Q</i> 7 5 	↑ ↑	7 5 A 3 9 7 A Q J 10 8 6 3	
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
	Sælensminde		Brogeland pass	
pass	1♠	3♣	pass	
pass all pass	dbl	pass	3♦	

Would you bid 3◆ or 3♥ on Boye's cards? North would have re-opened with a double with his red-suit lengths reversed, so it seems very much a guess. West led his singleton club to East's ♠A and back came the ♣Q. Fortunately for Boye, West did not find the best discard on this — he threw the ♥4 instead of a spade. How would you continue the play from this point?

Boye ruffed in the dummy and led the \forall K to East's ace, unblocking the \forall 9 from his hand. The heart return went to West's jack and dummy's queen. Prospects were still poor but Boye soldiered on with ace and another diamond, West winning the queen with the king. These cards remained:



West exited with a low spade and Boye had to calculate which card to play from dummy. He needed six out of the last seven tricks and had no side-suit entry to the South hand to draw West's trumps. With a trump trick to be lost, he calculated that he would have to score two trumps, one heart, and three spade tricks! 'Ten of spades, please, partner.'

Dummy's 10 won the trick. Boye reached his hand with a spade ruff and played his last trump, throwing a spade from dummy. When he turned to his heart winners, West could discard on the 10 but then had to ruff the second heart (otherwise Boye would reach dummy with the 8 and score the A for his ninth trick). On lead with only the KJ9 remaining, West had to lead a spade into dummy's AQ and the contract was made.

Before we move to the next deal, think back to the moment when Boye unblocked the $\P9$ from his hand. Had he retained the $\P109$ as his last two hearts, West could have discarded spades on the hearts. Declarer would be unable to reach the A and the defenders would score a club and West's last trump to beat the contract!

The second 3♦ contract comes from the world's top individual event — a type of tournament where the contestants change partners every few boards. How would you have tackled this one?



West led the \clubsuit 3 and Boye captured East's \blacklozenge 9 with the \clubsuit K. What would you have done next?

Boye could be fairly sure from the bidding that West's distribution was 2-5-2-4. (The spade lead could not be a singleton or East would have opened 1.) The percentage play in trumps, looking at the suit in isolation, was to cross to the ace and finesse the jack. Even if he managed to pick up the trump suit, however, there would still be a danger of losing two spades, two clubs and one heart (because there would be no entry to dummy to take the heart finesse).

Boye decided to take the second-best line in trumps, playing the king and ace. If West's doubleton trump included the queen, he would not only pick up the trump suit but also end in dummy to finesse the $\mathbf{\nabla}Q$. Sadly, the $\mathbf{\diamond}Q$ did not fall and prospects looked bleak. Would you have seen any chance to rescue the situation?

Unwilling to give up, Boye called for the \clubsuit 8. East, who could have scuttled the contract by covering with the \clubsuit 10, played low. Boye did the same and dummy's \clubsuit 8 won the trick! Since he was still in dummy, he was able to take a successful heart finesse. The contract was his.

Perhaps you are unimpressed by this and are muttering to yourself that any respectable East player would have seen the need to cover the \clubsuit 8. Oh yes? East was Italy's multiple world champion, Norberto Bocchi!

Prospects did look good initially on our next deal, a borderline club slam. A closer look revealed that there was more than one way to rescue the slam contract.



How do you rate your chances when the $\blacklozenge3$ is led?

If dummy's A is won by East's A, you will have a discard for your heart loser on the Q. The only chance of avoiding a spade loser will be for the Q to fall in two rounds. You would still need to make plans for your fourth spade — either by discarding it on the thirteenth heart, or by ruffing it if the defender with the Qxheld only two trumps. Not so promising. Can you see a better chance?

Boye saw that he had little to lose by playing the 4 from dummy on the first trick. If the lead was from the J, East would have to put on his ace. If instead East held the AJ and played the jack, declarer would still be able to set up one diamond trick by taking a ruffing finesse later. When Boye played a low diamond from dummy, East won with the A and switched to a low heart. What now?

Boye won with the \P A, played the \clubsuit A and tested the spades by playing the ace and king. If the \clubsuit Q had fallen doubleton, there would have been twelve easy tricks. Only spot cards appeared, however. Boye cashed the \P K, everyone following, and crossed to dummy with the \clubsuit Q. He then discarded a heart on the \clubsuit K and ruffed a heart high. Hearts were 3-3! He returned to dummy with the \clubsuit K and discarded both his spade losers, one on the \blacklozenge Q and the other on the thirteenth heart.

On the next deal a finesse for the \mathbf{A} seemed to be a 99% shot after East's opening bid. Yes, but the favorite does not always romp home.



Boye won the \blacklozenge Q lead with the \blacklozenge K and crossed to the \blacklozenge 10 to take the 'marked finesse' in diamonds. Not so marked on this occasion — East had opened on only 10 points and the finesse lost to the king. East won the spade continuation with the ace and cleared the spade suit. How would you play from this point?

Boye cashed one more round of diamonds, to see if the \diamond 10 would fall. To play another round of diamonds, hoping for a 3-3 break, would result in defeat. Instead, Boye switched back to the club suit. This was the position with one club still to be played:



Boye led the \clubsuit K, throwing dummy's \P 4, and East was squeezed in three suits. To retain his diamond guard, he had to discard a spade winner. No guess was now required. Boye played the \P 8 to the bare \P A and discarded the \clubsuit 4 when East

cashed his remaining spade. East had to exit with a diamond and the \bullet J and \forall K scored the last two tricks for declarer.

Moving on, we look at a deal where bad red-suit breaks put 3NT at risk.



Boye won the spade lead with the king and played a diamond to the jack. East won with the ace and returned a spade, West winning with the ace and clearing the suit. On the third round of spades, both East and South discarded a club. How would you have continued the play from this point?

Boye crossed to his A and ran the $\P10$ into the safe East hand. If East had won, everything would have been easy. No, this was the Vanderbilt and East withheld the \PQ . When the $\P9$ was run next, West threw a spade and East again held up the queen, hoping to restrict declarer to three heart tricks.

Thwarted in the heart suit, Boye played the \blacklozenge Q next. The suit failed to divide 3-3, East discarding a club, and these cards remained:



The tide turned when Boye played the \forall K. What card could West afford? Not a diamond, clearly. If he threw a spade winner instead, declarer would be able to set up a diamond trick, winning the last two tricks with the A and 4. West therefore had to throw the 9.

There was no future in setting up a ninth trick in diamonds now but Boye turned his attention to the other defender, continuing with the A and J. East won with the Q and scored a second club trick. Then, at Trick 13, he had to lead a heart to dummy's stranded ace. After a fine effort by all the players the game had been landed.

On the next deal the defenders had a chance to beat Boye as he tried to rescue an apparently doomed 3NT contract. See if you can spot the defenders' mistake as the play is described.



At the other table, the USA North passed and Tor Helness opened $1 \clubsuit$ on the East cards. Lew Stansby (South) came to rest in $2 \clubsuit$, just making for +110. A large number of IMPs were available if Boye could somehow make nine tricks in his unlikely looking notrump game.

Alan Sontag led the \forall 3 to partner's ace and Peter Weichsel returned the \forall 8 to West's \forall Q. There was little point in clearing the heart suit and West switched to the \blacklozenge 10, won by East with his \blacklozenge Q. How would you have tried to give yourself a chance in 3NT when East returns the \blacklozenge 8 to dummy's bare ace?

Boye crossed to the A and cashed the V, stripping East of his safe exit card in that suit. He then led the J to East's K. Weichsel, sitting East, had to find the best return in this end position:



A club into dummy's ♣KJ did not look very inviting, so Weichsel returned a low diamond. Boye ran this successfully to dummy's ♠J and discarded his remaining low diamond on the ♣K. His hand was then high — two spades and two diamonds — and the game was made.

Did you spot how the defense could have done better? In the six-card end position shown, East must exit with the \mathbf{A} rather than a low diamond. Declarer can win with the \mathbf{A} , cash two spades and cross to the \mathbf{A} to score the \mathbf{A} . He would then have to surrender the last trick to East's \mathbf{A} for one down.

Boye faced two problems on the next deal. The trump suit was somewhat inadequate and the defenders were threatening to score a club ruff. No genie in a bottle was available for assistance, so he had to rescue the situation himself.



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Sælensminde		Brogeland
		pass	pass
37	dbl	pass	3♠
pass	4♠	all pass	

How would you play the spade game when West leads the \$4?

Let's see first what happened at the other table, after the same lead. Declarer won with the $\mathbf{\Phi}Q$ and finessed the $\mathbf{\Phi}Q$, losing to the $\mathbf{\Phi}K$. West ruffed the $\mathbf{\Phi}10$ return and underled the $\mathbf{\Psi}A$ to put East on lead for a second club ruff. That was one down.

Boye won the club lead in the dummy and led a heart, breaking the link between the two defenders. East rose with the \forall K and gave his partner a club ruff. West then tried to cash the \forall A but Boye ruffed in his hand. A trump to the queen now would result in a second ruff, but Boye played a trump to the ace. He then returned to his hand with the \diamond K to lead a second round of trumps. This line would succeed whether West had started with \diamond K84 or \diamond J84. As the cards lay, the jack, queen and king appeared on the second round of trumps. Boye ruffed the heart return with the \diamond 9 and crossed to the \diamond A to draw East's last trump. Dummy was then high.

Boye reached a fairly awful slam on the deal below. West breathed some life into the contract with a helpful opening lead but there was still some work to do. How would you have played it?

Both Vul. Dealer North	 ▲ K J 9 ♥ K 5 4 3 ♦ K 6 5 3 ▲ A 10 	2003 Icelandair Open Reykjavik
 ◆ 5 ◆ A J 7 6 ◆ J 10 9 8 ◆ 9 6 5 4 	$\begin{bmatrix} N \\ W \\ S \end{bmatrix}$	 ♦ 862 ♥ 1082 ♦ Q72 ♦ KJ87
	 A Q 10 / 4 ♥ Q 9 ♦ A 4 ♥ Q 3 2 	3

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Zia		Brogeland
	1♦	pass	2♠
pass	3♠	pass	4♠
pass	6♠	all pass	

The Icelandic West led the ♥A and down went the dummy. On any other lead prospects would have been dismal indeed. How would you take advantage of this favorable start when West switches to the ♠5 at Trick 2?

There was no reason whatsoever to think that West would switch away from the \clubsuit K. Boye rose with the \clubsuit A and drew two rounds of trumps with the ace and queen, West showing out on the second round. He cashed the \P Q, crossed to dummy with a third round of trumps and discarded a club on the \P K.

Do you see the ending that Boye had in mind? Only one defender guarded the fourth round of hearts; only one defender held a guard against South's $\mathbf{P}Q$. If West held the $\mathbf{V}J$ and East held the $\mathbf{F}K$, neither defender would be able to retain a diamond guard when the remaining trumps were run.

Boye returned to his hand with the A and played two more rounds of trumps. These cards were still to be played:



This is the classic matrix of the double squeeze. When the 4 was led, West had to release the 10 to retain his heart guard. The 5 was thrown from dummy and East was caught in a similar dilemma. Whether he threw the K or a diamond, declarer would have his twelfth trick.

'You played it well,' said Zia. 'But next time, please, another king for your 2 \clubsuit bid!'

THERE'S NO JUSTICE!

In this chapter we will look at some championship deals where good play or good bidding was not rewarded on the scorecard. While this may seem unfair at the time, many people regard bridge as containing the perfect balance between skill and luck.

On the first deal Erik Sælensminde was in 3NT and had to calculate the best play to bring in dummy's long diamond suit.



Rose Meltzer led the \blacklozenge 5, Sælensminde winning with the \blacklozenge J. When a diamond was played to dummy's king, West followed with the \blacklozenge 2 and East with the \blacklozenge 10. What play should you make on the next round of diamonds?

Perhaps you think that it is obvious to continue with the \mathbf{Q} , pinning East's \mathbf{J} . In a typical club game you might well be right. In a world final, however, you can expect East to falsecard an honor from J10x. Indeed, if he fails to do so you

would have no guess in the suit; your only chance would be to lead a low card on the second round and this would bring down West's bare A.

Suppose East plays the $\diamond 10$ and you continue with a low diamond on the second round; you will make the contract when East began with $\diamond J102$ or $\diamond J105$ (two combinations). If instead you continue with the $\diamond Q$, you will succeed only when East holds $\diamond J10$ (one combination). Sælensminde duly continued with a low diamond — the percentage play. No justice on this occasion! East's $\diamond J$ won the trick and the game went three down.

The diamond situation is an example of the Principle of Restricted Choice. If West holds A5 or A2, she has no choice with her play; she must contribute the low card on the first round. From a holding of A52, she can choose which spotcard to play. Restricted Choice states that it is more likely that a card was played because its owner had no choice than that the card was chosen from equals.

When you have two possible trump suits available — one a 5-4 fit, the other a 4-4 fit — it is not always easy to decide which to choose. How would you and your partner have bid these hands?



Boye's 2♦ was a standard transfer bid, showing at least five hearts, and East's double showed something good in diamonds. Erik's transfer break to 3♣ showed a useful heart fit and a strong four-card suit in clubs. West preempted in diamonds and Boye then bid a small slam in clubs.

Do you see what an excellent contract 6^{-} is? Even if the club finesse loses, you can discard your spade loser on the fifth round of hearts and make the slam. No fewer than 14 pairs in this event bid the small slam in hearts instead, a contract that

would fail if West held the \clubsuit K. There's no justice! East held the \clubsuit K and the heart slam rolled home. The few virtuous pairs who had bid the better contract of $6\clubsuit$ paid out a few IMPs instead of gaining a large bundle.

On the next deal Boye and Zia Mahmood turned a blind eye to their 5-3 spade fit, preferring to play in notrump with a diamond holding of single \bullet J opposite \bullet 765. Would you expect this to result in a great score — after a diamond lead? You never know. Let's take a look.



West led the 10 and Zia did not like the look of dummy. East scored the two top honors in the suit and switched to the 3. Zia perked up a bit at this reprieve. He won with the A and played a club to the king. East ducked the first round of clubs and won the second. He then exited with the 9, won in the dummy as West showed out.

Zia's next move was to lead dummy's \P 8, which East does best to duck. Declarer would still arrive at eight tricks, since East would have to give him a third heart trick at the end. East decided to win with the \P K. Zia won the club return, discarding the \P J. He then unblocked the \P A and crossed to the \P K to enjoy three more heart tricks. That was +150 and a matchpoint score of 114 out of 130, contributing to an eventual win in the event.

Suppose the Q and K had been swapped on that last deal. The bidding would have been just the same but the defenders would have scored seven diamonds, one heart and one club. Four down!

Boye found a great defensive play on the next deal. The opponents had stayed low, however, so only overtricks were at stake.



North's 2[•] was Drury, showing a good heart raise, and East's double was leaddirecting. Playing third and fifth leads, Boye led the [•]6 to the queen and ace. Helgemo drew trumps in four rounds and led the [•]9. What are your thoughts now, sitting West?

If West plays low, declarer will run the 49 successfully. He continues with the A and 10, overtaking with dummy's jack, and can then throw two black-suit losers on the remaining diamonds for +680. Boye had no difficulty in reading the diamond position. He covered the 49 with the Q! Declarer had to win with dummy's K or the defenders would cash two club tricks. The diamonds were now blocked and Helgemo made only three diamond tricks instead of five, scoring +620.

You might fondly hope to pick up a couple of IMPs with a smart defense like that but at the other table Boye's team mates, Fantoni and Nunes, reached 6 after North had opened the bidding. Claudio Nunes sneaked through the 49, early in the play, and scored up his slam with five hearts, five diamonds and the two black aces.

It's time for a bidding problem and we will give you this hand held by Tony Forrester, sitting North in the 2002 Life Master Pairs:

♠AK1086 ♥6543 ♦6 ♣A85

With only the opponents vulnerable, the bidding starts like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
	Forrester		Brogeland	
			1♦	
pass	1♠	27	3♦	
3♥	dbl	pass	4♥	
pass	Ś			

Your second-round double is for takeout and partner responds with a cuebid of 4♥. What will you bid now?

Forrester placed Boye with great diamonds. The opponents' bidding, along with the $4 \forall$ bid, meant that Boye would hold at most one heart and maybe a void. Forrester bid $6 \blacklozenge$, on his singleton diamond, with every expectation that this would be a good contract. The next player doubled and this was the full layout:



East's Lightner double requested an unusual lead, often in dummy's first-bid suit. It was not difficult for West to find the spade lead. East ruffed and cashed the ♥A successfully. That was one down and poor reward for North-South's splendid bidding sequence. Boye and Tony finished third in the event and were left wishing that they had not bid this hand so well!

One good diamond slam deserves another and this time it was Boye's opponents who reached the top spot.



Espen Lindqvist's 2 \diamond showed length in an undisclosed major and Boye's redouble asked partner to identify his major. The American women, Tobi Sokolow and Janice Molson, wasted no time in reaching the superb contract of 6 \diamond . How would you give this the best chance when West leads the \diamond K?

Sokolow won the spade lead and laid down the A. (A failing trump finesse would result in immediate defeat, while other chances were available. Also, West's overcall suggested that he would hold the A.) Both defenders followed to the first round of diamonds but the king did not fall.

Declarer now needed to dispose of her spade loser. She played three rounds of clubs, hoping to throw a spade. If West held a doubleton club, he might have to ruff with the A and all would then be well. It was Boye in the East seat who held only two clubs. He ruffed with the A, the last outstanding low trump. Declarer overruffed, crossed to the A and ruffed a club in her hand to establish dummy's last club. It remained only to cross to a heart to discard the spade on dummy's thirteenth club. When Sokolow led a second round of hearts, however, West ruffed with the A and cashed the A. This was justice at its very harshest. After some excellent bidding and some equally good play, declarer was one down.

The board became all the more galling when it transpired that this was the bidding at the matching table:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Freeman	Svendsen	Hampson	Helness
			1NT
2♣	dbl	2♥	3♦
pass	4♦	all pass	

Jan-Petter Svendsen thought his 4 bid was forcing. (He could not play safe by bidding the opponents' suit because West's major suit had not been disclosed.) Helness took the view that 4 was invitational. It was lucky indeed for the European team to win the board after such an auction.

Look back at the full diagram. In another match there was no swing on the board; both tables went five down in 6NT!

How often will you hold a 7-6-0-0 hand? The chance of picking up such a shape is around 18,000-to-1 against. The fact that this book contains three such hands held by Boye and Erik Sælensminde at championship level, plus a fourth held by their opponents, tells you that they play a huge amount of bridge. How would you have bid the South cards here?



Erik's 5NT showed two places to play. He would have bid 6^{\clubsuit} with a major twosuiter, so Boye could infer that he held diamonds and a major. Boye bid 6^{\heartsuit} , with nothing to lose, and was not surprised to hear the correction to 6^{\clubsuit} . How would you play this contract when West leads the \clubsuit K?

With diamonds breaking 3-2 and the \bigstar K onside, perhaps you think that there is little to the play. (After ruffing the club lead, you can simply play a low trump

towards dummy's queen.) Erik did not play this way. He ruffed the club lead in his hand, cashed the A and ruffed a diamond with the A, all following. He then ran the Q. West won with the A and returned the J. East chose not to ruff this card because he knew that his J could not be caught. Erik had to lose a trump trick and he was one down.

Why did Erik play this way? West had opened with a non-vulnerable preempt, so East was favorite to hold the AK. By running the AQ through East, declarer would make the slam when East held AK, AKJ, AKX, AKJX, AKXX, AKJXX or AKXXX. That is fifteen combinations. He would succeed also when the AQ lost to the AK but the AJ fell on the second round (unless West could give East a diamond ruff). Leading low to the AQ instead would win against a similar number of combinations, mostly with West holding the AK. West was less likely to hold the AK, however, so it is not an even comparison. In addition to that, Erik would have made the contract some of the time when diamonds broke 4-1. When the preemptor held a singleton diamond, for example, he would not have been able to ruff effectively in front of the dummy. Declarer could establish the diamond suit by ruffing with the AS and then run the AQ.

So, Erik took the best line and, as a result, went off in a slam that his grandmother would have made easily. Mind you, she would probably have bid 6 instead of 5NT!

In the Danish town of Odense in 2000 a special bridge match was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of contract bridge. The match was between Denmark and the 'Rest of the World'. Boye was declarer on this slam hand:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Jens Auken	Zia	Sabine Auken	Brogeland	
2♥	dbl	37	4♠	
pass	57	pass	5♠	
pass	5NT	pass	64	
all pass				

At the other table Helgemo had opened 3 on the West cards and the bidding went 3 or 4 or 4. With spades 3-3 and the 4 onside, all thirteen tricks were made. So, Boye would pick up a useful swing if he could make 6.

Boye won the diamond lead with the jack and ruffed the \P 8 in dummy. The A and AK brought the good news that trumps were 3-2. A successful spade finesse would now produce twelve tricks but (unfortunately for him!) Boye had noticed that he could also make the slam if West held the AK. He cashed the \P A and ruffed the \P J in dummy. Boye then turned to the diamond suit. West could not ruff any of these since he would then have to play a spade into declarer's tenace or concede a ruff-and-sluff. When Jens Auken refused to ruff three times, this strengthened Boye's view that he might hold the AK. These cards remained:



On dummy's last diamond Boye threw the 6 and West the 9. (If he discarded the K instead, he would be thrown in with a trump). Expecting that he had squeezed West down to a bare K, Boye played a spade to his ace. Would this deal travel round the world's bridge magazines? No. To Boye's great disappointment it was only a humble 7 that appeared from West. Another grandmother-proof contract had bitten the dust.

When the last round of the 2010 Copenhagen Invitational started, Erik Sælensminde and Boye were lying second, facing Poland's fourth-placed Jassem and Martens. The prize money went down to third place and the Norwegian pair could afford to lose this match by 17 IMPs, but not 18, to come in the money. Boye will take up the story:

We had a terrible start to the 10-board match and were down 35 IMPs halfway through. I was desperate to create a swing when I picked up these cards for Board 6:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Martens	Sælensminde	Jassem	Brogeland
pass	1 🖤	dbl	Ś

We were non-vulnerable; the Poles were vulnerable. What would you have done to pick up some much-needed IMPs?

Hoping that the opponents had a vulnerable game, I decided to redouble — showing 10+ points and normally looking for blood! Martens passed, my partner did the same, and Jassem bid 2. What now?

I could hope that my redouble had done the trick. I didn't see them ending up in 2, though, so I followed up my initial redouble with a double for penalties! I hoped West would bid 2, and it would go two passes to me, so I could finally put a green Pass card on the table. Martens bid 2, asking partner to choose a black suit, and Jassem bid 2. I couldn't do much else than pass for now — forcing — and it looked like we were heading for trouble.

Martens passed, and Erik, probably disappointed that I couldn't double 2^{\pm} , bid 3^{\pm} . I passed, and Martens did the same. We had escaped! This was the layout:



Erik went two down in 34, losing 100, which looked like a great result as our opponents were cold for a vulnerable spade game.

all pass

34

pass

Did large wads of Danish kroner end up in our suitcases as a result? Sadly, no. Three of the eight E/W pairs had soared into 6, going down because of the 5-2 diamond split. We picked up only 5 IMPs on the board and were overtaken by the Poles in the final rankings. No glory, no prize money, but a thrilling ride it sure was!

INTERESTING BIDDING TREATMENTS

In this chapter we will look at various bidding treatments that have served Boye handsomely over the years. One real-life example of a particular method faring well may not be enough to convince you to use it, we realize. Still, you may find something that catches your eye.

SHOWING A MAJOR-SUIT RAISE

We look first at the important area of responding to one of a major when you have a good fit for partner. Suppose your partner opens $1 \checkmark$ or $1 \clubsuit$ and you respond $3 \clubsuit$ or $3 \blacklozenge$. What meaning do you assign to these bids? A popular method is Bergen Raises, where these bids indicate a four-card raise in a hand of a particular strength. Boye prefers to use mini-splinter bids, showing a limit raise with a shortage in the bid suit. This allows the opener to judge how well the two hands fit. Here is the method in action, using Boye's system at that time:



Judging the South cards to be too strong for a 15-17 point 1NT, Erik Sælensminde opened 1. Boye's 3. response carried the message: 'We may be able to make game in spades if you have a particularly good fit for my diamond singleton.' Erik's diamond holding then allowed him to bid game — despite the unpromising holding in hearts, the suit bid by East.

At the other table, South did open 1NT, followed by two passes. Terje Aa bid 2 on the East cards, promising six cards in one of the majors. South was reluctant to bid 2 immediately and must have been disappointed when 2 was passed out and made with two overtricks!

Players refine their systems over the years. When partner opens 1, these are the fit-showing responses that Boye now favors:

27	natural
2♠	shortage in a minor, invitational, 2NT asks for shortage
2NT	Jacoby, game-forcing
34	game-try, usually balanced
3♦	shortage in spades, invitational
3 🕈	preemptive
3♠, 4♣, 4♦	void-showing

As you see, you can discover that partner has a side-suit void, rather than a singleton. Traditional splinter responses do not allow this distinction. Here is an example of the void-showing responses:



What should Boye bid on the second round? In a bidding competition you might take a scientific route, cuebidding 4 to show a diamond control but no club control. On this particular deal you would then stop in 4 and pick up 10 points for your scholarly efforts. At the table, life is different. It was likely that North held a club control. Even if that were not the case, a helpful opening lead might allow the slam to make. Boye therefore bid Roman Keycard Blackwood. When he heard of one ace opposite, he bid the slam. When West missed the club lead, choosing a trump, Boye made the contract easily.

The responses to $1 \triangleq$ are similar to those after a $1 \clubsuit$ opening: $3 \clubsuit$ shows the shortage in a minor and $3 \blacklozenge$ is invitational; $4 \clubsuit / 4 \blacklozenge / 4 \blacktriangledown$ show a void.

CONTINUATIONS AFTER A JACOBY 2NT RESPONSE

The use of the Jacoby 2NT response to show a game-forcing raise of $1 \checkmark$ or $1 \blacklozenge$ is widespread nowadays. The value of such a convention lies in the continuations. Look up the basic version of Jacoby in some book intended for improving players and you could easily be unimpressed. $1 \blacklozenge - 2NT - 3 \blacklozenge$ shows a singleton diamond, the book may learnedly inform you, and $1 \blacklozenge - 2NT - 4 \blacklozenge$ shows a good five-card diamond suit. Yes, but that is not much use when you have little idea of the opener's strength!

Boye uses a scheme where a side-suit rebid at the three-level is natural and shows a non-minimum, non-flat hand. (When the opener has six trumps, the side suit may be of only three cards.). Partner can then ask for a shortage with three of the major or he can bid 3NT as a general try. Typically, 3NT shows 14-15 points and values in both possible singleton suits.

Let's see an example of this style of Jacoby 2NT:



Erik Sælensminde's Jacoby 2NT showed at least four-card heart support and was game-forcing. Boye's 3♣ was natural and showed an unbalanced, non-minimum hand. 3♥ asked for shortage and 3NT shows 2-5-2-4 shape (or possibly 2-6-2-3). On a hand that was at the bottom end of non-minimum, Boye could have bid 4♥ over 3♥, so 3NT was another all-so-important indication of playing strength. Erik's 4♣ was a cuebid and 4♥ a sign-off. With a stronger hand, Boye could have bid 4♦ instead — a 'last train' slam try, not saying anything about a diamond control.

North continued with 5, which carried the message 'I am still interested in a slam but I do not have a spade control.' Boye would have signed off without a spade control in his hand. His actual 5, showed a spade control but said nothing about his diamond holding.

That is how the Jacoby 2NT should be used — as a springboard for the exchange of information. How would you play the slam when West leads the AJ?

It is possible that West is leading from AKJ10x and some players would try their luck with dummy's AQ, intending to rely on a subsequent diamond finesse if East produced the AK. Since it was much more likely that East held the AK, Boye played low from dummy and won with the AA. He drew trumps in two rounds and continued with the three top clubs. If the suit had broken 3-3 he would have discarded dummy's penultimate spade on the 13th club and exited in spades, hoping to endplay East. (This was the reason for playing low at Trick 1.) When diamonds failed to break, Boye tried a spade to the queen anyway since this would endplay East if he had started with AKx. It would also set up a diamond discard if, unexpectedly, West had led from the AKJ10. East won with the AK and exited safely with a spade. A subsequent diamond finesse succeeded and the slam was made.

At the other table Roy Welland played in 6NT on the North cards. He won the diamond lead with the queen, crossed to a heart and led the \blacklozenge 9. When West covered with the \blacklozenge 10, he concluded that East held the \clubsuit K and held back his \blacklozenge Q. He won the diamond return and eventually relied on a 3-3 club break or a squeeze in the black suits (four clubs lying with the \clubsuit K). This line failed and Norway gained 17 IMPs.

2NT RELAY AFTER A RAISE BY OPENER

Let's look at something different now. When the bidding starts 1 - 1 - 2 +, the opener has shown a minimum-range hand with three or four spades. (In some parts of the world four cards are needed for a raise by the opener, but that is not a method that we recommend.) How can responder discover more about partner's hand? The answer is to use 2NT as a relay bid.

After a start of 1♥ - 1♠; 2♠ - 2NT, the opener rebids along these lines:

34:	3-5-1-4 shape
3 ♦ :	3-5-4-1
3♥:	3-5-3-2 or 3-5-2-3, minimum
3 4 :	4-5-2-2, minimum
3NT:	3-5-3-2 or 3-5-2-3, maximum
4 ♣ :	4-5-3-1
4 \ :	4-5-1-3
4♠ :	4-5-2-2, maximum

So, three-level bids in a new suit show three-card support and four cards in the suit bid. Four-level bids show four-card support and a shortage. If responder bids 3⁺ at his third turn, this shows only game-try values.

The 2NT relay bid made life easy on this slam deal from the Norway-Turkey match in the 2008 European Championship:

 ♠ AK 10985 ♥ K ♦ 1075 ♣ AK9 	N W S	 ▲ (♥ A ♦ (♦ (♦ (Q J 7 A J 10 8 3 Q Q 8 7 3
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Lindqvist		Brogeland	
		1♥	pass
1♠	pass	2♠	pass
2NT	pass	3♣	pass
3♦	pass	3♠	pass
4NT	pass	5♣	pass
5♦	pass	6♠	all pass

Espen Lindqvist bid 2NT to discover more about Boye's hand. The $3^{\text{+}}$ response was good news, indicating four clubs and a singleton diamond. He bid $3^{\text{+}}$ to set spades as trumps ($3^{\text{+}}$ would have been only a game-try, remember) and continued with 4NT. Over the one-ace response he continued with $5^{\text{+}}$ to ask about the queen of trumps. Without this card, Boye would have signed off in $5^{\text{+}}$, which would become the final contract. Holding the trump queen, but no king in the side suits, Boye jumped to $6^{\text{+}}$.

As you see, the key to the hand was East's singleton diamond opposite West's three spot cards. Suppose East's minors had been swapped and he had bid 3 • over the 2NT relay. The bidding would then have stopped in game — high enough when there might well be three losers in diamonds.

THREE-LEVEL RESPONSES TO 1NT

When partner opens 1NT what meaning do you assign to a three-level response, such as 3? For many years Boye has used such responses to show a shortage, opening the possibility of a minor-suit contract when the short suit is underprotected. The method worked well on this deal:



When Boye showed short hearts, Erik Sælensminde knew that 3NT would not be the right game. With the perfect fit in hearts, ace opposite the singleton, a slam might be possible if partner was strong. Erik therefore rebid 4^{\clubsuit} . Boye had no wish to play in a slam and signed off in his lowest playable suit, the bidding coming to a halt in 5.

Boye won the \mathbf{V} K opening lead and drew trumps. When he played the \mathbf{V} K, West followed with the \mathbf{Q} . What should declarer do on the next round of diamonds? Looking at the diamond suit in isolation, the Principle of Restricted Choice states that a singleton \mathbf{Q} or \mathbf{Q} is twice as likely as a holding of \mathbf{Q} J. By finessing the \mathbf{Q} on the second round, whenever the queen or jack appears from West, you will pick up the diamond suit two times out of three. There is a secondary issue here, however. If you play the \mathbf{A} on the second round and find that West began with \mathbf{Q} J, you will definitely make the contract; you can discard two spades from dummy on the diamonds and ruff a spade for your eleventh trick. If instead you finesse the \mathbf{A} on use the spade tricks in that case, as you fight your way back to dummy for a second diamond finesse. Suppose the spade honors are split and you finesse the \mathbf{A} , losing to East's \mathbf{A} . He will force your last trump with a heart and West will cash some hearts when he rises with the \mathbf{A} .

It was a close decision and Boye decided to follow Restricted Choice, finessing the \bullet 10 to West's \bullet J. West duly switched to a spade, putting declarer to a guess. With little to guide him, Boye made the happy choice to call for dummy's \bullet J. This forced the \bullet A and the club game was made.

3NT RESPONSE TO A 24 OPENING

Sometimes you add a gadget to your card and have to wait a very long time for an opportunity to use it. Boye likes to play that a 3NT response to a strong 2⁺ shows a solid suit somewhere. One advantage of the method is that the strong hand can then play the contract. Is Boye still waiting to use this wonderful bidding weapon? No, indeed...



With the ◆K protected from the opening lead, 6♥ was safe. What would have happened if North had played the contract instead? Any self-respecting East would have underled the ◆A. The only chance, isn't it?!

FIND THE LADY

Many a contract depends on locating a missing queen and there are few areas of the game where experts have a greater edge over non-experts. In this chapter we will look at several deals where success depended on reading which defender held a vital queen.

The time-honored method for deciding such matters is to gain as much information as possible on the lie of the other suits. Boye followed this well-beaten track on our first deal:



Erik Sælensminde's Jacoby 2NT showed a game-forcing raise in spades and Boye's $4\clubsuit$ rebid indicated a singleton or void club. Erik used Roman Keycard Blackwood to discover that South held one keycard (the \bigstar K), also the \bigstar Q and the \bigstar K. How would you play the slam when West leads the \bigstar 3?
Boye played low in the dummy, ruffing East's $\clubsuit 9$. A heart to the ace was followed by the $\bigstar A$, for a diamond discard. When a trump was played to the king, West ducked. He won the trump continuation and exited with a third round of trumps to dummy's jack. East, meanwhile, discarded a club, a diamond and another club. All followed to the $\clubsuit K$ and a heart ruff in dummy. A club ruff then brought down East's $\bigstar K$.

Boye's last four cards were the ♠Q and the ♠K74. Dummy held the ♣J and ♠AJ10. Still unwilling to commit himself in diamonds, Boye played his last trump, throwing the ♣J from dummy. Both defenders discarded a heart honor on this trick. What evidence had emerged? East was known to have started with no spades, four hearts and at least five clubs. His early discard of a diamond suggested that he had started with 0-4-4-5 shape. Indeed, if his clubs were headed by the ♣KQ9, he would surely have played an honor at Trick 1. East had started with four diamonds to West's two and was therefore a 2-to-1 favorite to hold the missing ♠Q. Boye duly finessed East for the missing queen and made the slam. The Chinese declarer played the slam similarly and no swing resulted.

On our next deal Boye faced Italian world champions, Lauria and Versace. His slam contract depended on finding the \clubsuit Q.



Look at the bidding first. What sort of hand would you expect South to hold for his 5♥ bid?

When the vulnerability is adverse, South should have a hand where he expects to make 5^{\clubsuit} . Odin Svendsen was confident that Boye would hold a good heart suit. It was also clear from the East-West bidding that South would hold at most one spade. He raised to 6^{\clubsuit} and that ended the bidding.

Alfredo Versace cashed the A and switched to the 10. How would you play the contract?

All depended on picking up the club suit. If West held 109, East's queen would fall on the second round. If instead West held 2109, declarer would have to finesse on the second round. Boye won the first round of clubs with dummy's ace and drew trumps, noting that West held only one trump. To gain as much information as possible, he next played the 4, 4, and 2. East followed with the 4, 5 and 8; West played the 2, 6 and J. All now depended on who held the 10. If West held it, his shape was 6-1-4-2 and the 2 would drop. If East held it, West's shape would be 6-1-3-3 and a club finesse would be necessary.

It may seem that Restricted Choice applied to West's cards in the diamond suit. If you play him for three diamonds whenever he plays the jack or ten on the third round, you will gain when he started with A xx or 10xx and lose only to J xx — odds of 2-to-1 in your favor. Is that right, though? If East had started with 108xx, he would have a free choice of cards to play on the third round.

Boye led a second round of clubs and finessed dummy's ♣J. East showed out and the slam was made. When asked by email why he had played clubs in this way, Boye replied:

I was not sure if Restricted Choice applied to West's play of the \blacklozenge J. East also had two cards that he could follow with if he held four diamonds (the 10 and 8). Isn't that kind of Restricted Choice too when he played the 8 instead of the 10? I think you would have to ask a math professor, and I am still not sure you would get the right answer!

I recalled that Lauria had jumped to $4\clubsuit$ — was that not a bit more likely with xxxx-xxxx-10xxx-x rather than xxxx-xxxx-Qx? On the other hand he would be more tempted to sacrifice in $6\clubsuit$ with the first hand since $6\blacktriangledown$ more or less has to be gin. The game of bridge is truly fascinating.

I did get a feeling, though, when Versace switched to the 10 quite quickly, that he had the queen of clubs. And looking at dummy (unless I need to guess clubs), the only way to beat the contract is to find Lauria with a club void. So I played more with my gut feeling than a sure knowledge of the odds.

Several years before, in the European junior championships, Boye had faced a curiously similar guess for the $\mathbf{+}Q$:



Boye's $3^{\text{+}}$ rebid, facing the Jacoby 2NT, was natural and showed a non-minimum hand. Øyvind Saur's $3^{\text{+}}$ then indicated a singleton. Two cuebids, followed by Roman Keycard Blackwood, led to a final contract of $6^{\text{+}}$.

West's $\diamond Q$ won the first trick and Boye ruffed the second diamond with the ace. All depended on the club guess and it was therefore essential to gather as much distributional information as possible. Boye crossed to a trump, ruffed another diamond, returned to dummy with a second round of trumps and ruffed dummy's last diamond. Noting that diamonds had broken 4-4, and trumps 1-3, he crossed to the A and drew East's last trump. West, meanwhile, had discarded two spades.

How did the clubs lie? West had shown up with five red cards to East's seven, which tilted the odds slightly in favor of him holding three clubs rather than two. No sort of count was available on the spade suit but Boye reasoned that West might well have found a spade overcall if he held six spades. If he held only five spades, as suggested by the lack of an overcall, this would give him 5-1-4-3 shape!

Boye played a club to the king and then finessed West for the \clubsuit Q. That was twelve tricks and a big swing for Norway when the German South went down in the same contract, playing for the drop in clubs.

We will end with a 3NT deal from a matchpoint event. There was a two-way guess for the \blacklozenge Q and the considerations were quite different from those prevailing at IMPs. We will present only two hands initially, so you can decide how to play the contract yourself. Boye will then describe his thoughts at the time:



West leads the \mathbf{V} 8, overtaken with the \mathbf{V} 9. I duck the first round of hearts and East continues with the \mathbf{V} K. I can assume the hearts are 6-2 after the jump overcall. In any case, it would be risky to hold up again because a club switch would be awkward. I win with the \mathbf{V} A, West following with the \mathbf{V} 7, and must now consider how to play the diamond suit. What would your thoughts have been? (Remember that it is matchpoint scoring.)

At IMPs there would be no problem whatsoever. West has no heart left to play. Cashing the A and running the J into the safe West hand would guarantee you at least ten tricks, even if West won with the Q. At pairs, I don't think this is the best line at all. When West holds the Q, you can score +660 instead of +630 by finessing against West and scoring five diamond tricks. In that case the extra 30 points will be worth a full half of a top. The whole field will surely be in 3NT, so your score on the board depends almost 100% on whether you guess the position of the Q correctly.

I mark time by playing a spade to the jack and a spade back to the king, to check if East has a singleton spade. (East and West would then hold seven major-suit cards each and there would be no reason to finesse West for the \mathbf{Q} .) When East follows with the \mathbf{Q} and \mathbf{Q} , it is clear that he holds at least two more cards in the majors than West. That makes West favorite to hold the \mathbf{Q} and I am going to play for that chance.

Should I cash the \bullet K on the first round, in case East holds a singleton \bullet Q? No, because this would prevent me from scoring five diamond tricks when East holds a singleton 7, 5, 3 or 2 in the suit, which is four times as likely. The right play is to run the \bullet 10 at Trick 3, underplaying with

dummy's \blacklozenge 9. I do this, confident that it is the right play, and the whole hand turns out to be like this:



West did hold more diamonds than East, as I had expected. Unfortunately, East held the singleton \mathbf{Q} and proceeded to cash four more heart tricks.

For minus 200 on the board we scored only 2 matchpoints out of 154. Although the bidding must have been similar at many tables, the other declarers obviously felt they should finesse into the safe hand. What a bunch of cowards!

WINNING THE GREAT RACE

The most important contract in bridge is 3NT. It is the most enticing game to bid, with its target of only nine tricks; it is also the game that is bid most frequently. In this chapter we will see some of the key techniques that you can use to 'win the 3NT race' — in other words, to score nine tricks before the defenders score five.

We will launch proceedings with a fairly gentle deal, where Boye was partnering his wife Tonje.



West leads the ♦3 to East's jack and your queen. What is your plan?

Four spade tricks will give you the contract and you would like to lead towards the \blacklozenge J on the first round. If East holds the \blacklozenge Q, you will then score the tricks you need against a 4-2 break either way round. How should you cross to dummy for the first spade lead?

Suppose you cross to the \P A and lead the \clubsuit 2, with East holding something like \diamondsuit Q9xx. He will be able to win with the \clubsuit Q and knock out the \blacklozenge A entry while the spade suit is blocked. Realizing that he could afford to lose one spade and three diamonds even if West had led from \blacklozenge Kxx, Boye preferred to enter dummy with the \blacklozenge A. When he led a spade, East rose with the \blacklozenge Q and all was well.

Boye represented Norway for the first time in 1993. On this deal he arrived in a Meckwell game (the USA's Meckstroth and Rodwell are famous for playing in 3NT with fewer than the requisite number of points).



Only 21 points between the hands, yes, but all four tens were to play a role. West led a heart to partner's ace and back came a heart to West's king. How would you tackle the contract when West plays a third heart to dummy's *****J, East throwing a club?

West had responded 1 \blacklozenge and shown up with five hearts. If his distribution was 5-5-1-2, East would be 5-5 in the minors and would have opened 1 \blacklozenge . It was therefore likely that West's shape was 5-5-2-1. Boye played a diamond to his king and ran the \blacklozenge 10 to East's \clubsuit Q. When East returned a low diamond, Boye rose with the \diamondsuit Q and the \blacklozenge J fell from West.

With seven top tricks available at this stage Boye led the $\blacklozenge J$ from his hand, covered by the $\blacklozenge Q$ and $\blacklozenge A$. The trick count was up to eight and East was now ripe for an endplay. Boye cashed dummy's $\heartsuit Q$, throwing a spade from his hand, and crossed to the $\blacklozenge K$. These cards remained:



When the \$10 was played, East was in trouble. Sensing his fate, he discarded the \$8. Boye then threw him in with a diamond to lead into dummy's \$AJ tenace. Meckwell would be proud of him!

The next deal illustrates two techniques that arise frequently at notrump.



If North held four spades and was looking for a 4-4 fit in that suit, he would have continued with an artificial $3\clubsuit$ on the second round. His jump to 3NT did not therefore promise four spades, as it would in many systems. What is your plan when West leads the $\diamond 3$ to East's ten and your queen?

Suppose you develop the clubs first, cashing the A and finessing the J. East will win with the A and clear the diamond suit. When you play on spades to seek

the extra tricks that you need, West will win with the ace and defeat the contract by cashing his diamond winners.

Foreseeing this possible outcome, Boye led the A at Trick 2. West won with the A and led the K to clear the diamond suit. Boye won the second round of diamonds and only then turned to the club suit. He played the A and led low to dummy's J, finessing into the safe (East) hand. The finesse lost but East had no diamond to play. Suppose East had begun with 1042 and could return a diamond; the suit would then be 4-3 and declarer would lose only two diamonds, a spade and a club, again making the contract.

The deal we have just seen illustrated two of the most important techniques in notrump play. The first was 'attacking the entry to the danger hand'. Boye drove out the A first because this card was the potential entry to the dangerous West hand. The second was 'finessing into the safe hand'. After West's diamonds had been established, it was clear to finesse clubs in such a way that only East could gain the lead.

You may wonder what would have happened if West had somehow diagnosed a switch to the $\mathbf{P}7$ after winning with the \mathbf{A} . In that case, declarer would hold up the $\mathbf{P}A$ for two rounds and still make the contract if he guessed correctly which defender held the $\mathbf{P}Q$.

Test yourself on the next deal, where you have to decide which suit to attack in the search for the extra tricks you need.



How will you play the notrump game when West leads the ♥3, East playing the ♥9? Boye saw that if the defenders persisted with hearts, giving him two tricks in the suit, one spade trick would take him past the finishing line. Since he intended to set up the spade trick before the defenders had made their second move in hearts, he decided to keep all of dummy's spades to protect him in that suit. (At the other table the German declarer discarded a spade from dummy on the first trick, after which the contract cannot be made against best defense.)

Boye discarded a diamond from dummy on the first trick, winning East's \P 9 with the \P K. The \clubsuit J to dummy's \clubsuit A was followed by a spade to the queen and ace. West persisted with the \P 5, to East's \P 10 and declarer's \P Q, and Boye had the nine tricks that he had visualized.

At the other table, after the same auction, Michael Elinescu was declarer for Germany. A heart was led and he discarded the \blacklozenge 5 from dummy. Terje Aa, East for Norway, won with the \blacklozenge A and returned the \blacklozenge J (it works better to play a middle heart on the first trick, retaining the \blacklozenge A as an entry). Elinescu won with the \blacklozenge Q, throwing a club from dummy, and ran the \blacklozenge 9 to the \blacklozenge J. At double-dummy declarer can duck East's \blacklozenge 10 return, win the next heart and clear a ninth trick in spades. It was more likely that West held the \blacklozenge K than the \blacklozenge A, however, particularly after East's apparent willingness to release his \blacklozenge A. Declarer duly won the third round of hearts and finessed the \blacklozenge Q, going two down when the finesse lost.

Both of Norway's pairs did well on the next deal, which was played against their old rivals, Sweden:



Boye arrived in 3NT (his previous bid of 2NT was game-forcing) and West led the ♥3 to East's ♥K, which was allowed to win. The ♥10 was covered by the ♥J and

♥Q, West persisting with hearts and Boye winning the third round. With only eight tricks on view, Boye ran five club tricks. West discarded the ♦Q and two low spades, leaving it clear that the outstanding spades were breaking 2-2. Boye played spades from the top and had his game. Suppose West had held AQxxx or AJxxx instead. He could retain a spade guard only at the expense of throwing a heart winner. Boye would then have been able to duck a spade (or lead the A).

This was the auction at the other table:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Helgemo	Upmark	Lund	Cullin
pass	1♠	pass	2♣
pass	2NT	pass	3♣
pass all pass	3♥	pass	3NT

Per-Ola Cullin's 2 \clubsuit was a forcing-to-game relay. The 2NT response showed 8-10 ZZ-points, where A=3, K=2 and Q=1, with at least ten cards in spades and one other suit. The 3 \clubsuit continuation was a further relay and 3 \checkmark named diamonds as the second suit. (We will understand if you do not leap to adopt this method immediately...)

With this information available to him, Børre Lund made the brilliant lead of the \forall K. The Swedish declarer won with the \forall A, no doubt expecting the lead to be from the \forall KQ, and played a spade to the ten. Lund won this trick and continued with the \forall 10 to give the defenders four heart tricks. 3NT was two down and that was 13 IMPs to Norway.

On the next deal, Boye arrived in 3NT and found that he had er... only three top tricks available. He will tell you the story of what happened.



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Stoyanov	Lindqvist	Hristov	Brogeland	
pass]♠	pass	1NT	
pass	2♦	pass	3♣	
dbl	pass	pass	3NT	
all pass				

My $3\clubsuit$ showed a strongish raise in diamonds. What should I think when Espen Lindqvist passes the lead-directing double from West?

With a minimum hand Espen would bid 3° , following the Principle of Fast Arrival. His pass suggests that he is interested in game. It would be too tame to finish in 3° , so I bid 3NT. How would you approach this contract when West leads the AQ?

If West holds \bigstar Kxx, I can score four extra tricks from spades and two heart tricks would bring the total to nine. Perhaps I should therefore play a heart at Trick 2? I don't think so. Since West is a passed hand he is unlikely to hold both red aces with his good clubs. I would like to knock out first the ace that West holds. Although I have no idea where the red aces are, it must be best to lead a low diamond from dummy. If East happens to hold this ace, he cannot play it without giving me at least two tricks in the suit.

When I lead a diamond, East plays the jack and West wins my queen with the ace. He persists with the \clubsuit J and I throw a diamond from dummy, ducking in my hand. West, who cannot continue clubs into my \clubsuit K9, switches to a heart. East wins with the \clubsuit A and I have to find a card from \clubsuit KQ8. It maybe seems right to follow with the \clubsuit 8, retaining two entries to my hand — to take a spade finesse, reach the \clubsuit K and perhaps do something with the diamonds. However, East is likely to hold the \clubsuit K. West would be close to an opening bid with that card; also, East has more vacant places to hold the missing spade honor. Since I need only four spade tricks for the contract, I unblock my \clubsuit Q under East's \clubsuit A. I win East's heart return with dummy's \clubsuit J, arriving at this position:



I now lead a low spade from dummy. If East holds the A, as I expect, I will have time to test the spade break before choosing a discard on the A. (If spades are 4-2, I will throw the 9; if spades are 5-1, I will throw a spade and then have to guess the position of the 10.)

Hristov, the Bulgarian East, rises with the \bigstar K and I have my nine tricks. If East had played low, a better defense, only three spade tricks would be available and I would have to guess the diamonds. By Restricted Choice, single \blacklozenge J or \blacklozenge 10 is more likely than \blacklozenge J10, so I would probably have made the contract anyway.

We will end the chapter with a couple of deals featuring defense against 3NT. The first is from Boye's days as a junior:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Brogeland		Saur	
			pass
pass	1♠	27	pass
pass all pass	2♠	pass	3NT

With the spades sitting so well, the ugly 3NT contract had every prospect of succeeding. A heart lead would have given declarer a ninth trick. South's bidding — passing on the first round, then leaping to 3NT — had shown good hearts. Boye was therefore inclined to look elsewhere. He led the $\diamond 5$ and Øyvind Saur won with the $\diamond K$. A return of the $\diamond 10$ would have assisted declarer and Saur was careful to play back the $\diamond 6$. Boye's $\diamond Q$ was allowed to win and a third diamond went to East's $\diamond 10$. When Saur found the only safe return, a spade, declarer had to surrender. He won with the $\diamond K$, cashed the $\forall A$ and took dummy's spade winners for one down.

Declarer can make the contract by winning the second round of diamonds with the A, blocking the suit from the defenders' point of view. He then runs all his spades and exits with a club, forcing the defenders to give him a ninth trick.

On the next deal Boye was South with Geir Helgemo East. Take Geir's cards and decide how you would have defended Boye's 3NT contract.

Both Vul. Dealer South	 ▲ Q J 8 ▲ K 1 ▲ Q 3 ▲ K Q 3 ▲ K Q 1 ▲ W 1 S 	3 5 4 10 J F €	2001 Norway pro Bergen - Trondheir 9 Q 7 6 4 K 9 7 6 A 10 7 2	emier league m
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Tislevoll	Sælensminde	Helgemo	Brogeland pass	
pass	1♠	pass	1NT	
pass	2NT	pass	3♣	
pass	3NT	all pass		

North's rebid of 2NT was forcing and South's $3\clubsuit$ showed an undisclosed minor of at least five cards. (North could have asked which minor his partner held by bidding $3\clubsuit$.) You are East, defending 3NT, and partner leads the \clubsuit 6 to dummy's \clubsuit K. You allow this card to hold, let's say, and declarer calls for the \blacklozenge Q. Will you cover with the \clubsuit K or not? Consider the matter before reading further.

Helgemo decided to cover with the \diamond K and this card won the trick, declarer playing the \diamond 2 and West the \diamond J. What will you lead next? When you have decided, you can look at the full deal:



West led the $\clubsuit6$, you will recall, and Geir Helgemo (East) allowed dummy's \clubsuitK to win. Declarer called for the $\diamondsuit0$ and Helgemo made one of his rare miscalculations when he covered with the \bigstarK . Boye played low and the \blacklozengeJ appeared from West. East continued with a low club, won in the dummy. Boye then finessed the \$8 successfully and scored five diamond tricks in addition to two hearts and two clubs. Game made!

If East holds back his A, declarer will make only three diamond tricks instead of five and will go down. Should East have found this defense? There are some possible hands for South, containing AJxxx, where failure to cover will allow the contract to be made. Against that, South might have held AJ10xx, where a cover allows four diamond tricks (after a duck) and a hold-up would restrict declarer to three diamond tricks. The play went exactly the same way at the other table and it was a flat board in +600.

Does anything else strike you about the deal? When East does cover and sees the \bullet J fall from his partner, how should he react to the situation? If he reads the \bullet J as a singleton, as well he may, declarer will have nine tricks on a club return. Amazingly, the contract can still be beaten by a diamond return! Declarer finesses the \bullet 8 but cannot safely cash all his diamond tricks. On the last diamond he would have to find one more discard from dummy's \bullet QJ8 \forall AK \bullet — \bullet QJ. None of dummy's seven cards can be spared!

8

OPENING LEADS — INSPIRED AND UNINSPIRED

In this chapter we will take a close look at some deals where the opening lead determined the fate of the contract, one way or another. There is a fair degree of luck involved with selecting an opening lead, of course, but good players seem to be lucky more often than not!

You would surely like to test your own skill (and good fortune) on these deals, so the lead problems will be presented in batches of three, with the full deals shown immediately afterwards.

SET A — THREE DOUBLED CONTRACTS

1. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
♠Q76	Brogeland		Saur	
💙 A 4 2				3♦
♦ J965	pass	pass	dbl	all pass
• 942				

There is no obvious opening lead, it has to be said. What would your choice be? (See page 88.)

2. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🛧 KJ75	Erichsen		Brogeland	
💙 K 10 5		1♦	3♠	4 ♣
🔶 J 9 8 4	pass	4♠	pass	5♣
• 64	pass	pass	dbl	all pass

What opening lead will you choose? (See page 89.)

3.	West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	🕈 A 10 5 4 3 2	Brogeland		Sælensminde	
	💙 1064			pass	1♦
	♦	1♠	dbl	pass	2♠
	🕈 A 5 4 3	dbl	3NT	pass	4♥
		pass	64	pass	6♦
		dbl	all pass		

The North/South bidding sounds unconvincing and it is possible that South assumed North would hold four hearts when this was not the case. Anyway, what will you lead? (See page 90.)



With only two spades in his hand, Øyvind Saur's double was a bit risky. Nor can he have been overjoyed when Boye passed the double for penalties. Look at the West hand now. Can you see a good opening lead?

Boye led the $\forall 2!$ Underleading an ace is always dangerous. If you enjoy such thrills and are happy to put up with the odd disappointment, you should consider it when two or more conditions in this checklist apply: (1) dummy is strong, (2) dummy is balanced, (3) you don't have a side entry and (4) a passive lead looks wrong. Here, South had opened with a non-vulnerable $3 \blacklozenge$ and was unlikely to hold the $\forall K$. If that card was in the dummy, declarer would surely misguess when dummy held the $\forall K$ J or he held the $\forall J$. Even without the $\forall J$, many declarers will not waste dummy's king at Trick 1.

Back to the deal in question! Declarer called for the ♥9 and Saur won with the ♥10. The ♣K return was won in the dummy and declarer played two top trumps, discovering the 4-1 break. His luck turned for the better when he ran the ♠10, forcing East's ♠A. Declarer ruffed the ♠Q return, played the ♦Q and was now at the crossroads. Had he switched back to spades, he would have been able to discard a heart loser on the fourth spade before West was able to ruff. Not expecting West to hold three spades after East's double of 3♠, declarer preferred to concede a trick to West's ♦J. When Boye continued blithely with the ♥4, declarer called for dummy's ♥J and lost two further tricks in the suit, going one down. Breathing freely once more, the Norwegian pair entered +100 in their scorecards.

How many IMPs did this virtuoso defense gain? At the other table, the Norwegian North attempted 3NT and went four down, so Turkey gained 3 IMPs on the board. It would have been far more, of course, if 3 doubled had been allowed to make.



North-South were playing Precision Club, so the 1 opening did not originally promise diamonds. When North subsequently cuebid spades to agree clubs, Espen Erichsen placed him with length in both diamonds and clubs. There was also Boye's double to consider. The preemptive 3 overcall had not suggested a hand rich in defense, so the subsequent double was likely to be Lightner. Everything pointed to East being void in diamonds.

Erichsen led the $\blacklozenge9$, a suit-preference card that requested a spade return. Boye ruffed with the $\clubsuit2$, West was relieved to see, and returned the $\bigstar2$. This was another suit-preference card, telling partner that he held another trump for ruffing purposes. Winning with the \bigstarK , Erichsen led another diamond and East's ruff put the club game one down.

It may seem that such pyrotechnics were unnecessary, since on a passive defense East-West have a chance to score one trick in each side suit. Suppose West leads a low spade to East's ace and a low heart is returned. Declarer plays low from his hand, preserving the $\mathbf{V}Q$, and wins with the $\mathbf{V}A$. He then draws trumps and plays the $\mathbf{A}A$, finding a potential loser in that suit. No matter! Declarer plays the $\mathbf{K}A$ and runs all his trumps. If West reduces to $\mathbf{V}K \mathbf{A}J9$, he will be thrown in with a heart to lead into declarer's diamond tenace. West can attempt to side-step the endplay by discarding the $\mathbf{V}K$, hoping that East has the $\mathbf{V}Q$. Not today! Declarer will score a second heart trick and make the contract.



South's bid of 2[♠] was based on the assumption that North would hold four hearts for his negative double. North was alarmed to hear the 4[♥] bid and the bizarre auction eventually came to a halt in 6[♠] doubled. At the other table the Norwegians had made 5[♠] with an overtrick, when the [♠]A opening lead allowed declarer to ruff and later discard his spade loser. Norwegian supporters feared that the same lead here might allow the doubled slam to be made.

Boye looked back at the auction and immediately discounted a lead of the A. North had announced good spades with his jump to 3NT and South might easily be void in the suit. How about leading the A? It was somewhat less dangerous than the other black ace but might still cost in various ways. Boye's eventual choice was the V4, spurning the lead of either ace. He could hardly believe it when Erik Sælensminde produced the VA! A spade return put the slam one down and that was 11 IMPs to Norway.

SET B THREE MAJOR-SUIT GAMES

4. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
• 974	Brogeland	Carruthers	Sælensminde	Weinstein	
💙 632				1 💙	
🔶 A 10 7 2	pass	1♠	2♣	37	
♣ K 7 5	pass all pass	4♣	pass	4♥	

North's 4⁺ was a cuebid, agreeing hearts as trumps. What lead would you choose? (See page 92.)

5. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
• 94	Sælensminde		Brogeland	
💙 A 3	pass	1 🗭	4♥	4♠
87432	all pass			
🕈 A 8 7 3				

The opponents are vulnerable, you are not. Choose a lead against South's contract of $4\clubsuit$. (See page 93.)

6. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
♠ J10	Brogeland		Andresen	
🕈 Q J			pass	2NT
♦ 8 6	pass	3♣	pass	3♦
🕈 Q J 7 6 5 4 2	pass	37	pass	3♠
	pass	4♠	all pass	

North's 3♣ is Puppet (Five-card) Stayman and the 3♦ response shows at least one four-card major. North's 3♥ shows a four-card spade suit, which allows the strong hand (South) to play the contract when a spade fit comes to light. Mind you, this may not be such a clever idea if you manage to find the same opening lead that Boye did. What is your choice? (See page 94.)



Prospects of beating the contract looked poor after North's cuebid of 4^{\bullet} . It seemed to Boye that the best chance was to underlead the A. Partner might hold Kx, allowing two diamond tricks and a ruff to be taken. The same effect might be possible if partner held Qx, with the K in dummy.

Boye led the \blacklozenge 7 and Weinstein called for dummy's \blacklozenge J. On lead with the \blacklozenge Q, Erik Sælensminde returned a trump. Declarer won in the dummy and ruffed a diamond with the \blacklozenge 8. He then cashed the \blacklozenge A and led a low club from his hand. Boye won with the \blacklozenge 7 and returned a second round of trumps to dummy's \blacklozenge Q. One club could be discarded on the \blacklozenge K but declarer still had two inescapable club losers and that was one down.

At the other table, after a similar auction, Fred Gitelman led a club against the same contract. East won and returned a trump, but Geo Tislevoll was able to unblock the A, ruff a club and discard a club on the A. When a diamond to the king was allowed to win, later in the play, he actually made an overtrick.

Perhaps you chose to lead a trump. What would happen then? Declarer wins in the dummy and realizes that he will not be allowed to ruff a club. He reaches his hand with the A and leads a diamond towards dummy, hoping to establish his tenth trick in that suit. You play low smoothly in the West seat and... declarer misguesses, playing the J from dummy. Partner wins with the Q and, feeling inspired, switches to a low club. You produce the hoped-for K, draw dummy's last trump and beat the contract. Brilliant!



Erik Sælensminde reckoned that he needed to give Boye at least one ruff to stand a chance of defeating the spade game. Although he was longer in diamonds than in clubs, it was more likely that partner held a singleton club than a void diamond (particularly as North had opened 1 and might well hold some length there).

Erik led the A and continued with the A, his highest club to indicate an entry in the higher of the other two side suits. (The A is visible in the dummy, yes, but that is no reason for failing to give a clear signal.) Boye ruffed the second club and returned the 2 to West's ace. A second club ruff then defeated the contract.

As you see, it would not be good enough to lead the $\mathbf{V}A$, expecting that a suit preference signal from partner would direct your continuation. Even if he persuaded you to switch to ace and another club, only one ruff would then be possible.



The spade game appears to be cast-iron, since declarer cannot lose more than one spade and at most two hearts. Can you imagine how it was defeated? It doesn't look as if a club lead will do the job. East can ruff, it is true, but West has no entry to deliver a second ruff. When declarer gains the lead he will cross to the A, pick up the remaining trumps with a finesse and discard two hearts from dummy on the diamond suit. That will give him an overtrick, in fact.

Boye made the deceptive lead of the \P J! Martin Andresen won with the \P A and returned a low heart. Not blessed with psychic powers, declarer played low on this trick. Boye won with the \P Q, surprising all present, and could see (after South's 2NT opening) that East must be void in clubs. A club ruff was followed by a heart ruff and another club ruff. The defenders had taken the first five tricks. It would have been rubbing salt into the wound if the fourth round of hearts had promoted a further trump trick for the defenders. No, declarer ruffed with the queen and drew the two outstanding trumps with the ace.

A lead of the jack from Q-J doubleton might misfire if dummy held the king and partner had the ace. That was unlikely on this deal after South's 2NT opening. Some players are reluctant to lead from queen-jack doubleton because they expect to score a trick if declarer holds A-K-10 and drops an honor on the first round. He may guess correctly, however, reasoning that if you held a singleton honor you might have led it.

SET C THREE 3NT CONTRACTS

7. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🕈 AJ1094	Brogeland	Lauria	Sælensminde	Versace
💙 Q 9 6 4				1♦
• 73	1♠	dbl	2♠	3♣
💠 J 5	pass	3♠	dbl	3NT
	all pass			

Your partner's double of 3♠ tells you that he holds a spade honor and suggests the lead of a spade. Will you lead a spade or try something else? (See page 96.)

8.	West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	♠ 4 3 2	Sælensminde	Weinstein	Brogeland	Garner
	🕈 Q 4	pass	1♠	pass	1NT
	• 92	pass	2♣	pass	2♦
	♣ J 10 9 8 4 3	pass all pass	2♥	pass	3NT

1NT was semi-forcing and the 2♠ rebid was either natural or (as here) strong and artificial. 2♦ showed 8+ points and was forcing to game. 2♥ promised at least three hearts and 16+ points. What lead would you choose? (See page 97.)

9. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🕈 A K Q 4 2	Fallenius	Brogeland	Welland	Shugart
💙 J 10 7 6 4				pass
9 6 5	1♠	dbl	pass	1NT
♣ —	pass	3NT	all pass	

What lead will give you the best chance of beating South's 3NT? (See page 98.)



Boye considered the auction carefully, in particular his partner's lead-directing double of North's $3 \clubsuit$ bid. Was it possible that partner had raised to $2 \clubsuit$ on a holding of \clubsuit Kxx and that South had bid 3NT on just \clubsuit Qxx? It seemed unlikely. South might venture 3NT on a guard of just queen-third on some other auction, but not when East had shown a high honor (which would be the ace or king in that case); the loss of the first five tricks would then be almost certain.

Placing declarer with the guarded \bigstar K, Boye sought a lead that might create an entry to partner's hand. He led the \checkmark 9. The choice of a high card would let partner know that he was not interested in heart tricks, merely in putting him on lead for a spade return.

Alfredo Versace rose with dummy \mathbf{A} and East gave an encouraging attitude signal. When the \mathbf{A} K failed to drop the \mathbf{A} Q, declarer could make no more than eight tricks.

At the other table the auction was identical except that the Italian East did not double the cuebid of $3\clubsuit$. Paradoxically, it was at this table that West (Andrea Buratti) did lead a spade. Glenn Grøtheim scored his nine top tricks, including the \bigstar K, and Norway gained 10 IMPs.



Although clubs had not been bid naturally (North's 2* rebid, in combination with his 2* follow-up, was artificial and showed 16+ points), Erik Sælensminde could see no future in a club lead. Even if the suit could be established, his own hand was so weak that he was unlikely to gain the lead thereafter. Partner was the one with the likely entries, so he tried to find Boye's best suit by leading the *Q.

Steve Garner won with the king and ran the \bullet 10, which held. When a second diamond was played to the jack, Boye won and persisted with hearts. Since East holds the \bullet A doubleton, declarer could make the contract at double-dummy by setting up two club tricks (to go with three hearts, three diamonds and one spade). At the table he naturally preferred to win with the \blacktriangleleft J and play on spades. A spade to the queen lost to the king and Boye cleared the heart suit. A subsequent finesse of the \bullet 10 also failed and Boye scored two heart tricks to put the contract two down.

At the other table (after bidding of 1 - 1NT; 2 - 3 + 3; 3 - 3NT) Zia made a speculative double in the East seat, based on the limited auction and the position of his spade honors. Tor Helness promptly redoubled in the South seat and, after a spade lead, made an easy nine tricks. That was a novel way to pick up 800 and Norway scored 14 IMPs.

In the interests of journalistic integrity (not a phrase that you hear very often nowadays), it is only fair to report that Boye had made a similar lead-directing double of 3NT only two deals before. Steve Garner had redoubled and collected ten top tricks — a novel way to pick up 1400!



Björn Fallenius tried his luck with the $\P6$. With her spade stopper still intact, Rita Shugart needed only to set up some club tricks and negotiate the blockage in the diamond suit. She won with the \PA and played dummy's AK. She then reached her hand with the \PQ and played her remaining two diamond winners. When she turned to the club suit, leading the \PQ from her hand, the defenders were powerless. If East ducked the first two rounds of clubs, declarer would have eight tricks before her and dummy's $\P K$ would be the ninth. Roy Welland in fact won the first club, switching to a spade, and the game was made.

Look back to the opening lead now. South surely had a spade stopper, so there was no future in leading spades from the top. If West begins with a low spade, East will return a spade when he wins with the A and the game will go down. The most likely distribution of the spades around the table is 5-2-2-4. North is likely to be relatively short in spades for his double; East might have raised to 2A if he held three-card spade support plus the high card that will be necessary for 3NT to be beaten. A low spade lead would concede the contract if declarer had eight running tricks and a spade trick brought this to nine. This is an unlikely outcome compared with the chance that a low spade will beat the contract.

What were the prospects for the defense after a heart lead? Not only would East need to hold something good in hearts, he would also need a high card in one of the minors to prevent declarer running for home. Another point is that North was likely to hold good hearts after his negative double of 1. All in all, it does seem that a low spade will give the defenders the best chance of beating the contract.

SET D THREE DOUBLED GAMES

10. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🔶 Q J 8	Sælensminde	Pzszcola	Brogeland	Kwiezcen
💙 A Q 8 7 4 2				1♦
🔶 J 10 8	1 🎔	pass	4♥	5♣
♣ 5	pass	pass	dbl	all pass

What will you lead against the doubled club game? (See page 100.)

11. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🔶 J 10 5 3	Aasand		Brogeland	
🕈 Q 6		1 🛧	pass	1 🖤
🔶 A K Q 8 7 3 2	2♦	2♥	3♦	dbl
+ —	3♠	4♥	dbl	all pass

The opponents are vulnerable and you are not. What will you lead against the doubled heart game? (See page 101.)

12. West	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
🛧 J 10 9 5 4	Lindqvist	Smirnov	Brogeland	Piekarek
💙 64			1NT	2♥
1095	pass	4♥	dbl	all pass
🗣 J 9 6				

South's 2♥ shows hearts and a minor suit. Your partner's double is for penalties. What lead will you make? (See page 102.)



A heart lead was unlikely to be productive after East's raise to the four-level. Erik Sælensminde led the AQ, hoping to claim whatever tricks the defenders were due in that suit. Boye won with the A and returned the AQ, knocking out declarer's AK.

When Michal Kwiecen played the ace of trumps, both defenders followed but the king did not drop. He then turned to the diamond suit. If the defender with the trump king had to follow to three diamonds, dummy's last spade could be thrown on the fourth round of diamonds. The Card Gods did not have this outcome in mind. Boye ruffed the third diamond and the defenders claimed a second spade trick to put the doubled game one down.

The game would have been easily made without a spade lead, it is true, but did you spot a chance that declarer missed? Suppose he drops the \clubsuit K under East's \clubsuit A. As the cards lie, he will then be able to use the \bigstar 10 as an entry to dummy; he can pick up East's \clubsuit K and make the contract. Whether this is a better line than the one that declarer chose is a close judgment. If everyone is expected to play double-dummy on the deal, then the spotlight might turn in Boye's direction. He can prevent declarer's brilliant unblock of the \clubsuit K by declining to play his \bigstar A on the first trick!



A total of 380 pairs entered the 2003 European mixed pairs and 52 made it through to the final, including Boye and his partner Tonje Aasand (later to become his wife). South rather overstated her values with the double of 3♦, which is usually played as a game try, and ended in 4♥ doubled by Boye in the East seat.

What did you decide to lead from the West hand? No one can blame you if you lay down a top diamond. One diamond trick, one club and two hearts will put the contract one down doubled and +200 will score well. Tonje liked the odds that Boye would hold the \blacklozenge J, after his raise, and led the \blacklozenge 2!

Her bravery was rewarded when Boye's $\diamond 10$ won the first trick. Boye returned the $\diamond 4$, ruffed by West. Declarer ruffed the next diamond — low to the $\diamond J$ — but could not avoid the subsequent loss of two trump tricks and one club. That was two down for a penalty of 500, giving the Norwegian pair 42 matchpoints out of a possible 50. They eventually finished in 15th place.



South's 2♥ showed hearts and a minor suit. What sort of hand does partner hold for his penalty double of the resultant 4♥? He is likely to hold either three trump tricks and one outside winner or perhaps two trump tricks and two outside winners. The best opening lead is therefore a trump. Partner can win and then cash his outside winner(s) before declarer has a chance to take any discards. It is possible also that a trump lead will prevent declarer from scoring some ruffs in the dummy.

Espen Lindqvist led the \blacklozenge J instead. As you see, a diamond or club lead would have been fatal, allowing declarer to discard his two spade losers and then establish the clubs with a ruff. The spade lead did not suffer this fate because it hit partner's ace. Indeed, it put the contract two down! Boye won the dummy's \blacklozenge K with the \blacklozenge A and drew three rounds of trumps, switching to a club. Declarer could discard three clubs on the \blacklozenge AKQ but this still left him with a club loser.

If Espen had led a trump, as we recommend, the contract would have gone only one down. After drawing three rounds of trumps, Boye would have to take his A (setting up the KQ for a fourth club discard) to prevent declarer from discarding his spades.

'Shouldn't you lead a trump, partner?' 'We needed the 300!'

9

SLAM ADVENTURES

Back in Chapter 2 we looked at the main mechanisms for bidding potential slam hands. Now we will see some more slam deals from championship play, looking at further bidding methods as we go.

Have you ever made a cuebid based on a queen? It doesn't happen often, it's true, but the possibility can arise when a player has already denied first- or second-round control in a suit.



Boye's 2NT response showed positive values and a balanced hand. His subsequent $4 \bullet$ was a cuebid passing these messages: (1) I have a heart fit and I'm interested in a slam, (2) I hold the A or K, (3) I do not hold the A, K, A or K; otherwise I would have cuebid in one of the black suits instead. What a wealth of information from just one bid!

Leif-Erik Stabell made a similar cuebid in spades and Boye then bid 5. What could this possibly mean? Since he had already denied the A and K, he could only be showing the Q. South could place his partner with the K in addition, to make up the original 2NT response, and therefore leapt to a small slam.

A club was led to the ten, jack and king. Declarer played the $\mathbf{P}A$, $\mathbf{P}Q$ and $\mathbf{P}K$, East's $\mathbf{P}J$ appearing. A club ruff in dummy was then his twelfth trick.

Is the 'Leaping Michaels' convention safely installed in your system? Boye and Erik Sælensminde made good use of it on this deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Fantoni	Sælensminde	Nunes	Brogeland
		pass	pass
2♠	4♦	pass	4♠
dbl	rdbl	pass	57
pass	64	pass	6♦
pass	7♥	all pass	

Leaping Michaels

Over an opening bid of 2[•] or 2[•], an overcall of 4[•] or 4[•] shows a strong two-suiter in the bid minor and the other major. So, jumping to 4[•] over an opponent's 2[•] shows a heartclub two-suiter. Over a natural opening bid of 2[•], 4[•] would show both major suits.

Some players also use non-leaping Michaels, where 4⁴/4⁶ over an opposing preempt of 3⁴ would show clubs/hearts and diamonds/ hearts respectively. A natural jump overcall of $4 \bullet$ (or $4 \bullet$) is not very useful over a weak-two in a major. When you play Leaping Michaels, $4 \bullet$ shows a strong two-suiter in diamonds and the other major. How should Boye respond on the South cards, do you think?

Only six points in the South hand, yes, but they represent a magnificent fit for the suits that North has indicated. Boye therefore responded 4, bidding the opponent's suit to show slam possibilities. West doubled, meaning in his system that he did not want a spade lead. Erik Sælensminde then redoubled to indicate his spade control and interest in a slam. Boye, who had already bid his moderate hand strongly, applied the brakes in 5 Ψ . Erik persisted with a grand-slam try of 6***** and Boye was then willing to cuebid his high card in diamonds. This was sufficient encouragement for Erik to bid the grand slam, which was easily made. A fine auction!

At the other table Lauria and Versace stopped in 5, albeit after vigorous preemption from Helgemo and Helness. Only five pairs reached the grand slam in the open section of the European championship.

When the bidding is already inconveniently high, it is sometimes impossible to check that you do not have two top losers. You hear players saying: 'I couldn't risk bidding a slam; we might have had two top club losers.' It is easy enough to avoid responsibility in that way. When a slam can be made, however, you may still lose a double-figure number of IMPs.

Boye faced the possibility of two top spade losers on this deal:



How would you react on the North cards over the surprising leap to 5+?

A cautious performer (not that Boye has ever been called that) might think that there could be two top spade losers. Boye reasoned that his partner had suggested 4-7 shape in the minor suits and the odds were high that he did not hold two spade losers. This was reason enough to raise to 6♠ and many players would have found that bid. Boye went the extra mile and cuebid 5♥ in the search for a grand slam! If his partner were then to cuebid 5♠, showing a void spade, it was possible that seven clubs, five hearts and the diamond ace would allow 7♠ to be made.

Boye's intention was to bid 5NT over 5♠ from partner, suggesting a grand slam. His partner in fact bid 5NT himself, carrying the message: 'I do not hold a firstround spade control, but I am otherwise great for a grand slam.' Knowing that there was a loser in spades, Boye completed a splendid auction by bidding 6♣.

There was some interest in the play. Andrey Gromov won the spade lead and switched to the $\P10$, won in the dummy. Erik played the $\clubsuit Q$, to check for a 4-0 break. When both defenders followed, he played the $\clubsuit AK$ and ruffed a diamond with the $\clubsuit J$. The fall of East's $\blacklozenge Q$ meant that he could return to hand, draw trumps and claim the slam.

Suppose partner opens 2NT and you have a major single-suited hand that may produce a slam. How do you pass this message to your partner? If you start with a three-level transfer bid, you may find yourself with no good bid on the next round. One solution is to use 'two-below transfer bids' at the four-level. With a long spade suit, for example, you can bid 4. Boye and Erik Sælensminde made good use of the method here:



Erik Sælensminde decided to open 2NT. This was not so much because he feared $1 \blacklozenge$ being passed out, more that it would be difficult to express his hand after any response to $1 \blacklozenge$. Boye held a great hand for two-below transfers. A response of $3 \clubsuit$ would have been a standard transfer to $3 \clubsuit$, showing at least five spades. His actual response of $4 \blacklozenge$ was a slam try based on a spade suit of at least six cards. Partner could then show interest in a slam by bidding $4 \clubsuit$. Since Erik held only a singleton $\diamondsuit Q$, he signed off in $4 \spadesuit$.

Boye rated his hand as worth another move and continued with a cuebid of $5\clubsuit$. When Zia made a lead-directing double, Erik redoubled to show a first-round club control. With a couple of slam invitations already made, Boye had no more to say and signed off in 54. Placing his partner with very good spades and a singleton club, Erik then bid the small slam, which was an easy make when trumps broke 3-2. This was worth 12 IMPs when Ralph Katz and George Jacobs demonstrated the potential problems of opening $1 \blacklozenge$ on the South cards. They stopped in game after the auction: 1♦ - 1♠ - 3NT

(Amusingly for Boye, it was Zia who

originally taught him the 'two-below transfer' method, when they were partners in the 2000 Denmark v. Rest of the World match in Odense.)

Let's look at something different. What does it mean when you follow a Stayman inquiry with a 3♣ or 3♦ bid? One good method is that these bids should be natural and forcing to game. Look at this deal:

N-S	S Vul.	🛧 AJ9)	2000 Bermuda Bowl
Dec	aler North	🕈 A K 8	87	Norway - Brazil
		🔶 A 9 8	82	
		+ 87		
	К 1063		•	842
•	96	N	•	10 5 4 3 2
•	J <i>7</i>	W	E 🔶	63
÷	Q 6 5 4 3	S	+	K 10 2
		🔶 Q 7	5	
		🕈 QJ		
		🔶 K Q	1054	
		🕈 AJ9)	
	WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Chasas	Drogoland	Dumman	Carlanaminda

\	NEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
(Chagas	Brogeland	Branco	Sælensminde
		1NT	pass	2♣
F	oass	2♥	pass	3♦
F	oass	3♥	pass	3NT
F	oass	4 ♠	pass	4NT
F c	oass all pass	5♣	dbl	6♦

Two-below transfer bids

show a slam try and at least a

Opposite 2NT (or 2+-2+-

2NT), four-level responses

4 - slam try in hearts

4 - slam try in spades

4♠ – slam try in diamonds

When the opener is slam-

suitable, he makes the in-

between bid (4 over 4).

4♥ – slam try in clubs

six-card suit:
Boye's 1NT showed 15-17 points and the South hand, packed with queens and jacks (over-valued by the point-count system) was only just good enough to visualize a slam. Erik Sælensminde decided to show his diamond suit and therefore began with Stayman even though he did not hold a four-card major. His subsequent 3♦ was natural and forcing to game. With no particular fit for diamonds, North would have signed off in 3NT. His actual 3♥ showed a diamond fit and was encouraging. What should South do next, do you think?

Bidding a minor via Stayman

Even if you play four-suit transfers (where you can show a six-card minor via a transfer) it is worth playing that 3♣ or 3◆ via Stayman is natural and forcing to game. The opener can cuebid to show a good fit, otherwise sign off in 3NT. The fact that South had introduced a minor suit implied that his hand was good enough to contemplate an eleven- or twelvetrick contract. With a minimum hand in this context and a lack of controls, Erik suggested stopping in 3NT despite the diamond fit. Boye's hand was splendidly rich in controls, not to mention his four-card diamond support and a ruffing value in clubs. He continued with a cuebid of 4[•] and Erik advanced to the small slam. Brazil's Campos and Villas Boas matched this successful contract at the other table.

Suppose you open 1♥ and the next player overcalls 4♠. Most pairs would treat 4NT by the responder as showing the minor suits rather than asking for keycards in hearts. Boye and Erik used 4NT with this meaning on a slightly different auction here:

Neither Vul.	♠ A7	2007 Bermuda Bowl
Dealer South	 ♥ J76 ♦ A96 	Norway - Sweden
 ★ K Q J 8 6 5 4 3 ♥ K ◆ Q 8 2 ₱ 9 	 A 7 6 3 2 N W E S 10 2 A Q 8 5 3 2 K K J 10 5 	9 1094 J107543 Q84

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Bertheau	Brogeland	Nyström	Sælensminde	
			1 🎔	
4♠	dbl	pass	4NT	
pass all pass	5NT	pass	6 4	

Boye's double of 4^{-1} is described as 'negative' on the convention card. It is not for penalties, but partner is entitled to pass on a flattish hand with little potential for a contract at the five-level or higher.

Erik had some shape opposite and was happy to play the hand, rather than defend. His 4NT rebid passed the message: 'I have (at least) two places to play'. In other words, he could see two possible trump suits. With five or six hearts and five clubs, he would have rebid 5⁺ instead. The inference to be drawn was that South's second suit contained only four cards.

If Boye was merely interested in playing at the five-level in the best fit, he would bid $5\clubsuit$ next. Should South then advance to $5\diamondsuit$, announcing that he held both red suits, the bidding could come to a halt in $5\heartsuit$.

Holding three aces, Boye visualized a slam. When he continued with a pick-aslam 5NT, Erik bid 6 \clubsuit and this concluded the auction. How would you play the club slam when West leads the \blacklozenge Q?

Erik won with the A and played a diamond to the king. Since West held many more spades than his partner, it was clear to finesse East for the AQ. (The odds between playing for the drop and finessing are fairly close even when there was no adverse bidding. With West holding long spades, the odds swing hugely in favor of a finesse against East.) When Erik led the 10 from his hand, the 9appeared from West and he won with dummy's ace. After throwing his spade loser on dummy's A, Erik finessed the J successfully. He then drew East's last trump and played the A, preparing to set up the hearts. The K fell from West and he had an overtrick.

Suppose the trump finesse had unexpectedly lost to AQ9 with West. What then? Because of Erik's unblock of the A10 on the first round, he would have been able to reach dummy with the A7 to take the percentage play in hearts: a finesse of the queen.

Most partnerships have plenty of system to guide them towards a major-suit game or slam facing a 2NT opening (or a start of 2 - 2 - 2NT). It can be a different matter when the responder holds length in the minor suits. What sequences do you have at your disposal?

One method is to use a 3^{e} response to show both minors, while 4^{e} and 4^{e} are natural and show a suit of at least six cards. (If you play two-below transfer responses, which we mentioned a few pages back, you use 4^{e} and 4^{e} to show the single-suiters in a minor.)

Erik Sælensminde had to judge how strongly to bid a minor two-suiter on this deal:

Neither Vul. Dealer North ◆ K 10 6 ♥ K 9 7 6 3 ◆ 9 8 4 2 ◆ 6	 AQ A10 AQ AK AK W S 85% 85% KJ5% 	$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 5 \\ 10 & 7 \\ 4 & 2 \\ \end{bmatrix}$	2004 Euro Champiol Norway - Serbia/Mo J 9 7 4 3 Q J 4 2 6 J 8 7	nship ntenegro
WFST	♣ Q 10 NORTH	0953 FAST	SOUTH	
11231	Brogeland	LASI	Sælensminde	
	2♣	pass	2♦	
pass	2NT	pass	3♠	
pass	4♦	pass	4♥	
pass	4NT	pass	5♦	
pass all pass	6 ♣	pass	7♦	

Showing the minors opposite 2NT

When partner opens 2NT (or opens 2⁺ and rebids 2NT), it works well to use 3⁺ to show both minor suits. Partner can rebid 3NT with no good fit for your suits. Boye's 2NT promised 22-24 points and Erik Sælensminde's $3 \blacklozenge$ showed both minors. Boye's $4 \blacklozenge$ set the trump suit and $4 \blacktriangledown$ was a cuebid. RKCB revealed that South held the \blacklozenge K and Boye now had a grand slam in his sights. After partner's heart cuebid he had no heart losers; the \blacklozenge Q could be discarded if partner held five clubs headed by the queen. He passed this message by bidding $6 \clubsuit$.

It took some courage to bid a grand slam on the 6 points that South held. Erik looked

favorably at his $\bullet J$, however, and at his productive club holding. Partner's grandslam try implied that all six keycards were present; he must also hold the $\bullet K$ or he would have asked for that card by bidding 5NT. Erik duly bid 7 \bullet and made the contract easily. He scored two heart ruffs in his hand and discarded dummy's $\bullet Q$ on the fifth club. A few pairs elsewhere bid the grand slam in clubs, surviving when the spade finesse proved successful.

On the next deal, the last of a closely-fought match, a bucketful of IMPs turned on the play of one defensive card. Additional pressure was on the players because the tournament director was hovering, trying to assess who had been responsible for the slow play and a late finish.

E-W Vul. Dealer West ♠ K 5 3 ♥ K 10 7 4 ♦ Q J 7 ♣ 4 3 2	 ♦ 8 6 2 ♥ A J 9 6 ♦ 6 2 ♥ A 10 9 ₩ E \$ \$ \$ A Q 9 \$ 3 	2 65 N 9 ↓ J ↓ G ↓ 1 ↓ J 7 4	009 Bermuda Bowl Iorway - Netherlands 10 2 8 2 0 8 4 3 8 7 5
	♦ AK9 ♣ KQ6	5	
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
de Wijs	Lindqvist	Muller	Brogeland
pass	pass	pass]♠
pass	2♣	pass	3♥
pass	3NT	pass	4♣
pass	4♥	pass	5NT
pass	64	all pass	

Espen Lindqvist's $2^{\$, on a passed hand, showed 8-11 points and three-card spade support. Boye's $3^{\$ was a splinter bid and 3NT showed slam interest. After two cuebids, Boye's 5NT carried the pick-a-slam meaning, just in case North had a good diamond suit. Our question for you on this deal is: after a lead of the \diamond Q would you expect the slam to succeed or not?

Boye won with the A, cashed the K and ruffed a diamond with the A. He then led a trump, the 10 appearing from East. At double-dummy the slam can be made by rising with the A on this trick. You can then lead your last diamond and West cannot ruff effectively because he would have to use his K to beat dummy's A. This happens to work only because East's 10 is from J10 rather than from K10, also because East holds the outstanding 10 (which could easily lie with West after his Q lead).

Boye played with the odds when he finessed the $\mathbf{A}Q$ on the first round of trumps, hoping that East had started with $\mathbf{A}K10$. The finesse lost to West's $\mathbf{A}K$ and all now depended on the return that Simon de Wijs made. A trump return would prevent declarer from ruffing his last diamond and kill the slam. With the tournament director making his presence known, de Wijs extracted a trump from his hand. The tournament director consulted his watch, yet again. De Wijs pushed the trump back into his hand and switched to a heart! Boye won with dummy's \mathbf{A} , crossed to his hand and ruffed his last diamond successfully. He was then able to draw trumps and the slam was made. Norway gained 11 IMPs instead of losing 11 IMPs and had some insurance against a possible slow-play fine!

Bridge writers often debate the pros and cons of presenting deals in two-hand format initially, rather than four-hand format. Of the present authors, Boye likes to start by showing two hands — simulating conditions at the table — while David has always preferred the four-hand format (which consumes less space and can be easier to follow). Test yourself on this grand slam, presented in two-hand format.



How will you play $7\clubsuit$ when West leads the \clubsuit 2?

A successful finesse in either major suit would bring a thirteenth trick. You might also try to drop the missing honor in one major before finessing in the other. Or is there a different way to play the slam? Over to you!

When you have decided on your line of play, look at the complete deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Nyström	Brogeland	Strömberg	Sælensminde	
			1 🛧	
pass	1 🎔	pass	27	
pass	2NT	pass	3♦	
pass	4♣	pass	4♦	
pass	4NT	pass	5♦	
pass	5♥	pass	7♣	
all pass				

Boye's 2NT asked for distributional information and 3^{\diamond} showed the 1-3-4-5 shape. Clubs were agreed as trumps and RKCB revealed the one keycard (the \diamond A) that Boye was missing. The 5^{\heartsuit} continuation asked for the \clubsuit Q and invited a grand slam. Erik Sælensminde held two side-suit kings in addition to the trump queen. Since he had limited his hand with the 2^{\heartsuit} rebid, he was happy to leap to 7^{\bigstar} .

Erik won the trump lead in his hand, crossed to the A and ruffed a spade. When he played a trump to the ace he was pleased to see the suit breaking 3-2. In that case he could proceed with his intended plan — a dummy reversal!

A second spade ruff was followed by a diamond to the queen and a third spade ruff. A heart to the ace allowed declarer to draw East's last trump and three more rounds of diamonds then provided a parking place for dummy's two potential heart losers. Did you spot the dummy reversal when shown only the North and South hands? For some strange reason, it is an easy play to miss.

Well, that seemed to work all right. (Perhaps Boye's idea is not so bad.) Let's go mad and use two-deal format for the next deal too:

N-S Vul.	• 7		2010 Buffett Cup
Dealer North	🕈 A	1082	Europe - USA
	♦ K (Q J 8	
	♣ A	Q 10 6	
	♠ A	8	
	🕈 K (Q 5	
	♦ A	943	
	+ 7 :	543	
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Hampson	Hackett	Rodwell	Brogeland
	1 🕈	pass	1♦
2♠	3♠	4♠	5NT
pass	6♦	all pass	

Boye, who was partnering Justin Hackett in the individual segment of the event, will take up the narrative:

I was worth a slam after partner's 3Φ and my 5NT was pick-a-slam, asking partner to choose a minor suit. West's lead against the diamond slam was the Φ K. How would you play?

Your instinct, as mine, is probably to pull the opponents' trumps and then take the double hook in clubs. With a 3-2 trump break and divided club honors that plan is as good as any, but what if trumps are 4-1? In that case you can't afford to pull trumps immediately, as you need to ruff a spade in dummy as well as tackling the club suit. To cater for a 4-1 trump split, you should go after clubs right away. I led a low club at Trick 2, planning to insert dummy's ± 10 . West followed with the $\pm K$ on the first round and I won with dummy's ace. It was time to check the trump break by playing the $\pm KQ$ and East pitched a spade on the second round. How would you continue?

Unless the \bigstar K was a falsecard from \bigstar KJ or \bigstar Kx, you pretty much have the whole distribution figured out now. The bidding suggests that spades are 6-4, so West has 6-2-4-1 shape, leaving East with 4-4-1-4. If East has \clubsuit Jxxx as well as his \clubsuit Jxxx, you can still make the slam with careful play. You may look at all four hands before planning the endplay:



The early play in $6 \blacklozenge$ was a spade lead to the ace and a club to the king and ace, the \blacklozenge KQ then revealing the 4-1 trump break.

After this start I crossed to my hand with the \mathbf{V} K, ruffed the spade loser and cashed the \mathbf{A} J. Returning to hand with the \mathbf{V} Q, I drew West's last trump and pitched a club from dummy. Eric Rodwell, sitting East, had to throw one club and his last spade — otherwise I would score my twelfth trick in either hearts or clubs. With four cards left, this was the situation:



In a competition like the Buffett Cup, with the very best players from Europe and the USA battling for glory, there was no point in playing the hand out. An endplay in either hearts or clubs would work, and all four players around the table knew what was going on. Eric Rodwell put his hand back in the slot and I had my +1370.

We will end the chapter with two truly spectacular deals. On the first one, the Icelandic South player picks up an all-black hand:



Ljosbra Baldursdottir passed on the first round, licking her lips at the prospects of partner re-opening with a double. It was not to be. South rebid 4⁺ to show a big two-suiter. North announced her strength with a cuebid and South's 5NT then asked partner to 'pick a slam'. What would you have bid on the North cards?

6NT would not be a clever move. North appreciated the need to play the hand with a trump suit and opted for 6. Saur led his singleton diamond to the \bullet 10 and \bullet J, Stefan Johannson ruffing in his hand. When declarer continued with ace, king and another trump, Boye was endplayed! A heart or diamond return into dummy's tenace would give declarer four spade discards, saving him the spade guess. Boye chose to return a spade, a defense that would have succeeded if West held \bullet Q10x. With declarer's actual spade holding, he was again saved the spade guess and the slam was made.

Not wishing to end the chapter on an anti-climax, after the massive South hand we have just seen, we will look at a deal where Boye picked up an all-red hand. Not only that, both suits were headed by the ace-king. How would you have bid such a monster?



An opening bid of 2^{O} would not be right on the North cards. You can expect heavy intervention and it is essential to mention your suits as soon as possible. Boye opened with a simple 1^{O} and the opponents did indeed enter the auction. At his second turn he showed a giant hand with his 3^{O} bid. At this stage Forrester was unimpressed with the contribution that his hand might make as the dummy. He indicated this by doubling East's 4^{O} bid.

Boye was not finished, of course. One possibility was to leap to $6 \bullet$ at his next turn, but this would not pass the message that a grand slam was possible. Boye chose the amazing bid of $6 \bullet$. This was clearly a grand slam try and had to be based on a red two-suiter. Forrester not only read the message, he realized that his four-card diamond support would allow declarer to establish the heart suit. He completed a glittering auction with a leap to $7 \bullet$, which was easily made. How often do you see the trump suit for a grand slam named for the first time at the seven-level?

DELAYED HEART ATTACK

Sometimes you pick up a hand that looks nothing special initially. As the bidding progresses, you begin to realize that your cards have real potential. Competing in the 1996 European Under-26 Championship (an event that Norway eventually won), Boye picked up these cards in the South seat:

♠J ♥K75432 ♦K3 ♣10765

East opened 1, showing at least four clubs. With only his side vulnerable, Boye decided to pass. West responded 2, an inverted raise that showed club support and good values. How would you react to the situation when East rebids 2, showing a shortage in hearts?

You may think that you still hold a rather drab 7-point hand, but look how much the bidding has told you. West did not respond 1^{\diamondsuit} , so he will hold at most three hearts facing East's singleton or void heart. You therefore know that your partner has a minimum of three-card support for your hearts. The opponents' bidding has also told you that partner has at most one club. In short, the odds look good for a heart contract your way!

By now you must be expecting that Boye bid 3^{\clubsuit} at this stage. Er... no, remember that it was a junior event. He actually went all the way and bid 4^{\clubsuit} . Have you ever seen such an amazing bid? This was the full deal:



West led the $\clubsuit 2$ and dummy went down with two useful cards but disappointing trumps. East won with the $\clubsuit K$ and returned his singleton trump. West defended strongly now, winning with the $\blacklozenge J$ and continuing with the $\blacklozenge A$ and $\blacklozenge Q$. This sacrificed a trump trick, yes, but it prevented declarer from ruffing two clubs in the dummy. Boye lost two trumps, the $\blacklozenge A$ and four club tricks for a penalty of 1100. At the other table his teammates picked up +460 in 3NT.

Some twelve years later, in the 2008 European Championships in Pau, Norway faced the Czech Republic. With only the opponents vulnerable, Boye picked up this South hand:

West opened 1, Espen Lindqvist passed and East responded 1. Would you find a bid on that hand?

Boye is always on the lookout for lead-directing overcalls but here the heart suit was not particularly good. If the opponents stopped low, he would have another chance later. He passed.

West rebid 2⁺ and East bid 2⁺, an artificial game-try. Are you tempted to bid on Boye's hand now?

West could still hold hearts over him, so it was no less dangerous to bid than before. Boye passed again and this was the situation at his next turn:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Vozabal	Lindqvist	Slemr	Boye
1 🛧	pass	1♠	pass
2♣	pass	2♦	pass
3 🛧	pass	pass	Ś

The final chance to bid on the South cards had arrived. What would your decision have been?

Perhaps you are surprised even to see a '?' in the South column. How could it be right to pass twice and then put your head on the block with a bid of 3**?**? It's true that West cannot now hold four hearts and he has declined the game invitation, but surely any possible gain from bidding is outweighed by the chance of conceding a big penalty?

Some players may talk with the angels. Boye sometime feels that he has a good dialogue with the cards. On one occasion (don't laugh, it's true...) the jack of diamonds actually winked at him. At such moments the rational mind has to take second place. Boye dug halfway into his bidding box and extracted the cards for a $3 \forall$ bid.

Memories of Cardiff 1996 came flooding back when West doubled. What would Geir Helgemo have to say when scores were compared and Boye had to announce minus 500 or worse on their card?

This was the complete deal:



West began with the ♣AK, East following twice. How would you play the contract?

Boye ruffed the second club and paused to consider the lie of the trump suit. West had denied four hearts with his $3 \clubsuit$ rebid and had then doubled $3 \heartsuit$. It seemed that he would hold \heartsuit Qxx. Boye finessed the \heartsuit 10 successfully and cashed the \heartsuit A. When he led dummy's \bigstar 9, East covered with the jack and the queen was finessed successfully. The \blacktriangledown K drew the defenders' last two trumps and it was time for some work on the diamond suit.

How did the diamonds lie? East was marked with 5-3-3-2 shape and had so far shown up with only 5 points in the black suits. To justify his game-try on the second round he should hold at least AJx. If West held the remaining Qxx, this would give him another value to justify his penalty double of the final contract. The 9 was the critical card. If West held Q94, nothing could be done — unless West had a brainstorm and forgot to insert the 9 on the first round, allowing dummy's 6 to be played. What if East held AJ9? Ah, then declarer would be in business!

Boye led the \$8 from his hand and was rewarded by the sight of West playing low. East won with the \$9 and returned the \$5. Nothing could be gained by finessing the \$6 at this stage and Boye won with the \$10. When he played his last two trumps, the Czech East player had to make a final discard from \$K85 \$AJ. His choice was a spade and Boye continued with ace and another spade, forcing East to concede a trick to dummy's \$K.

What was the effect of all this? Nine tricks, a fine 730 in the plus column and (more importantly) all memories of Cardiff were extinguished!

11

TECHNICAL MASTERY

In this chapter we will see some impressive examples of cold-blooded technical cardplay, an important attribute of any top performer. We begin with another memory from Boye's early days in the game. In 1994 he played in his first teams final, eventually losing on a split tie. Boye was disappointed not to receive the 'best played hand' award for this deal:



Boye and his partner were experimenting with Precision Club in those days and the 2° opening showed around 11-15 points with short diamonds. 2NT was a relay bid and 3NT showed a maximum with 4-4-1-4 shape. Terje Aa found the only lead to trouble the heart game, a low trump. How would you play the contract when the defenders persist with two further rounds of trumps?

Boye unblocked a trump honor from his hand on the second round and won the third round in the dummy. He then led a low diamond, to rectify the count for a possible squeeze ending. East won with the A and switched to a club, declarer

winning with the ace. Boye crossed to the A and ruffed a low diamond in his hand. (He did not cash the A first because this was his intended squeeze card.) He then played the A and ruffed a spade, isolating the spade guard in the East hand. These cards remained:



The ♦A squeezed East in the black suits, completing a well-timed hand.

Just five years later Boye and his partner, Espen Erichsen, had reached the big time. They were in Las Vegas, playing alongside Brazilian maestro, Gabriel Chagas and the one and only Zia Mahmood. Boye made an excellent technical play on this deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Goldman	Erichsen	Soloway	Brogeland	
			1♠	
pass	2♠	pass	3♦	
pass	4♠	all pass		

Bobby Goldman led the \mathbf{V} K, winning the first trick, and switched to the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ Q. Boye won and took a losing finesse of the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ Q. After winning the club return, he crossed to the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ A and returned to his hand with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ A. At this stage declarer needs to take two ruffs in the dummy and cannot afford to be overruffed. The appearance of the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ 10 and $\mathbf{\Phi}$ 9 from East suggests that he might be short in the suit. How would you continue the play?

Boye led a third round of clubs and discarded dummy's last diamond. On any return he could then ruff a diamond with a low trump and a club with the $\mathbf{\Phi}Q$. This technique is known as 'trading ruffs'. You use a loser-on-loser play to swap a dangerous club ruff for a safer diamond ruff.

Erik Sælensminde reached an ambitious grand slam on the next deal. Bidding the grand was one thing — making it was another! Would you have seen the required line of play?

Both Vul.	🔶 Q 9	4 200)2 European Championship
Dealer South	♥ KQ ♦ K5	73 Nor 83	way - Greece
 ★ KJ2 ♥ 108 ◆ J972 ♣ J976 	 ▲ A7 ♥ AJ9 ◆ AQ ◆ Q5 	E + 1 F + 1 3 2 6 8 3	10 8 6 5 5 4 2 10 6 4 10 4 2
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Brogeland		Sælensminde 1 NT
pass	2♣	pass	2♥
pass	37	pass	3♠
pass	4♣	pass	4NT
pass	5♠	pass	5NT
pass	6♣	pass	6♦
pass	77	all pass	

At that time, Boye and Erik treated North's 3 as forcing. Two cuebids followed and Erik then bid RKCB, hearing of two keycards and the trump queen. 5NT asked for kings and 6 showed the AK. Now 6, the only available bid below six of the trump suit, was Last Train for the grand slam. Boye does not like to accept second prize on such deals and decided to bid the grand slam.

How would you play 7♥ when West leads the ♥8 to your ♥9?

Erik drew trumps in two further rounds. To bump the total to twelve tricks (one short of the required target), he would have to ruff the fourth round of either diamonds or clubs. Which should it be? Erik looked ahead to the end position he would need, to conjure a thirteenth trick. His aim was to squeeze a defender who held the A alongside the sole guard in one of the minor suits. If he played for a spade-club squeeze, only West could be the victim. (East would sit over dummy's threat cards and could not be squeezed). If instead he played for a spade-diamond squeeze, it would be possible to squeeze either opponent. It therefore followed that he should preserve his diamond holding and take a ruff in the club suit!

Erik played three rounds of clubs, throwing a spade from his hand, and ruffed a club with his last trump. He then played the A, a Vienna Coup to free the Q to act as a threat against either opponent. A diamond to the dummy's king left these cards still to be played:



Declarer called for the $\mathbf{P}Q$, discarding the $\mathbf{P}7$ from his hand, and West had to concede the thirteenth trick. Any overbidding could now be forgiven.

On the next deal the Chinese opponents attempted to make life difficult with an unusual opening bid. The end effect was to push Boye into a playable game that might otherwise not have been bid.



Fu Zhong's 2Ψ showed both major suits. When Boye overcalled 2Φ and Jack Zhao raised to 3Ψ , Erik Sælensminde entered with a competitive double. This showed both minor suits and a tolerance for spades (usually a doubleton). Boye could place his partner with at most one heart, after the East-West bidding, and ended the auction with a leap to 5Φ .

East won the heart lead and shifted to a spade. Boye rose with the A and finessed the Q successfully. He cashed the A, throwing a spade, and continued with a spade to the king. Heart ruff, diamond ruff, heart ruff and another diamond ruff left these cards still to be played:



Needing three of the last four tricks, Boye led a spade. If West discards the \mathbf{V} K, declarer will ruff with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ 6, ruff a diamond with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ A and lead his last spade, certain to score another trump. West decided to ruff with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ 7 rather than discarding. Boye overruffed with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ J and led a good diamond. East had to ruff, to prevent declarer from throwing his last spade and endplaying West. Boye overruffed with the $\mathbf{\Phi}$ Q and West's $\mathbf{\Phi}$ K completed the trick.

At Trick 12, West had a choice of two losing cards to play. A trump would allow Boye to win with the A and score a good spade. The VK would let declarer score his last two trumps separately

Look back to the full diagram for a moment. At the other table East did not open and the Chinese pair bid 1 - 2 - 2 - 3, stopping there. It is difficult to fault the auction but clubs were never mentioned.

The key move on the next deal, from the semi-final of a two-day Compact Knockout event, was a subtle one. Would you have spotted it?



West leads a low spade to the ace and East persists with another spade. How would you play the contract?

Boye ruffed the second spade and played the ace of trumps, West discarding a spade. If declarer had followed with the 4 from dummy, he would have gone down. As a matter of good technique, Boye unblocked dummy's 7. This would give him the option of a further trump entry to his hand with the 6.

Boye continued with three rounds of clubs, throwing two hearts from dummy. After a heart to the king and ace, East returned the $\forall J$. Boye ruffed this with dummy's $\diamond 8$, again preserving the $\diamond 4$. One more heart ruff would establish the

suit. Boye returned to his hand by leading the 44 to his 66, taking the marked finesse. He was then able to ruff a third round of hearts high and return to his king of trumps to claim the remainder. (Note that East could not defeat the contract by inserting the J on the second round of trumps, aiming to kill the 6a as an entry. Declarer would then crossruff the remaining tricks with no risk of an overruff.)

You can see what would go wrong if declarer failed to unblock on the first round of trumps. Whether he used the \mathbf{A} or a spade ruff as the entry to his hand for the second heart ruff, East's \mathbf{A} would be promoted.

You may not find Boye's play of the next hand particularly impressive because it was merely a matter of good timing. The fact remains that one of the USA's top players, with many Bermuda Bowl wins to his name, did not find the winning line. We will describe the play up to the point where the two lines diverged. At that stage, you can decide what you would have done next.



Declarer won the \blacklozenge Q lead, cashed the other top diamond and ruffed a diamond in the dummy. A trump to the jack lost to West's queen and West switched to the \blacklozenge 7, drawing East's jack and declarer's ace. Take South's remaining cards now. What will you do next?

Let's see first how the USA declarer went down. He continued with a second round of trumps and West rose with the ace, persisting with a second round of spades. Declarer won with dummy's king, drew the last trump and finessed the \clubsuit J. The finesse lost and East cashed the setting trick in spades.

Foreseeing this 'road to ruin', Boye finessed the **+**J immediately after winning the first spade trick. The finesse lost but East could not play another spade from

his side of the table. When he returned a club, Boye won with the ace and played a second round of trumps. West rose with the \forall A and switched back to spades but Boye could then draw the last trump and discard his spade loser on the thirteenth club.

There are not many matchpoint deals in this book, so make the most of the next one. Look at all four hands and put yourself in declarer's position, playing 4 on the lead of the $\mathbf{\Phi}Q$.



You have an unavoidable trump loser, as the cards lie, and a seemingly certain further loser in spades. Can you see any way that you might make twelve tricks for a good pairs score?

Boye assessed it as a deal where you should try to make as many trump tricks as possible. Since he wanted to ruff three diamonds in his hand, he preserved the entries to dummy by winning the club lead with the ace. A diamond to the ace was followed by a diamond ruff, a club to the king and another diamond ruff. A trump to the ace allowed him to ruff dummy's last diamond, everyone following. Little could be lost by this sort of play; if a defender happened to overruff the fourth diamond, this would often be at the expense of a natural trump trick.

A club ruff in dummy was followed by a second round of trumps. All followed to the AK, leaving only two tricks to be played:



In a way, the two original losers (one spade and one trump) were still intact. Boye led the 46 and ruffed successfully with dummy's 9. At Trick 13 West had to ruff partner's 4Q with the Q. Twelve tricks! Even if West's last side-suit card had been a spade, instead of a club, dummy's 9 would have been promoted as a twelfth trick.

Well, that's amazing. You wait an age for a matchpoint deal and then two arrive in a row. Take Boye's cards here and test yourself on this one:



How would you play this heart game when West leads the **\$**Q? It is Boye's turn to tell you what happened at the table:

I start with one loser in each suit, and in trumps I could even get two losers if it's a 4-1 break. The task is to get rid of one of the losers and surely that must be the one in spades. Somehow I must set up a diamond trick, so I can discard a spade from dummy. How can that be done?

I should lead the single diamond from the dummy. If East rises with the ace, which is perhaps more likely when defending at matchpoints than in an IMPs game, I can take a ruffing finesse against West's king.

Well, I am going to try that. I need to reach dummy to lead the 6. If I play the ace and king of trumps, I will be short of entries to my hand, so I make the better play of the 8 to dummy's K. I lead dummy's 6, hoping to see the A appear from East. No, he plays an unhelpful 10. I cover with the queen and West wins with the ace. West continues spades and I win with the K. What now, do you think?

The only hope is that I can ruff out the K doubleton. East played the 10 on the first round; maybe he started with K10. It is not much of a chance but it is all I have. I lead the 3 and — wonderful sight — the Kappears from West! He began with AK. I ruff in the dummy and return to my A, both defenders following. I can now play the established J to discard dummy's last spade. No one ruffs with the top trump but it would make no difference if they did. I lose just one trump and the minor-suit aces to make the game.

This was the full layout:



When I look at the detailed scoresheet later, I see that some declarers were favored with a top-diamond lead from West. It was easy for them to set up a diamond trick with a ruffing finesse and then discard a spade from the dummy. At the nine tables where West found the more awkward lead of a spade, only four of the declarers managed to make the game. They had to earn their money rather than just put it in their pocket!

We will next see a deal where decisions were to be made in both the bidding and the play. Boye will describe the action:

Both Vul.	🔶 K 8 6	43	2001 Bermuda Bowl
Dealer North	💙 A 7 3		Norway - Japan
	🔶 Q 5		
	♣ 652		
♠ J5		•	1092
♥ 5	N N	•	Q 10 9 6 2
🔶 AKJ1073	2 W E	•	4
1097	2	+	K Q 8 3
	🕈 AQZ	7	
	🂙 K J 8	4	
	986		
	🕈 AJ4		
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Sælensminde		Brogeland
	pass	pass	1NT
pass	2♥	pass	2♠
pass	3NT	pass	4♠
all pass			

Should I pass 3NT or go to 44, playing in the 5-3 fit? Many players reckon that it is better to play in 3NT in the long run. The main reason why I decided to bid 44 was that the Japanese West had seemed keen to bid, both over 1NT and 24. So I assumed he had a long diamond suit, which might be cashing against 3NT.

Quite right! Lefty starts with AK against the spade game and East discards a heart. How do you play when West continues with the J?

You need five spade tricks to have any hope of winning this contract. Rather than ruffing, I pitch a losing club from dummy at Trick 3. West switches to the ♥5, which goes to East's queen and your king. What now?

East's ready discard of a heart tells me that hearts are likely to be 5-1. Five spades, three hearts and the A leaves me one trick short. My only chance is to find East with the A (in addition to his heart guard. I will then be able to squeeze him in hearts and clubs. I cash my A and pull trumps to reach this ending, with the lead in dummy:



When I play the 6, East shrugs his shoulders. He has to give up one of the suits and I have a neat 620!

On the next deal Boye was partnering Rita Shugart of the USA. This was the layout:



How would you have played this contract when West leads the A?

You have one trick to lose in spades and therefore need to lose only one diamond trick. Provided East holds at least one of the missing diamond honors, you can succeed by taking two diamond finesses. There are only two entries to dummy with which to take these finesses: the A and the A. You should therefore take one diamond finesse immediately after winning with the A. Does anything else occur to you about the deal?

Boye considered the situation where West held a singleton $\diamond K$ or $\diamond Q$. Suppose he won the first trick with the $\diamond A$ and ran the $\diamond J$, losing to a singleton honor. West might be able to cross to the East hand with a spade and a diamond ruff would then beat the contract! Once he had spotted this potential problem, it was easy to find a remedy. To break communications between the West and East hand, Boye ducked the opening lead. He won the spade continuation and led the $\diamond J$. Had this lost to a singleton honor, all would have been well. There would have been no possibility of a spade entry to the East hand.

As you see from the diagram, eleven tricks would have been made even if declarer had won the first spade and drawn trumps, later relying on just one diamond lead from dummy. Sometimes virtue must be its own reward!

THREE SLAMS IN SHANGHAI

With one sixteen-board set to be played in the final of the 2007 Bermuda Bowl, contested in Shanghai, Norway led the USA by the considerable margin of 284-207. Only a wild set of boards would give the Americans any chance at all of closing the deficit. This was the third board:

E-W Vul. Dealer South	 ▲ K9 ▼ 3 ◆ 7 3 ◆ K9 	83 8543	2007 Bermuda Bowl fina Norway - USA	I
 ♦ 65 ♥ Q965 ♦ K Q86 ₱ 762 	N W S ▲ A 100 ♥ A 100 ♥ A 100 ♥ A 4 100 ◆ A J 100 ♣ A J 100	E 0 4 2 10 2	Q J 7 J 8 7 4 10 9 5 4 2 Q	
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Helgemo	Rosenberg	Helness	Zia 2♣	
pass	2♦	pass	2NT	
pass	3♣	pass	4 ♣	
pass	4♥	pass	4♠	
pass	4NT	pass	5♦	
pass	5♥	pass	5♠	
pass all pass	6 ♣	pass	6♠	

Zia upgraded his hand into the $2 \oplus$ range. His $4 \oplus$ Stayman response showed four cards in both majors and Rosenberg bid $4 \heartsuit$ to transfer into spades. Roman Keycard Blackwood discovered that Zia held all four aces but not the queen of trumps. Rosenberg offered $6 \oplus$ as an alternative contract but Zia went back to $6 \oplus$.

Zia won the K lead, drew one round of trumps with the ace and played two top hearts to ditch dummy's diamond loser. A trump to the king brought good news on the break in that suit and the K then dropped the Q from East. +980 to the USA.

At the other table Boye opened 2NT and made twelve tricks in the spade game. 11 IMPs away.

Norway had lost two further big swings by the time the next slam arrived:



Boye was on lead, after East's conventional opening. Since the opponents figured to hold two long and strong suits, he had to look for quick tricks in the other suits. His opening lead was the A, on which Erik played the 9. This was a reverse-attitude discouraging signal. Knowing that there were no further tricks available in diamonds, Boye switched to the 3. Sweet news arrived on this trick. Declarer called despairingly for dummy's K and Erik won with the A! Any fears of a catastrophic final set that would snatch victory from Norway's grasp could now surely be put aside.

This was the auction at the other table:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Helgemo	Rosenberg	Helness	Zia
		2♣	pass
34	3♠	4♥	4♠
6 ♣	pass	67	all pass

What should Zia lead, do you think? The situation was similar to that at the other table: declarer had a great heart suit and dummy had a similarly powerful club suit. Was it not clear to attempt to cash two tricks in the other two suits?

A spade lead would have beaten the contract; Rosenberg would surely switch to a diamond, knowing from Zia's raise that no further spade trick was available. As at the other table, the A lead would receive a discouraging attitude signal and a spade switch would then be obvious. What about a club lead? Declarer would win with the A and, with no further entry to dummy available, would have to try a second round of clubs to get his spade loser away. North would ruff the second club, leaving declarer with losers in both spades and diamonds, so even a club lead would beat the slam.

Zia led a trump.

The commentators on the internet site Bridge Base Online, David Bird among them, could not fathom the rationale behind this lead. Tor Helness drew trumps and ran the clubs for an overtrick. The Norwegians gained 17 IMPs and were now 49 IMPs ahead with only six boards to play.

The penultimate board of the match provided yet another slam opportunity:

N-S Vul. Dealer South	 ♦ 976 ♥ J85 ♦ 83 ♥ K85 	5 2 4	2007 Bermuda Bowl final Norway - USA
 ♠ K Q 8 5 ♥ 9 ♦ Q J 5 ♣ A J 4 3 2 	N W L S ▲ A 10 ♥ 7 6 3 ● 9 4 2 ◆ 9 7 6	4 3	J A K Q 10 2 A K 10 7 6 Q 10
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Weinstein	Sælensminde	Garner	Brogeland
			pass
] 🛧	pass	1♦	pass
]♠	pass	2♦	pass
2NT	pass	3♦	pass
3♠	pass	4♦	pass
4♥	pass	4♠	pass
5♠	pass	6♦	all pass

Steve Garner's 1♦ response showed hearts and 2♦ was fourth-suit forcing. On the fifth round of bidding, both players cuebid a singleton opposite a known suit in

partner's hand, which is a risky practice unless you know what you're doing. The bidding came to a halt in 6 and it was Boye to lead. What would your choice have been from that South hand?

It was not attractive to lead the A since this would surely set up at least one winner in dummy, perhaps allowing a club discard. West had implied a club control with his grand-slam try of 5A and Boye led the A6 through West's top card in the suit. Garner had no alternative but to run the club lead. Erik Sælensminde won with the AK and returned a spade, putting the slam one down.

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Helgemo	Rosenberg	Helness	Zia	
			pass	
1 🕈	pass	1 💙	pass	
1♠	pass	2♦	pass	
2NT	pass	3♦	pass	
4 ♣	dbl	pass	pass	
rdbl	pass	4♥	pass	
4♠	pass	4NT	pass	
5♦	pass	6NT	all pass	

This was the bidding at the other table:

Helgemo's 4[•] agreed diamonds as trumps. When this cuebid was doubled by Rosenberg, he redoubled to confirm first-round control. Seeing the danger of a club lead against 6[•], Helness chose 6NT (which would be played by West) as the final contract.

Rosenberg led the \bigstar 7, Zia winning with the \bigstar A and switching to a club. Helgemo rose with the \bigstar A and eventually finessed the \checkmark 10 to make the slam. A few minutes later, the final score was announced: Norway 324 - USA 245. The Norwegians were world champions for the first time. What does it feel like to be a world champion? Let Boye tell you:

Winning the Bermuda Bowl in 2007 was a dream coming true. Ever since I was a kid, I wanted to become a world champion at something. I always admired the best athletes in any sport, boxing and football being my favorites, but I soon understood that I wouldn't become a Muhammad Ali or a Diego Maradona. In bridge, though, I felt I could compete at the highest level, given some experience. I would hate to be forty and look back at what could have been, so in my twenties I dedicated a lot of time to become as good a bridge player as I could.

We played pretty well in the final, and going into the last segment the USA needed a spectacular finish to beat us. They got off to a good start while we had some shaky moments, but after beating a slam and banking a couple of other good results, I knew we couldn't lose. Leaving the table to meet the rest of the team I was covered with goose bumps. We had made it; Norway's first gold in the Bermuda Bowl.

It was a great win for Erik and me, as we had played less often in recent years and knew that it could be our last chance to win the Bermuda Bowl together. After the tournament we decided to call it a day since it sure wouldn't get better than this. Standing on the podium singing Queen's 'We are the Champions' and our national anthem 'Ja, vi elsker' truly was a high in my bridge career.



Celebrating the Bermuda Bowl win in Shanghai, 2007.



With Zia Mahmood after their win in the Icelandair Open Pairs, 2003.



Boye becomes a World Grand Master by winning the Bermuda Bowl in Shanghai, 2007 (L-R Tor Helness, Boye, Geir Helgemo).



Comparing scores at the Bermuda Bowl in São Paulo, 2009 (L-R Ulf Tundal, Glenn Grøtheim, Boye, Espen Lindqvist).



With Ishmael Del'Monte after winning the IMP Pairs in St. Louis (Spring Nationals 2007).



The winning Norwegian team, European Championships, 2008.

DEFEND WITH YOUR LIFE

At the age of fourteen, Boye played his first competitive bridge at a local club in Moi, a small town in the south of Norway with a population of 1500. His partner then was Knut Erik Ljung, not only the best player at the club but also Boye's mathematics teacher at school (his multiplication exercises were the highlight of the week.) Boye believes that the five years he played with his early mentor, from 1987 to 1992, were the most important of his bridge career.

The fondly remembered defensive deal below was played around 1990. Boye will describe the action.



all pass

I led the AG and Ljung took the first two tricks with the AQ and AK. He switched to the AG and declarer won with the ace. Declarer played three rounds of diamonds, and I pitched a spade as Ljung won with the jack. The AQ return went to the nine and ten, and I cashed three rounds of clubs, getting to this situation before the last club:


When I led the $\clubsuit7$, Ljung discarded the $\bigstar3$. Can you believe it now? Declarer was caught in a defensive criss-cross squeeze! Whichever spotcard he decided to throw, we would score the remaining three tricks. When he let go of a heart, I cashed the \PK and Ljung got the last two tricks with the \bigstarA and the \PJ . The contract was down four. I slept well that night.

Another happy moment from Boye's formative years at the bridge table was the defense against this spade game, from his first win in a big pairs event.



Boye led the \forall K and Kåre Kristiansen overtook with the \forall A to return another heart, drawing South's \forall 10 and Boye's \forall Q. It was clear to Boye in the West seat that no

defensive tricks would come from the minors. He continued with a third round of hearts, declarer winning with the \checkmark 9.

A diamond to the ace was followed by a finesse of the $\blacklozenge J$, losing to West's $\blacklozenge K$. When Boye led a fourth heart, it mattered little that this would give declarer a ruffand-sluff. East ruffed with the $\blacklozenge Q$, overruffed by South's $\blacklozenge A$ and this promoted West's $\blacklozenge 8$ into the setting trick.

Aided by this board, Boye and Kåre went on to win the event. The victory was especially sweet since they finished 1% ahead of Geir Helgemo and Tor Helness, who were already big stars at that time.

Boye recalls:

This still stands as one of my finest memories — in tears, phoning my grandmother from a phone booth just minutes after winning the tournament. At the weekends, as an eight-year-old, I loved going to my grandparents', as my grandmother made the most delicious pancakes with tasty bacon. Every night I was allowed to stay up, playing cards, and one of these nights they taught me to play three-handed bridge. Just to pick up the cards and count my points was a thrill, let alone to aim for a certain number of tricks in the bidding and then plan the play of a hand.

In the 1998 Norwegian Club Championship, Boye won the Rica Prize for the best defended deal of the event. He was sitting West on this deal:

Neither Vul.	♠ —	1998 Norwegian championship
Dealer South	 AQ63 AQJ74 Q1042 	Fagernes
 ♦ 9642 ♥ J94 ♦ K985 ♦ K6 	N W E S ♠ K J 10 5	 ▲ Q 8 7 3 ♥ 8 7 ♦ 10 6 ₱ 8 7 5 3
	♥ K 1052 ♦ 32 ♣ AJ9	

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Brogeland	Halvorsen	Sælensminde	Sjømæling
			1 💙
pass	2NT	pass	4♥
pass	4♠	dbl	pass
pass	rdbl	pass	5 +
pass	67	all pass	

North's Jacoby 2NT showed a game-forcing raise in hearts; South's jump to 4♥ then indicated a minimum. When Erik Sælensminde doubled the 4♠ cuebid, North's redouble showed that his control was first-round rather than second-round. With trumps 3-2 and the diamond finesse onside, you may think that the slam was destined to succeed. Let's see what happened.

Boye led a spade, ruffed in the dummy. Knut Sjømæling led the $\blacklozenge2$, East showing count with the $\blacklozenge7$ (second-best from four), and finessed the \blacklozengeJ . If Boye were to win this trick, the slam would easily be made. Suppose he returns another spade. Declarer ruffs in dummy, cashes the \lorAQ and plays a club to the nine. He can then draw West's last trump and finesse the $\diamond Q$. He returns to hand with the \diamondsuitA , finesses the \blacklozengeJ and discards both the remaining spades (one on the \blacklozengeQ , the other on the \diamondsuitA).

Boye knew from Erik's count signal that declarer had three clubs and was likely to repeat the club finesse. Hoping to spoil the entry position, he let the $\clubsuit J$ win! Declarer finessed the $\blacklozenge Q$ successfully and played a club to the nine. When Boye won with the $\bigstar K$ and led another spade, declarer's entries were hopelessly entangled. He ruffed in the dummy, played the ace-queen of trumps and tried to reach his hand with the $\bigstar A$. Boye ruffed with the $\blacklozenge J$ and a spade to East's ace put the slam two down.

Sometimes a position is reached where 'only one card is good enough'. It happened on this deal from a round-robin match in the Bermuda Bowl.



i

On this type of auction the best attack is often in dummy's second-best suit. Boye led the AQ and this was allowed to hold. East won the club continuation with the ace and cleared the suit, South and West throwing spades. Not blessed with any psychic powers, declarer played the A and Q, West throwing another spade. A diamond to the king was followed by the 10 to the queen and king. Boye was on lead in the West seat with these cards still out:



Suppose you were sitting West here. How would you continue the defense?

You can see what would happen on a low heart return. Declarer would win with the $\forall 10$ and throw West back on lead with ace and another spade. The enforced heart exit would be run to the queen and declarer would have his contract.

A spade return is better for the defense but declarer still has a chance to make the contract if he scores his spades and endplays West with a heart honor. Only one card is guaranteed to defeat the contract and Boye found it: the ♥K! Declarer won with the ♥A and continued with the ♥Q and ♥10. Boye scored the ♥J9, putting the contract one down, and then had to lead into the spade tenace.

Take Boye's East cards here and see if you can match his defense:



Tony Forrester's negative double implies hearts and you show your three cards in hearts with a support double. South arrives in $3 \clubsuit$ and Forrester leads the $\bigstar K$. At Trick 2 he switches to the $\heartsuit 3$ and you win with the $\blacktriangledown A$.

How would you continue the defense from the East seat? When you have made up your mind, you can take a look at the full deal:



If partner's \diamond K opening lead was from a doubleton, you can play the \diamond A and give him a diamond ruff. That will be four tricks for the defense but it is likely that declarer can then discard any club losers on the surplus diamond winners in dummy. If he holds the \forall K, he will make the contract.

Boye paused to calculate West's diamond holding. Would he really have made a speculative lead from Kx when he could have led one of the two suits that the partnership had bid? Surely he must hold a singleton K!

Once this inference had been taken, the next step was to lead the \blacklozenge 10 at Trick 3, retaining the \blacklozenge A. Forrester ruffed and switched to the \clubsuit J, setting up Boye's

◆K. What's more, this card had been set up before dummy's long diamonds were established for club discards. The defenders duly scored a club and a second diamond, putting the contract one down. It was a memorable defense.

The next deal illustrates a difference between defending at teams and at pairs. With the chance to defeat a vulnerable game at IMPs scoring, Boye took a risk that he might have spurned in a pairs event.



Erik Sælensminde led the \mathbf{Q} against the heart game. Declarer won with the \mathbf{A} and then played ace and another trump. Suppose you were sitting West. How would you continue the defense?

With only two tricks available to the defenders in the red suits, and none in clubs, Erik could see the need for a spade switch. He switched to the \$10 and Boye won with the bare ace. All now depended on East's next move. What would your decision have been?

If West had led from a doubleton diamond, his remaining card could be the \bullet 10, \bullet 7 or \bullet 3. At pairs it would be dangerous to return a low diamond, underleading the \bullet KJ, because if declarer won with the \bullet 10 he would score a valuable overtrick. At teams, any chance to beat the contract should be grabbed. The only way to beat the contract was to find partner with exactly \bullet Q10 and Boye duly returned a low diamond. He was rewarded by the appearance of partner's \bullet 10 and a spade ruff then defeated the game.

(At double-dummy, declarer can make the contract — even with an overtrick — by finessing the \clubsuit J at Trick 2. This would be way against the odds compared with the line that he actually chose.)

The next deal comes from a Bermuda Bowl final. The Americans reached 3NT on a deal where Helgemo and Helness had stopped in 3• at the other table. Finding the right defense against 3NT was therefore worth a bundle of IMPs. How would you have fared?



Boye led the $\blacklozenge2$, Kyle Larsen winning East's $\blacklozenge9$ with the \blacklozengeJ . A finesse of the \blacklozengeJ proved successful and declarer then ran the \blacklozengeJ to Boye's queen. Suppose you had been sitting West. What would you have done next?

You can expect declarer to have seven tricks in the minor suits. If he can add one spade and one heart to the total, he will reach the tape before you. Continuing clubs would have been too slow; declarer would win with the ace, run the \P 8 and set up a spade trick. Boye realized that three spade tricks would be needed to accompany his two tricks in hearts. The \P 9 might have a role to play later, so he switched to the \P 5.

Larsen played low from dummy, Erik Sælensminde winning with the \blacklozenge J. Back came the \blacklozenge 3 to West's \blacklozenge 9 and dummy's queen. Running the \blacklozenge 8 to West's \blacklozenge A would not help declarer now, since he would lose five tricks in the majors. He therefore led the \blacklozenge 8 to his \blacklozenge K, hoping that East held the \blacklozenge A. Not today, my friend. Boye won with the \blacklozenge A and led a third round of spades through dummy's \blacklozenge K. The game was then two down, which was worth an 8 IMP swing in conjunction with the +130 from the other table.

The next deal features defense against an elimination end position. Take the West cards and see how well you would have fared.



Boye led the \mathbf{A} K, East signaling count with the \mathbf{A} 3, and declarer followed with the \mathbf{A} 9. Maarten Schollaardt won the low diamond continuation, crossed to the trump ace and ruffed dummy's last diamond. He then drew the outstanding trumps, cashed the \mathbf{A} K and ruffed a club in his hand. Would you have seen the danger when declarer next led a heart towards dummy's jack?

Suppose you play the \P 9 on the first round. You will have to win the next round of hearts and, with only minor-suit cards in your hand, concede a ruff-and-sluff. Declarer will discard dummy's last heart, ruff in his hand and claim the contract.

When declarer led the \forall 3, Boye rose with the \forall A. The only chance of beating the contract now was to find partner with the \forall KQ. He exited with his remaining heart and partner scored two more heart tricks, for one down.

TOIL AND TROUBLE

Doubled contracts have a character all of their own. It's as if a thundercloud has descended and is hovering a few feet above the table. In this chapter we will see several instructive contracts with one aspect in common — they were all doubled. By the time the chapter closes, we may have picked up a lesson or two on when a penalty double is appropriate.

The first deal comes from the final round of a national championship for club teams.



You may choose your own adjective for Boye's 4♥ bid. It was a somewhat ambitious shot, it is true, and he was lucky that dummy had nothing wasted in clubs.

West led the 10, won by East's A. A trump return would have worked well, leaving declarer with three spade losers in addition to the trick already lost in

diamonds. No, East returned a diamond and West ruffed with the $\mathbf{\Psi}4$. A club came back to the ace and Boye ruffed in the South hand.

So far the play was the same as at the other table, where the contract was also 4♥, although not doubled. The other declarer continued with the ace and king of trumps. He discarded a spade on the fourth round of diamonds and eventually lost two spade tricks to go one down. Boye drew just one round of trumps, with the ace, hoping that this would exhaust West's trumps. He then played dummy's ◆QJ, discarding a spade. West was unable to ruff and the contract would now be made if declarer could ruff a spade in dummy.

When Boye led a low spade from the table, the \blacklozenge 7 appeared from East. He finessed the \blacklozenge 10 — losing the first round to West, who did not have a trump to return. Nothing could then prevent him from ruffing a spade for his tenth trick. (It would not assist East to insert the \blacklozenge Q. Boye would win with the \blacklozenge A and play the \blacklozenge 10, forcing West to win the trick.)

Switching tack somewhat, we will see a deal where Norway played in a doubled game at both tables:



Erik Sælensminde opened a strong 1NT, adding a point or two for his chunky club suit. It was not attractive to defend with such a long suit in his hand, so he jumped to 3NT on the second round. Alfredo Versace doubled but on any lead there were nine top tricks. +550 to Norway.

At the other table East opened the bidding:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Helness	Nunes	Helgemo	Fantoni
		1♦	24
dbl	2NT	pass	3NT
4♣	pass	4♦	dbl
pass	pass	rdbl	pass
4♥	pass	pass	dbl
all pass			

Nunes and Fantoni did well to reach 3NT but Helness was not willing to surrender. He bid 4♠ over Fantoni's 3NT, looking for the best available trump suit. Helgemo did not want to guess which major to bid, so he marked time with 4♠, happy to play there undoubled if there was no further bidding. When this was doubled, he redoubled for rescue. Helness ended in 4♥ doubled and North led the ♠K. What outcome would you expect?

Helness ruffed the club lead and crossed to the A to lead a trump. When the K won he led the Q from his hand. South won with the A and led a club, forcing declarer to ruff again. A second spade went to North's K and he had to find a return from 6 = 6 = 104 = 28. Six of his seven cards would have been good enough to defeat the contract but Nunes chose the seventh, the G. The contract was made and Norway gained 15 IMPs — not enough to win the match, as it turned out.

We will take a breather from doubled contracts at both tables. On this deal Boye and his partner were doubled in two different games:

 ◆ 854 ♥ AKJ8 ◆ ◆ A62 	2004 Euro Championshi Norway - France	p	
N W E S ↑ 10 2 ♥ 7 ♦ Q 10 ♣ K Q J	7 3 7 5 4	K Q J 3 Q 10 5 A K J 8 6 10	
NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Sælensminde 1 ♥	Rombaut dbl	Brogeland 2♣	
4♥	dbl	pass	
5 ♣	pass	pass	
all pass			
	 ♦ 8 5 4 ♦ A K J 8 ← ♦ A 6 2 N W E 5 ♦ 10 2 7 ♀ 10 2 7 ♀ 10 2 ₹ K Q J NORTH Sælensminde 1♥ 4♥ 5♣ all pass 	\bullet 8 5 4 \bullet A K J 8 6 4 3 \bullet $$ \bullet A 6 2 W E \bullet 10 2 \bullet 7 \bullet Q 10 7 3 \bullet K Q J 7 5 4 NORTH EAST Sælensminde Rombaut 1 dbl 4 dbl 5 pass all pass \bullet	 ♦ 8 5 4 2004 Euro Championshi ♦ A K J 8 6 4 3 Norway - France ♦ A 6 2

At the other table, North's leap to 4^{\heartsuit} ended the auction. Multon, the French declarer, ruffed the A lead and crossed to the A. A finesse of the \Im failed and the defenders claimed three spade tricks for one down. So, how would Boye fare in his contract of 5^{\clubsuit} doubled?

Lionel Sebbane launched the defense with ace and another spade. Jérome Rombaut won the second spade and switched to the A, aiming to force the trumps in the hand that contained the long hearts. This line of defense made it likely that East held a stopper in the heart suit. After ruffing the diamond switch in dummy, Boye returned to his hand with a spade ruff and led another diamond. This was the key trick. Which card would you have played from dummy?

Although there was no risk of an overruff, Boye ruffed the second round of diamonds with dummy's A to avoid a blockage in the trump suit. He was then able to lead the A to his A and run the remaining trumps. On the last trump East had to find a discard from Q105 and A. A heart discard would obviously be fatal, so he threw the A in the hope that West held the Q. It was not to be. Boye faced the Q and then scored the AK to make his doubled contract. A fine piece of cardplay!

Boye faced a similar problem on the next deal — communication between the two hands — but his solution was different. Would you have made the contract?



East's double was not music to West's ears. Since he could hardly bid at the fivelevel on his drab hand, he had to pass. He led the $\diamond 2$ and cannot have found much cheer from the dummy that went down. East won with the $\diamond 10$ and continued with the $\diamond A$. Boye ruffed in the South hand, noting that he would have to restrict his losers to the three missing aces. When he led a club to the queen, East won with the ace and played another top diamond. Boye ruffed low and saw that if he ruffed his club loser with the \Rightarrow 10, he might have difficulty in returning to his hand without suffering a trump promotion. How would you have continued from this point?

Boye cashed the $\bigstar K$ and ruffed his club loser with the $\bigstar 10$. Without cashing the $\bigstar K$, he then led the $\blacklozenge J$. When this was covered by East's $\blacklozenge Q$, he discarded his heart loser. After this clever move all thoughts of a defensive trump promotion could be dismissed. If East played the $\blacktriangledown A$ next, Boye would ruff, cross to the $\bigstar K$ and return to his hand with a heart ruff to draw West's trumps. East in fact played a fifth round of diamonds, which Boye ruffed in his hand. If West chose to overruff with the $\bigstar J$, dummy's $\bigstar K$ would win the trick and declarer could then return to hand with a heart ruff to draw trumps. That was ten tricks for declarer, however the defenders twisted and turned.

Espen Lindqvist was declarer on the next deal, again a doubled game. The kibitzers at the time would have offered long odds against the contract being made. When a contract is doubled, however, strange things can happen.



West led a heart to East's \forall J and East continued with the \forall K. Lindqvist ruffed with the \diamond 8, West following suit, and led the \diamond K to West's \diamond A. How would you attempt to give yourself a chance when West returns the \diamond 7?

East holds eight red cards and must therefore guard at least one black suit, if not both. There cannot therefore be a genuine black-suit squeeze on West. The $\mathbf{\Psi}Q$ threat card is positioned under East's guard in the suit and cannot be of any use with regard to a possible double squeeze. In short, Lindqvist realized that he would

not be able to make the contract against perfect defense. Instead he aimed to make life difficult for the defender in the West seat.

Lindqvist won with dummy's A, deliberately blocking the club suit. If he had won with the K, there would have been no chance of West abandoning his club guard later in the play. This way, there might be some doubt in West's mind as to the location of the K.

Now came a torrent of diamonds. West decided to keep the \bigstar KQ, in case declarer held the \bigstar J. In fact his first four discards were club, spade, club and club. He threw two more spades subsequently, keeping \bigstar KQ and \bigstar Q as his last three cards. Lindqvist was then able to play the \bigstar K and cross to the \bigstar A to score the \bigstar 6 as his eleventh trick.

Before moving on, do you think that the defenders should have done better somehow? After West's club switch at Trick 4, it was difficult indeed for him to judge which cards to keep. South was likely to hold two spades and two clubs, yes, but West still needed to guess whether South held the \bigstar K or the \blacklozenge J. It seems to us that West should have switched to the \clubsuit K instead of a club. Declarer would then make the contract only if he held both \blacklozenge Jx and \clubsuit Kx, in which case no defense would have troubled him.

We have something different for you now: Boye is the declarer, in a high-level doubled contract, and you have the chance to defend against him.



After an exciting auction, South ends in 5 \blacklozenge doubled. West, your partner, leads the \blacklozenge A and declarer ruffs with dummy's \blacklozenge 3. What is your plan for the defense when declarer's next move is to call for dummy's \blacklozenge 8?

When you have decided what to do, look at the complete diagram:



Alex Dubinin played low, perhaps thinking that declarer would run the \clubsuit 8 to some bare honor in the West hand. The contract could no longer be beaten! Boye won with the \clubsuit K and ruffed a diamond in dummy. A heart to the king allowed him to ruff his last diamond, exhausting the table's trumps.

Boye reached his hand with the \bigstar K and led the \bigstar Q to East's \bigstar A. With no diamonds left, East switched to the \blacktriangledown Q. Declarer won with the \clubsuit A and led a second round of clubs. The poor East player had only black cards in his hand. He could not prevent declarer from reaching his hand in clubs and drawing the last two trumps with his \bigstar 107. That was eleven tricks and +650 to go with the +600 for 5 \bigstar at the other table — a swing of 15 IMPs.

To beat the contract, East had to win with the trump ace and play another trump. Declarer would no longer be able to ruff all his diamond losers.

All four tables in the Vanderbilt semi-finals reached 4♥ doubled here:



Boye passed on the first round of bidding, to discover how strong the opponents' hands were. When they dropped the bidding in 2 \blacklozenge it was clear that North, Rita Shugart, would hold at least 8 points. (Boye had 9 points and East-West would surely have tried for game if they held 24 points or more.) Hoping that his partner's points would plug a few of the gaps in his hand, Boye bid 4 \clubsuit . East doubled this, on the strength of his two aces facing a strong 1NT. As you see, East-West in fact had a spade game available their way, due to the double fit.

Both Wests in this match led the K against Ψ doubled. At Boye's table East signaled encouragement with the 7 and West played another diamond. Curtains for the defense! Boye ruffed in his hand, crossed to the V and returned to his hand with another diamond ruff. He drew a second round of trumps with the ace, East showing out, and played the K and A, West's queen appearing. Away went a spade on the third round of clubs and West had to ruff with his trump trick. Declarer lost one spade, one heart and one diamond, making the contract.

At the other table Ishmael Del'Monte sat West with George Mittelman East. They were playing the excellent signaling method known as 'ace for attitude, king for count'. In other words, they would signal their attitude if partner led an ace (or a queen) but show their count after a king lead. When Del'Monte led the K, Mittelman gave a reverse count signal of the 2, showing an even number of diamonds. Since declarer was known to hold a huge number of hearts, the odds were high that East held four diamonds to declarer's one. Del'Monte therefore switched to the K. This time East signaled an odd number of spades, with a

reverse count signal of the \blacklozenge 7. Knowing that a second spade would stand up, West cashed the \blacklozenge Q successfully. The reversion to diamonds was ruffed but nothing could stop West from scoring the setting trick with his \blacklozenge Q.

In the other semi-final one West continued diamonds at Trick 2 and the other switched to a trump. A flat board in minus 790! It is hard to imagine a more compelling advertisement in favor of 'ace for attitude, king for count'.

Have you heard of the Buffett Cup? It is the bridge equivalent of golf's Ryder Cup, where Europe faces the USA every two years. To match the three sections of the Ryder Cup, the bridge event is split into teams-of-four, pairs and an individual (all with point-a-board scoring). The next deal arose in the individual segment of the 2008 event. Take the West cards and see if you can solve the defensive problem that Boye faced.



Boye led the \bigstar 4, Sabine Auken winning with the \bigstar 10. When the \blacklozenge 5 was returned, Hamman put in the \blacklozenge 10 and Boye won with the \blacklozenge J. This is the first part of the problem. What would you return from the West hand?

It is not safe to play another spade, since there is a danger that declarer will set up dummy's spade suit. Boye decided to return the \forall K and all followed to this trick, South winning with the ace. Hamman's next move was to lead the \diamond Q from his hand. Boye won with the \diamond K, East showing an odd number of diamonds, and now faced a serious problem. What should he do next?

When you have made your decision, take a look at the full diagram:



The early play was: spade lead to East's ten and a trump return to the ten and jack. Boye returned the king of trumps to the ace and declarer then threw him on lead with the \mathbf{Q} to his \mathbf{K} . Suppose West exits with a diamond. Declarer will win with the \mathbf{Q} and throw a club from dummy on the \mathbf{A} . He will then ditch dummy's last club on the fourth round of diamonds, a loser-on-loser play. West will be endplayed without escape. A spade will allow dummy's suit to be set up. A club, high or low, will let declarer score his \mathbf{K} and ruff the other two club losers.

Boye found the only exit to prevent the contract from being made. On lead with the \mathbf{K} , he played ace and another club. This allowed declarer to make his \mathbf{K} but he was left with three losers (two diamonds and a club) and only two trumps in dummy with which to ruff them. One down!

We will close the chapter with a deal where Boye made two bold moves during the bidding:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Sælensminde		Brogeland	
			1♦
pass	1♥	pass	1 🛧
pass	2♠	3♣	3♦
pass	4♠	dbl	all pass

As you look at Boye's bid of 3, you are maybe regretting the purchase of a book by two authors, at least one of whom is completely mad. Hang on a minute and listen to the reasoning behind the bid. West has neither overcalled in a major nor made a takeout double, despite being white against red and obviously holding fair values. It follows that he should hold some length in clubs. You're not convinced? Well, it was many years ago; Boye might not find such an overcall nowadays.

The main point of the deal lies in Boye's double of 4^{\bullet} . This could hardly be based on high-card values and was therefore lead-directing. Erik Sælensminde led the $\bullet A$, Boye throwing a heart, and continued with a suit-preference $\bullet 2$. Boye ruffed and returned a club, the defenders eventually claiming two trump tricks, two clubs and the two red aces for a penalty of 800. The time to try such a double is when the opponents' auction is limited and you have some reason to think that the indicated lead will defeat the contract. When their bidding is less limited, you may run into a redouble and a smirking opponent eventually saying 'Now, what does that come to?' Not a pleasant experience!

15

BATTLES AROUND THE TRUMP SUIT

In this chapter we will see some deals where declarer had to operate with an inadequate trump suit. In particular, we will look at how the ruff-and-sluff can be a valuable weapon for the defenders when seeking to wrest trump control.

The USA's Rose Meltzer reached game on a 4-3 spade fit on this deal:



Helgemo/Helness had pocketed +130 in 4♠ at the other table, so the success or failure of Meltzer's spade game would swing a large number of IMPs. Take the West cards. You cash the ♥AK, your partner playing the ♥3 and the ♥5 to show three cards in the suit. What next?

Only one defense is good enough. You must play a third round of hearts, even though this will give a ruff-and-sluff. Erik Sælensminde continued with the $\forall J$ and Meltzer ruffed with dummy's $\diamond Q$, throwing a club from her hand. When she played a trump to the ten, Sælensminde won with the ace and led a fourth round of hearts! If declarer discards from dummy, East will uppercut with the $\diamond 6$; this will force South's $\diamond J$ and promote West's $\diamond 9$ into the setting trick. Meltzer chose instead to ruff with dummy's $\diamond 8$. Since this was dummy's last trump, she then had to take a club finesse while there were still two trumps out. West ruffed the first round of clubs and the game was one down.

Let's return to the third trick and imagine that declarer ruffs with the \clubsuit 8 instead of the \clubsuit Q. She can then play the \clubsuit Q to West's \clubsuit A. A fourth round of hearts will not work now, since East's potential uppercut will no longer be effective. West can still beat the contract, however, by switching to a diamond. This removes dummy's last entry and again forces declarer to take a premature club finesse, West ruffing as before.

You may think there was nothing special about the play of the next hand but few declarers managed to make the contract.



North's 2♥ response showed 8-11 points and three-card heart support. How would you play the heart game when West leads the ♣2 to your bare ♣A?

Boye played the two top spades and led a third round of the suit. West could not benefit by ruffing and discarded the \blacklozenge 7. After ruffing the spade in dummy, Boye played the \clubsuit K and discarded a diamond. A club ruff in the South hand was

followed by declarer's last spade. Again, West had no reason to ruff. He discarded a club and the spade was ruffed with dummy's $\mathbf{\Psi}4$.

When the $\forall 10$ was run, West won with the $\forall Q$ and played the $\diamond A$ and $\diamond Q$, won with dummy's king. Declarer's remaining three cards were the $\forall AJ7$. He ruffed a diamond with the $\forall 7$, overruffed with the $\forall 9$ and West then had to lead from his $\forall K5$ into South's $\forall AJ$ tenace. Making ten tricks in $4 \forall$ was worth a full 90% of the available matchpoints!

We will present the next deal differently. Watch as the play is described and see if you can spot how the defenders could have beaten the contract.



Boye won the \forall K lead and played three top diamonds to discard the \forall 9. After a trump to the ten and king, West forced the South hand by playing the \forall Q. With no quick entry to the dummy, Boye cashed the \clubsuit AK. When the \clubsuit Q fell from West, he played the \clubsuit J. West could not ruff and the contract was made.

Did you spot the defenders' missed chance? Instead of playing the $\mathbf{\Psi}Q$, West needed to play a fourth diamond, weakening dummy's trumps. Suppose declarer ruffs with dummy's $\mathbf{\Phi}6$. East discards a club, leaving this position:



When the \bigstar 7 is led, East rises with the \bigstar A and plays a heart. If declarer ducks this to West, he will have no entry to dummy to finesse the \bigstar 9. Suppose instead that he ruffs with the \bigstar 9. Whether he plays the \bigstar Q next or runs the clubs, he will lose trump control and go one down.

Let's see one more deal that illustrates the defensive power of the ruff-and-sluff. The play was interesting from both sides of the table.



Rosenberg followed an artificial sequence to show a balanced limit raise in hearts. Boye, South at the other table, also reached the heart game. Both Wests led a low diamond and the early play was the same at both tables: \mathbf{Q} finessed, \mathbf{A} for a club discard, club finesse losing to West's \mathbf{A} K.

Let's see how the defense developed at Zia's table. Helness played a third round of diamonds and Zia ruffed. He led a spade towards dummy and Helness rose with the \bigstar K, forcing declarer again with the \bigstar K. Zia crossed to the \bigstar Q and ran the \blacktriangledown Q, losing to West's \clubsuit K. These cards remained:



How would you continue the defense from the West seat?

Suppose you play a club. Declarer will win with the ace and draw one more round of trumps with the ace. He will then give himself a double chance of success by playing the ♠A. He will make the contract when spades are 3-3 or when they break 4-2 but the defender with the doubleton spade does not hold the last trump. (This is how Boye made the contract at the other table, after West had followed a different defense.) To avoid this outcome, Tor Helness led a fifth round of diamonds! This conceded a ruff-and-sluff, yes, but see the effect of it. Zia ruffed in dummy with the ♥3, overruffed by the ♥5 and ♥J. Declarer could no longer make the contract against a 4-2 spade break. He had to draw the outstanding trumps and rely on spades being 3-3. That was one down.

On the next deal Erik Sælensminde played the macho man by opening a onebid on an aceless 9-count. He ended in 4^{-1} on a deal where declarer at the other table went down in 2^{-1} . Hardly a promising situation, you might think...



It was not a contract that the VuGraph commentators had suggested when the deal first flashed onto the screen. The lie of the cards was benign, however. Declarer would certainly lose two trump tricks and a diamond. To beat the contract, the defenders would have to force the South hand continually in the diamond suit.

Cezary Balicki found the necessary opening attack — the A followed by another diamond. Erik ruffed in his hand and led the 5 to dummy's J. He then called for dummy's J. Adam Zmudzinski needed to rise with the A and force declarer with his last diamond. Since West had a trump entry and more diamonds to play, declarer would then have lost trump control. The J actually ran to West's Q. West could force the South hand with a diamond but Sælensminde then crossed to the A and led a trump towards the king. When East took his A he had no diamonds left. Declarer was able to draw the last trumps and take an eventual club finesse for the contract.

At the other table the Polish South opened $2\clubsuit$ (showing a two-suiter) and this was passed out. When Tor Helness chose the seemingly uninspired lead of the $\P K$, Lloyd's of London would have insured the contract. According to the championship bulletin, declarer decided to score as many trump tricks as possible, making use of dummy's $\clubsuit J9$. He was subsequently 'affected by the heat of the room', the account continues, and failed to cash the $\P Q$, ending with only seven tricks. A weird board indeed.

The Italian maestros, Benito Garozzo and Giorgio Belladonna, occasionally surprised the kibitzers by drawing trumps only at the very end of the play. Sometimes the aim was to discover the likely lie of the trump suit; sometimes they hoped to force the defenders to surrender a trump trick at the end. We will finish the chapter with a deal where Boye played the same way.



West led the \P 8, Boye winning with the \P A and leading a club. West rose with the \clubsuit K and played another heart to South's king. A club to the ten and East's ace was followed by a third round of hearts, West discarding a diamond and dummy ruffing. All followed to the \clubsuit AK and Boye drew one round of trumps with the ace. Dummy's \clubsuit Q then allowed him to pitch his last diamond.

These cards remained in play:



Unless his $\diamond Q$ had been an imaginative falsecard, West's initial shape was marked as 4-2-3-4. Boye ruffed a club to reduce his trumps to the same length as West's and then led the $\diamond 7$ from his hand. West won with the $\diamond 10$ and had to lead into the $\diamond KJ$ tenace. Game made!

ENTER THE ILLUSIONIST

No bridge player can say that his game is complete until he has mastered the art of deception. Some players would actually prefer to bring home a dubious contract by this route than by a clean-cut technical play. Does this mean that there is a hint of the masochist in them? It's not for us to say.

On the first deal Boye cast a magical cloak over his threatening club holding. From the West defender's point of view, declarer's **\$**KQ became invisible.



North's 3[•] showed a sound raise in hearts and East's 3[•] was intended as leaddirecting. West duly led the •6 and Boye won with dummy's ace, sure from East's diamond bid that he would hold the king. There are four top losers. How would you try to give yourself a chance?

Suppose you play a club to one of your honors at Trick 2. West will surely see the risk that you hold the other missing club honor and are about to discard one of dummy's spade losers on it. He will switch to the \clubsuit 2 and the contract will die an early death.

Boye tried something different. He led the \clubsuit 7 from dummy and contributed the \clubsuit 5 from his hand! Not sensing any danger, West won with the \clubsuit 9 and continued with a second round of diamonds. Boye ruffed in his hand, drew trumps and led the \clubsuit K for a ruffing finesse against West. He was then able to discard one of dummy's spades on the established \clubsuit Q.

Note that it would be a poor idea to draw trumps before playing a club. If trumps broke 2-0, one of the defenders might signal a strong spade holding.

On another deal from the same event Boye recognized the opportunity for a deceptive opening lead.



West's 2**4** showed a good diamond raise and North's 3**4** showed a good spade raise. After this pleasing symmetry in the auction, Boye had to find a lead against South's 3**4**. Any ideas?

North had opened 1 \clubsuit and shown most of the points held by the partnership. It was therefore a near certainty that he would hold the \clubsuit K. Boye chose the \clubsuit Q as his opening shot and, sure enough, dummy went down with the \clubsuit K.

Placing the A with East, Ian Thompson played low from dummy on the first trick. At double-dummy the contract can now be beaten by force: A, club ruffed with the J, diamond underlead to West's king and a fourth club to promote the bare K. The club position was not clear, however, and Boye switched to a heart. Thompson won in the dummy and called for the 9, East rising with the A. Declarer won the heart return with the Q and paused to assess the position.

West might well have led a diamond from a combination headed by the AQ, so he seemed to hold at most AJ in the suit. Add in the QJ and that still left him short of his AJ bid, which had shown a sound raise. He must hold the AJ too!

Very sound reasoning, no doubt, but when declarer ran the AQ it lost to the AK. The defenders then scored the AA and a club ruff. A contract of AA had gone down when the cards lay well enough for AA to be made.

Next we will look at a single-suit position from the 1996 Nordic Championships in Denmark. (The full deal was not recorded for posterity). Sweden's Sven Åke Bjerregaard led a third-and-fifth +8 against 3NT and this was the lie of the suit:

Boye won deceptively with the \clubsuit J and then led the \bigstar 6. Placing his partner with the \bigstar 9, West followed with the \bigstar 3. Boye called for dummy's \bigstar 4 and then had four club tricks. One to show the grandchildren!

Boye tried a rather unusual deception on the next deal. He will describe events as he saw them at the time.



West leads the \bigstar K and it sure looks like ten tricks. There are no squeeze opportunities and no chance of ruffing out the \bigstar Q in the West hand. Should I concede one down?

It can't do much harm to duck the opening lead. West will probably switch to a diamond and collect two more tricks for one down; my heart loser will then go away on the A.

I try a low spade from dummy and look what happened. East followed with the 10 and I had to play my 9. West was sure that I must have a second spade, after not winning the A. He tried to give his partner a ruff and I finessed the J successfully for my eleventh trick!

West should have been able to figure this out, I agree. Not by knowing who had the singleton spade, but by checking it by playing the $\mathbf{A}Q$ at Trick 2. East is more or less marked with $\mathbf{A}K$ for his opening bid. He will discourage in diamonds if he has a singleton spade and wants a spade ruff. On his actual hand he will encourage a diamond continuation and the defenders will take the three tricks that belong to them.

Deceptive plays are not restricted to the play of the hand. Let's see a deceptive move from Boye during the auction.



Espen Lindqvist's 2 showed a sound raise to at least 3. East's double meant that he did not want a diamond lead from partner, thereby implying that he had another suit that he would like to be led. What should Boye bid now in the South seat?

With a near minimum and the long suit headed only by the queen, some players would sign off in 3. If your intention is to play in 3NT when partner holds a heart stopper, you could show your good spades with a rebid of 2. Partner

might then indicate a heart stopper with a bid of 3^{\clubsuit} and you could say 3NT. Boye thought that he might make nine tricks in 3NT, provided he could avoid a heart lead. He therefore made the deceptive bid of 2^{\clubsuit} , indicating that he held a stopper in hearts but was weak in spades!

Lindqvist had no spade stopper and limited his hand by rebidding 3♣. Boye continued to the intended 3NT contract and West had to find a lead. A heart would have been deadly, since East would have gained the lead in the suit to play a diamond through declarer's ♠KJ. With declarer's 2♥ bid fresh in his mind, West led the ♠2 to the ♠8 and ♠Q. So far so good, from Boye's point of view, but there were still only eight tricks on view. How would you have continued the play?

Boye ran the club suit, hoping that he could eventually endplay West for the extra trick that he needed. West's first three discards were two diamonds and one heart. These cards were still to be played:



When the last club was played, West could beat the contract if he ditched another diamond. This was hard to judge and he chose instead to throw his penultimate heart. Boye was quick to take advantage of this slip. He cashed dummy's $\mathbf{\nabla}A$, removing West's safe exit card in that suit, and continued with a spade to his ace. Seeing that he would be endplayed with a spade if he followed with the $\mathbf{\Phi}6$ on this trick, West unblocked $\mathbf{\Phi}K$ under South's $\mathbf{\Phi}A$. This would have saved him if East had held the $\mathbf{\Phi}J$. As it was, Boye faced the $\mathbf{\Phi}J$ and claimed his game.

A bidding deception of a different type paid off handsomely on the next deal, from the final of the 2005 European mixed teams in Tenerife. Both sides were vulnerable and the bidding started like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
L.Goldberg	B.Brogeland	U.Goldberg	T.Brogeland
1 🛧	pass	3♣	3♥
pass	Ś		

East's 3 vas a Bergen raise, based on four-card spade support, and Boye held these cards in the North seat:

♠ A 10 2 ♥ K 10 8 4 ♦ A 7 2 ♣ 8 3 2

What would you say now on those cards?

When you have made up your mind, you can read Boye's own thoughts on the situation:

Of course I was worth a raise to 4. The trouble with such a bid was that East or West would surely bid 4 over it. The decision whether to continue to 5 would not then be so obvious. I decided to hide the value of my hand by passing Tonje's 3. I was confident that this would not be passed out because lefty's 3 bid had already indicated the values to play in 3.

This was the full deal:



Boye passed Tonje's 3♥ overcall, confident that Ulla-Britt Goldberg would compete with 3♠. This vision in his crystal ball duly materialized and after two passes he bid 4♥. It was an unexpected bonus when this was doubled by Lars Goldberg in the pass-out seat. Tonje guessed the hearts correctly but not the diamonds, ending with a doubled overtrick and a score of +990. At the other table the bidding was a brief 1♠ - 2♠, with South not venturing an overcall. Espen Erichsen was allowed

to make the spade partial and the Norwegian team gained 15 IMPs on their way to collecting the gold medals.

In 1995 Boye won the first World Junior Pairs in Belgium's Ghent, partnering Geir Helgemo. When asked about this triumph in an interview at the time, he replied 'Well, to tell you the truth, I played terribly and Geir carried me to more than a 61% score. It was weird to become a world champion after playing maybe the worst tournament in my life!'

Let's sample the Helgemo magic from that memorable win:



Helgemo's psychic response was a bold move, particularly when vulnerable. He struck lucky when Boye held length in spades and not hearts. Boye did not like the look of 3NT over partner's sign-off in 3• because East's clubs were likely to be set up on the opening lead and he might then require nine quick winners.

Boye won the club lead with the ace, crossed to dummy with the $\blacklozenge Q$ and led a trump. East defended strongly by rising with the $\blacklozenge A$, cashing two club tricks and playing a fourth round of clubs. If Boye were to ruff this with the $\blacklozenge 9$, West would overruff and beat the contract by giving East a spade ruff. Boye side-stepped this fate by ruffing with the $\blacklozenge K$ and playing a trump.

Scoring +110 on the North-South cards yielded a sackful of matchpoints because East-West could score at least nine tricks in hearts. If East plays the contract, it requires a double-dummy low spade lead (or the $\mathbf{V}A$ followed by a low spade switch) to defeat $4\mathbf{V}$. North would then win with the $\mathbf{\Phi}Q$ and switch to a diamond before the clubs were established for discards.
Next we will see a psychic overcall. On the first board of a match against Sweden, with neither side vulnerable, this was the start to the auction:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Fredin	Svendsen	Fallenius	Brogeland	
	pass	1♠	Ś	

Boye held these cards in the South seat:

♠97 ♥— ♦AKJ8643 ♣8432

What would you have bid?

Boye will describe the action on this one:

I guess you are considering 24, 34 or 44. Against a world class pair such as Fallenius and Fredin, the 2009 European Pairs winners, I didn't think a diamond pre-empt would do much damage. Even if it did and they missed a 4-4 fit in hearts, it could be the wrong thing to do with the hearts breaking badly.

With a passed partner you have more leeway to do extraordinary things in the bidding. Bridge, like poker, is a positional game, and I thought this was the time and place for a bluff. A cheap one too: 1NT!

Peter Fredin, a well-known bridge illusionist himself, doubled. Partner passed (a good sign as he probably didn't have five hearts), Fallenius passed and I was back in the hot seat. What now?

I am pretty sure you are thinking: '2•, what else?' and probably it is the right bid. But when I have a winning hand I like to suck'em in. So I tried 2•, hoping that someone would double. Fredin was right there with the axe, obligingly, and after two passes it was my bid again.

I know I am going to bid 2° but I don't want to do it too fast or too slowly, which would have been unethical. I try to find the perfect tempo to put 2° on the bidding tray. My heart is pounding — will I really be able to buy this in 2° doubled when the opponents have at least a nine-card heart fit?

Fredin whacks me again, and everybody seems to be happy when it is passed out. I certainly am! This was the full layout:

Neither Vul.	🔶 A 10	83	2010 Euro Championships
Dealer North	♥ 754 ♦ 2 ♣ Q92	13 76	Norway - Sweden
 ♠ 6 4 ♥ A J 10 8 2 ♥ Q 10 7 ₱ K J 5 	 N W S 97 → 97 → A K J ★ 843 	8 6 4 3 2	K Q J 5 2 K Q 9 6 9 5 A 10
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Fredin	Svendsen	Fallenius	Brogeland
	pass	1♠	1NT
dbl	pass	pass	24
dbl	pass	pass	2♦
dbl	all pass		

Fredin leads the 6. I win with dummy's ace, cash the AK and eventually set up a club trick for plus 180.

Hands like this are match winners. For one thing you collect 12 IMPs when your teammates score the obvious 420 in 4 \checkmark . Much more important is the momentum you gain. With 19 boards left to play in the match, your opponents feel gutted and hustled. After this start they will not be able to play anything remotely close to their A-game — trust me, I've been there. Bridge at the top level is more than anything a game of psychology.

Out-and-out psychic bids are somewhat rare nowadays but it has become part of the modern game to respond to partner's opening bid on very weak hands. You pay out occasionally when partner has a strong hand and will not let the bidding drop until you have climbed too high. Many more times, you will make life difficult for your opponents. Let's see an example of this tactic:

N-S Vul. Dealer West ◆ J 10 ♥ Q 10 2 ◆ K Q 7 6 5 2	 ♦ 95 ♥ J76 ♦ J8 ♦ AQJ N W 	199. 5 3 Norv 8 • K • K • 1	7 Euro Junior Cho way - Poland 7 6 3 8 4 0 4 3	ampionships
✤ K 6	 <i>S</i> A K C A 9 A 9 A 9 A 9 A 9 A 13 	2	075	
WEST	NORTH	EASI	SOUTH	
Saur	Kielichowski	Brogeland	Grzejdziak	
1♦	pass	1♠	pass	
2♦	pass	pass	dbl	
pass	2♥	2NT	dbl	
3♣	dbl	3♦	pass	
pass all pass	3♥	pass	3♠	

With the vulnerability in his favor, Boye ventured a 1♠ response. More players would follow this tactic today than was the custom back in 1997, when this deal was played. South had nothing to say over this but he re-opened with a double when West's 2♠ rebid ran back to him. North bid 2♥ and Boye felt that one more effort was required to prevent the opponents from bidding the game that seemed to be available to them. He bid 2NT, indicating that he wanted to compete in one of the minor suits.

South doubled to show a good hand, and North doubled Øyvind Saur's 3, which had shown tolerance for clubs if East's 2NT was based on long clubs. Boye corrected to 3, and the opponents' bidding eventually drew to a halt in 3. Four tricks in each black suit, plus the two red aces, gave declarer an easy overtrick. It is not always easy to overcome such tactics, as you see.

When you have a notrump contract in mind, it is an old ploy to open a weak minor suit. In Victor Mollo's splendid series, Bridge in the Menagerie, the Hideous Hog was a master of such deception: 'You play the weakest minor, of course?' was often heard when Hog cut Hog.

Boye had no doubt which was his weaker minor on this deal:



Boye will take over the narrative on this one:

I have to admit that I like preparing for notrump when I have a balanced hand with a weak minor suit. When it goes all pass, I look pretty stupid, but after reaching every other contract it can be hard for the opponents to find the right lead. Over a jump to 2NT (18-19) we use transfers, so 3 from partner showed 4-4 in the majors.

West had no problems finding a diamond lead, starting with the \blacklozenge K. East followed with the \blacklozenge G and I played the \blacklozenge 2, trying to discourage another diamond from West. (As declarer you should use the same signals as the opponents. If you want them to continue the suit, encourage; if you prefer that they switch suit, discourage.)

After a few seconds, West switched to the 4. East played the 6 and I won my ace. This didn't look promising. Even five club tricks would only make a total of eight. There was a small chance of a stepping-stone squeeze in diamonds and spades if I had five club tricks and ran them, but I decided to go for a more cunning play. At Trick 3 I led the 4 from my hand!

West put in the \blacklozenge J, and East, shaking his head, won with the \blacklozenge Q and returned the \clubsuit G. With diamonds 5-2, as every card and every grimace by the opponents suggested, I was back in the ballgame. What now?

Thinking about Vacant Spaces, with the diamonds 5-2, I could have played righty for AJxxx and let the club ride. But the AG didn't look like

an attitude card; also, with the \P A in the East hand I didn't need more than four club tricks. So I played three rounds of clubs from the top, West following with the \$8, the \$7 and then discarding a spade. What now?

With only three club tricks I had no chance of making if West had the \blacklozenge A, so I placed East with that card. I cashed the \blacklozenge Q and exited with a club to East's jack. East played a spade to dummy, and both I and West threw a diamond. Do you have a full count of the hand now? This was the position I had reached:



West had started with two spades, two clubs and five diamonds, so he must have four hearts. That leaves East with five spades, two hearts, two diamonds and four clubs. Cashing dummy's fourth spade would give the opponents five tricks (two diamonds plus one in each of the other suits), so I played a heart to the king. Leaving the last club uncashed too, I continued with a heart to the ten and ace. East's spade return gave the last two tricks to the dummy and plus 600 gave us 38 out of 38 match points.'

Next we see a deal involving deceptive defense. Boye is sitting East.



Espen Lindqvist led a third-and-fifth $\clubsuit4$ and declarer ducked this to Boye's $\bigstar K$. With the spades under control there was no hurry to dislodge dummy's $\bigstar A$. Boye returned the $\checkmark J$, declarer winning with the ace. What are your plans for the defense, sitting East, when declarer plays the $\bigstar8$ to West's $\bigstar7$ and dummy's $\bigstar10$? These were Boye's thoughts:

My instinct tells me to win deceptively with the A and return a club, but at the last second, I chicken out. I do not feel we have complete control of the trumps (although declarer would certainly have cleared trumps unless Espen has a trick in that suit). I convince myself that declarer will go down if I do not give him a trick. I think he will finesse in diamonds, or that partner even may have two trump tricks. Therefore I win with the A just as my grandmother would have done. I return a club. But declarer has no option in diamonds; there is no finesse. He simply pulls trumps and bangs down the two top diamonds to take nine red tricks and the ace of clubs.

I am furious with myself! When I play in the zone, I have such false cards on the fingertips. I had all the information and only needed some guts to produce the magic. How could I miss this opportunity? It is nauseating! If I had won with the A and played a club, I can guarantee that declarer would try to cash the good spades to discard his low diamonds. Placing Espen with the A, he would have no reason to fear a ruff from him. On the next deal a deceptive hold-up by Boye led to a pretty ending:



Boye led the \blacktriangleleft 3, playing third-and-fifth leads, and dummy's \blacklozenge Q won. When Lew Stansby led a diamond at Trick 2, East played the \blacklozenge 2 to show an odd number of cards and declarer finessed the queen. Seeing that declarer would score an easy three diamond tricks if he won, Boye tried the effect of holding up the \blacklozenge K.

Stansby continued with the $\mathbf{A}Q$, covered by the $\mathbf{A}K$ and $\mathbf{A}A$. His next move was to lead dummy's $\mathbf{A}J$, hoping to pin an original $\mathbf{A}I08$ with West. Not today. Boye won with the $\mathbf{A}K$ and led a heart to dummy's bare ace, freeing a trick for his $\mathbf{A}K$ and leaving dummy's diamond holding blocked. Declarer continued with jack and another club, throwing Boye on lead.

Boye paused for thought. If East held the \P J, it was possible that declarer had the \clubsuit K. Erik had discouraged on the first round of hearts, so Boye placed declarer with the \P J. In that case he had 10 points outside spades and was likely to hold only the \clubsuit Q (because he had rejected the 2NT game try). Boye switched to ace and another spade, allowing the defenders to score four tricks in the suit. This was the position as Erik led his last spade:



Declarer was caught in a defensive squeeze. If he discarded the A, Boye would score a trick in each red suit. When he chose to throw the \P 9, Boye discarded the 10 and claimed the last two tricks in hearts. +300!

The next deal was played in Tenerife, an island that became famous when a well-known English bridge writer and his wife chose it for their honeymoon, way back in 1975.



They say that 'anything goes' in the third seat at favorable vulnerability. Quite so, and Boye was there with a $1 \blacklozenge$ opening. There was no resultant good fortune in

the bidding, however, with the opponents brushing the psychic opening aside and arriving in the best contract played by the right hand.

A diamond lead would have made life easy for declarer but Boye reached for the $\blacklozenge2$, won in the dummy. When Piergiovanni Zucchini continued with the \clubsuitA and \clubsuitQ , Erik Sælensminde won with the \clubsuitK and switched to the $\blacklozenge8$. Sitting South, how would you play to this trick?

Declarer had eight top tricks and a seemingly easy ninth by leading through West's presumed $\P A$ to dummy's $\P K$. He rose with the A, Boye unblocking the J. Declarer led a heart to the king and was amazed to see this lose to East's ace. Sælensminde continued with the 7 and, thanks to Boye's previous unblock of the J, the defenders took three diamonds for one down.

Have you ever seen someone make a natural bid in notrump with a void in the opponents' suit? Zia Mahmood achieved the feat here:



Sensing a big spade fit for East/West, Zia attempted to cloud the issue with a psychic rebid of 1NT. West raised to $2\clubsuit$ and this ran back to Zia. Since a club game was still possible he jumped to $4\clubsuit$, causing a few puzzled looks around the table. There was no further bidding and West led the \bigstar K.

Zia ruffed the spade lead and played the A, dropping the Q from East. It did not escape his attention that the A was now an entry to dummy. He played the V, which won, followed by the A to dummy's K. West had signaled his count in hearts and East won the second round. A low diamond would have put Zia to a guess but East returned a spade, ruffed in the South hand. Zia crossed to

the \clubsuit 8 and discarded two diamonds on the \clubsuit Q10 to make eleven tricks for a score of +150. This gave him a better result than those pairs who had picked up +50 or +100 by defending a spade contract.

We will end the chapter with an amazing deal from Boye's early days:



You like Boye's 6° ? Ever since playing three-handed bridge with his grandparents he has loved to 'bid what I think I can make'. West led the AK and, after some thought, switched to a heart. How would you play the slam?

The only serious technical chance is to finesse the $\mathbf{V}Q$. However, Boye was absolutely certain that West did not hold the $\mathbf{V}K$. If that were the case, he would surely have attempted to cash another top spade or (if he rated the South player as a very wild bidder) played his partner for the $\mathbf{A}A$. Following his judgment, Boye rose with the $\mathbf{V}A$ and immediately called for the $\mathbf{V}Q$!

Believing that South held only one heart, East followed with the ♥7. After such a majestic coup in hearts it would have been unjust if there was a trump trick to be lost. No, the trumps broke 2-2 and Boye made the slam.

Perhaps you are unimpressed and think that no East player at your club would be fooled by such a ruse. It's not the right reaction. Sam Inge Høyland is a strong player — a Norwegian international. Instead you should tuck away the important message that you must follow your instinct at this game. If you truly believe that the cards lie in a particular way, do not follow a line of play that would then lead to defeat.

17

EXTRACTING THE MAXIMUM PENALTY

Once in a while you double the opponents in an unfortunate spot and there is no escape for them. Your task is only half done. It is essential in such circumstances to assume the role of a Victorian hanging judge — inflicting the maximum sentence on your poor victims. In this chapter we will see some examples of such merciless behavior.

On the first deal, South chose an unlucky moment to enter with the Unusual Notrump. He was made to pay the maximum price.



Since North had declined to choose his better minor, it was quite likely that he held two cards in each suit. Aiming to prevent any club ruffs in dummy, Øvind Saur made the accurate lead of the \diamond 10. Declarer won with the jack and led his singleton heart. West went in with the ace and Boye followed with the \heartsuit J, a suit preference signal for spades.

Message received! Rather than returning his remaining trump, Saur switched to the \$8. Boye took his two top winners in the suit and led back the \$2, a suit preference signal for clubs. Declarer discarded a club loser and West ruffed with the \$9. The \$A and \$K came next, followed by a low club. Declarer ruffed with dummy's \$8 and Boye overruffed with the \$K. Dummy held the top cards in both major suits at this stage, so Boye exited with a trump. Declarer had to concede a further trick to West's \$Q and that was four down for a penalty of 800. Neatly done!

Dutchmen, Bauke Muller and Simon de Wijs, defended excellently to take the maximum from Erik Sælensminde's contract of 54 doubled here:



Erik Sælensminde, sitting South, had an unwelcome decision to make on this deal. Should he sit for the double of 4, hoping that partner held four tricks in defense, or should he look for a sacrifice somewhere? He chose the latter option, bidding 4NT to show two places to play, and eventually ended in 5, doubled.

Muller led his singleton heart, won in the dummy, and Erik played the \diamond K to East's \diamond A. The next trick came as something of a surprise. East led the \diamond 8 and this drew the \diamond 4, \diamond 7 and \diamond 5! There could be only one reason for West leaving East on lead: he wanted a heart ruff. De Wijs duly led the \checkmark 4 to the next trick. West ruffed with the \diamond J and returned the \diamond Q, giving the defenders three club tricks for an 800 penalty.

At the other table the first seven bids were the same but Bas Drijver then decided to defend against 4Φ doubled. North cashed the Ψ A and switched to the

•Q, won in the dummy. Tor Helness drew trumps and picked up the club suit, allowing him to discard his diamond loser. That was two doubled overtricks, a score of +790 and... a flat board!

Extracting the maximum from low-level doubled contracts can be difficult. Boye and Erik Sælensminde managed to squeeze the last drop from this particular lemon:



When Erik Sælensminde led the \clubsuit 7, Fulvio Fantoni played low from dummy and Boye won with the \clubsuit 10. What should East do next?

Boye could be fairly sure from the opening bid that Erik held the \forall KQ. He switched to the \forall 3, West playing the \forall Q and dummy winning with the \forall A. Declarer played a low heart towards his hand and Erik won with the \forall K, continuing with a third round of hearts. Boye ruffed, cashed the \clubsuit A and continued with a low club. When Fantoni chose to ruff with the \clubsuit 8, Erik overruffed with the \bigstar 9 and cashed the \blacklozenge AK. A third round of diamonds gave Fantoni another decision on how high he should ruff. This time he assigned dummy's \bigstar A to the task.

Declarer had scored two tricks and it seemed he would score two more. It did not turn out that way. Fantoni led dummy's $\forall J$ and Boye ruffed with the AJ, South discarding his last diamond. East was on lead in this position:



Boye led the A and Fantoni was faced with yet another decision in the trump suit! He now had to guess whether West's remaining trump was the A or the A. He chose to ruff with the A10, playing West for the A7, and then had to lose two further trump tricks to Boye's A7. He was 1100 down at the one-level.

Perhaps you are expecting the final deal of this chapter to feature a penalty even bigger than 1100. You will have to wait and see. It certainly features a fine defense by Odin Svendsen.



Boye's double showed at least four hearts (part of the method known as 'transfers over an overcall', described in Chapter 18). Svendsen rebid 1^{\clubsuit} with his three-card support and it was easy then for Boye to bid game in hearts.

What do you think of the way that South bid his hand, eventually sacrificing in 4⁺? He had 7-5 shape, it is true, but his suits were not particularly robust. Perhaps he would have done better to show his playing strength earlier, bidding 2⁺ rather than 1⁺. He could then have left any further bidding to his partner.

The deal presented an instructive defensive point, as we will see. Boye led the \mathbf{A} , ruffed by declarer. He cashed the \mathbf{A} , dropping dummy's \mathbf{A} , and advanced the \mathbf{A} . When Boye played low smoothly, declarer ruffed with dummy's \mathbf{A} and was overruffed with the \mathbf{A} . Svendsen returned the \mathbf{A} , won with the \mathbf{A} , and this position had been reached:



Declarer led the \$8, covered by the \$9, and ruffed with dummy's last trump (the \$7). If Svendsen overruffs in the East seat, declarer will be able to ruff the second round of hearts and set up three diamond tricks while maintaining trump control. He will escape for two down and a penalty of just 500. (This was the penalty conceded in the same contract at the other table, where Thomas Charlsen took a better view by running the \$J at Trick 3.)

Svendsen made no such mistake! He discarded a club on the trick. When declarer led a heart from the table, Svendsen rose with the ♥K and drew two rounds of trumps. A heart continuation forced South's last trump and he lost the remaining tricks, going five down for a penalty of 1400. That was 14 IMPs to Norway.

EXTENDING THE USE OF TRANSFER BIDS

The use of transfer bids increases year on year. In this chapter we will look at five different areas of bidding where transfer bids may be new to you.

TRANSFER RESPONSES TO 1+

Almost everyone uses transfer bids opposite 1NT, bidding 2^{\diamond} with hearts and 2^{\diamond} with spades. A similar scheme works well opposite 1^{\diamond} . A response of 1^{\diamond} shows four or more hearts; 1^{\diamond} shows four or more spades.

After a start of $1 \\leftharpoint - 1 \\leftharpoint, when the responder is weak and holds only four hearts, he can pass$ or sign off in 1NT. When he is stronger, with only four hearts, he can bid a new suit(including 2) or make a higher bid in notrumps. When the responder holds fiveor more hearts an eight-card fit has been found. He can sign off in 2 or invite agame with 3 . A further option is a mini-splinter (including 3), showing at leastgame-try values. Right, that's the theory. Let's see the method in action:



Odin Svendsen's 1♥ showed any hand of up to around 17 points that contained three-card heart support. Boye's 3♣ was a splinter bid, showing five or more hearts and at least invitational strength. The opener's 3♠ was a cuebid, 4♣ showed a void club and 4♠ was a (very frisky) 'last train' slam try. Such a bid, barely justified on the South cards here, indicates slam interest and does not promise any control in the diamond suit. A last train bid may be used when it is the only bid available below game-level in the agreed trump suit.

It is often a question of luck whether a transfer bid happens to make the right hand declarer. Here the method worked well and West started with an unfortunate 4 J lead, East's 4 dropping the 4 from declarer. The contract cannot be beaten after this opening salvo. East in fact returned a spade into dummy's tenace and Svendsen was able to ditch both his diamonds. A trump to the jack lost to the king and West returned a trump to the ace. Declarer then drew the last trump and ran the clubs, ending with an overtrick.

At the other table the Finnish North responded with a natural $1 \checkmark$ and ended as declarer in $4 \checkmark$. East led the $\blacklozenge Q$, West winning and returning a diamond to declarer's king. What can declarer do now? If he plays a trump to the queen and king, West will cross to partner's $\blacklozenge A$ and a diamond will promote an extra trump trick for the defenders. If instead declarer plays ace and another trump, West will win and cross to the $\blacklozenge A$; the $\blacklozenge J$ will then force dummy's $\blacklozenge J$, promoting East's ♥10. Declarer in fact played a spade himself and a third round of diamonds then established two trump tricks for the defense — one down.

We mentioned that the sequence 1 - 1 - 1 = 1 is non-forcing. The opener may therefore have to find another bid when he has three-card heart support and 18-19 points. 2NT is available and the responder may then rebid his hearts to seek a 5-3 fit in the suit.

What does the opener do when he has four-card support for partner's indicated major? He rebids at the two-level with a minimum hand (11-13 points), or 14 with 3-4-3-3 shape. So, the sequence 1 - 1 - 2 shows a minimum hand with four-card heart support. If that seems strange to you, remember that it is the equivalent of a standard 1 - 1 - 2 auction. With a stronger hand, the opener can raise the hearts to a higher level.

When the opener does not hold support for the suit indicated by partner's transfer response, he rebids naturally. That's what happened on this deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
D.Jones	Svendsen	G.Jones	Brogeland
			1♣
pass	1♦	dbl	2♣
pass	2♦	pass	2♥
pass	2♠	pass	2NT
pass	4 ♣	pass	5 ♣
pass	6 ♣	all pass	

Odin Svendsen's 1 response showed hearts and East's double indicated a good holding in diamonds. Boye's 2 rebid denied three-card heart support and showed at least six clubs. With a minimum 3-2-3-5 hand he would have passed instead (or perhaps rebid 1NT if he held a diamond stopper).

North continued with 2, a game force. Since Boye had already denied three hearts, he could bid 2, keeping the bidding low on his minimal hand. 2 and

2NT were natural bids and then came $4\clubsuit$, a clear slam try in clubs. Boye declined to cuebid his diamond control on such a weak hand but Svendsen had no intention of staying out of a slam and raised to $6\clubsuit$.

How would you play the slam when West leads the $\diamond 2$?

Boye won the diamond lead with the ace and led the $\clubsuit6$. It would be a mistake to lead the $\clubsuit10$ instead, since you would then lose two trump tricks if East covered with a singleton \clubsuitK or \clubsuitQ . East played low and declarer's \$9 won the trick. When clubs broke 3-2, there was only one loser and the slam was made.

To end this section, take a look at the complete list of responses available opposite partner's $1 \clubsuit$ opening:

1♦	shows at least four hearts
1♥	shows at least four spades
1♠	denies a major
INT	11-12, balanced
2♣	inverted minor raise
2♦	6-9 points with at least five clubs
2NT	13-15 or 19-20, with 3-3-3-4 or 3-3-4-3 shape
3♣	preemptive (not invitational even if partner has 18-19)
3♦/3♥/3♠	void-showing with 5+ clubs
3NT	16-18 with 3-3-3-4 or 3-3-4-3 shape

The 1 response is not available when you hold diamonds, of course, so you would respond 1 instead. This response also covers balanced hands that contain no major suit and are not strong enough for the medium-range 1NT response.

TRANSFERS OVER AN OVERCALL OF 1♦ OR 1♥

Transfers are also useful after a one-level red-suit overcall by your right-hand opponent. Suppose the bidding starts like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1 🕈	1♦	Ś	

East can choose from these alternatives:

dbl	four or more hearts
1 🖤	four or more spades
1♠	denies four or more in a major
1NT	11-12 points, balanced
2♣	natural, raise in clubs
2♦	cuebid, showing strong club raise
27	fit jump (five hearts and four or more clubs, 6-9)
2♠	fit jump (five spades and four or more clubs, 6-9)

The response of 1^{16} is a catch-all for those hands that do not contain a four-card major. Since 1NT shows 11-12 points, you would use the 1^{16} response on hands that would normally respond 1NT but contain only 6-10 points.

The method is similar after a 1♥ overcall. Suppose the bidding starts like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1 🛧	1 🎔	Ś	

East can choose from these alternatives:

dbl	four or more spades
1♠	denies four or more spades
1NT	11-12 points, balanced
2♣	natural raise in clubs
2♦	natural and forcing
27	cuebid, showing strong club raise
2♠	fit jump, five spades at least four clubs, 6-9

Again, $1 \clubsuit$ is used as a catch-all for those hands that do not fit into the other categories.

Erik Sælensminde used the spade-showing double on this deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Rosenberg	Sælensminde	Zia	Brogeland	
			1 🛧	
1 💙	dbl	27	3♣	
pass all pass	3♥	dbl	3NT	

Sælensminde showed at least four spades with his double. Over Zia's raise to 2 another convention came into play. Boye could use the Weak-Strong 2NT to show two different types of 3 rebid. His actual 3 showed full values, a hand on which he would have jumped to 3 anyway. The alternative was a conventional 2NT. Partner would then continue bidding on the assumption that partner held a weaker type of 3 bid — in other words, one based on extra shape but otherwise close to minimum.

Sælensminde asked for a heart stopper and the partnership duly arrived in 3NT, which was easily made. There was some interest in the other auction too:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Tundal	Jacobs	Grøtheim	Katz
]♣
1 🖤	dbl	27	3♣
37	4♣	all pass	

West's continuation to $3\P$ robbed North of the opportunity to use this bid himself. He might have passed a similar message with a competitive double, again giving South the opportunity to bid 3NT. His actual choice was $4\clubsuit$, which was as high as you want to be in that denomination.

SWITCH BIDS OVER AN OVERCALL OF 1. OR 2.

When your partner's opening bid is overcalled with 1 + or 2 +, there are two unbid suits that you can show at the two-level. Considerable advantage can be obtained by switching the meaning of these two suit-bids. Suppose the bidding starts like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1♦	1♠	Ś	

A double and 1NT hold their usual meanings, with the negative double strongly suggesting at least four hearts. In addition, East can use these two switch bids:

2♣

shows at least five hearts, invitational plus

2 shows at least five clubs, invitational plus

A cuebid (2Φ) would show at least invitational support of diamonds.

One obvious advantage of switch bids is that East can respond 2^{\clubsuit} on a moderate hand (9-11 points) with five or more hearts and come to rest in 2^{\clubsuit} . A standard response of 2^{\clubsuit} would have been forcing, perhaps carrying the bidding too high.

After a start of $1 \diamond (1 \diamond) 2 \diamond$, where $2 \diamond$ is a switch bid showing hearts, the opener rebids along these lines:

- 2♥ at most two hearts, not especially strong
- 2♠ at most two hearts, extra values
- 3♥ at least three hearts, forcing
- 4♥ at least three hearts, good 12-14

All other bids are natural and show a hand that is not prepared to stop in 2 \heartsuit opposite a minimum switch bid.

Similarly, when an opening bid of $1 \clubsuit$ or $1 \clubsuit$ is overcalled with $1 \bigstar$, the two-level responses in the remaining suits are switched. For example, after a $1 \clubsuit$ opening overcalled with $1 \bigstar$, $2 \bigstar$ would show diamonds and $2 \bigstar$ would show clubs.

Switch bids apply only after a black-suit overcall. This is the situation when the overcall is in clubs:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1♦	2♣	Ś	

There is no change to the negative double. In addition, East can use these two switch bids:

- 2 shows at least five spades, invitational plus
- 2 shows at least five hearts, invitational plus

The same scheme applies when an opening bid of 1^{\heartsuit} or 1^{\clubsuit} is overcalled with 2^{\clubsuit} . There will be two bids in new suits available at the two-level. The suits shown by these two bids will be switched.

When the responder has extra values, he will bid again at his second turn:



East is too strong to pass 2 and makes a game-try, which West is happy to accept.

Here the switch bid allows East to describe two aspects of his hand, while keeping the bidding low:

West		Eas	t
• 87		• /	A K 6 3 2
💙 AK64		Y (Q 8
🔶 A 10 8 5 3		• (Q 6 2
🕈 Q 2		+ (973
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1♦	2♣	2♥	pass
2♠	pass	3♦	all pass

East shows his spade suit, which does not elicit a fit, and is then able to show some diamond support. West sees no reason to bid further and a sensible contract is reached.

Let's see an exciting competitive deal that includes a switch bid:



Odin Svendsen's 2^{e} response was a switch bid showing at least five hearts. Paul Chemla doubled, to show spades, and Alain Levy eventually ended in 6^{e} doubled, a sacrifice over the making 6^{e} .

Svendsen led the \mathbf{A} K, winning the first trick, and continued with the \mathbf{A} 9. Declarer does best to cover this with the \mathbf{A} J, bolstering the value of dummy's

diamond pips. He played low, which allowed Boye to play low too, and the trick was ruffed in the South hand.

Svendsen won the $\mathbf{A}Q$ with the $\mathbf{A}K$ and switched to the $\mathbf{V}Q$, covered by the king and ace. South ruffed and continued with a club ruff, followed by a low trump lead from dummy. This was the second key moment in the play. If Boye plays the \mathbf{A} , declarer will have the chance to insert the \mathbf{A} 10. He would then establish the clubs with a ruff, return to the $\mathbf{A}A$ and play good clubs, escaping for only two down!

The position was clear to Boye and he inserted the \bigstar J. Levy won with the \bigstar A and ruffed the clubs good. He could not make any use of them, however. He ruffed a heart with the \bigstar 7 and led the \bigstar 8. Boye ruffed with the \bigstar 8, drew a round of trumps with the \bigstar K and scored the \bigstar A and \blacklozenge Q. Dummy's \bigstar Q took the last trick and the penalty was 1400.

We wonder if you will believe the bidding at the other table. Christian Mari opened 2NT on the East cards and Bjorn Olav Ekren overcalled 4. This set the French West, Frederic Volcker, a difficult problem. Eventually he bid 6NT! Mari won the A lead with the A and played a heart to the jack, finessing against North because South had so many more clubs that North. 6NT was made with an overtrick and France gained 2 IMPs for the 1470 that edged ahead of 1400.

TRANSFERS OVER A TAKEOUT DOUBLE

We will look next at the use of transfer bids over an opponent's takeout double. Suppose the bidding starts: $1 \checkmark$ - dbl. The next player may bid a forcing $1 \clubsuit$ with at least four spades; he may redouble with a strong hand when interested in penalties. That much is standard. In addition, it works well to play the following bids as transfers:

- 1NT shows clubs
- 2**+** shows diamonds
- 2 shows a good raise to 2*, about 7-9 points
- 2♥ shows a weaker raise to 2♥, about 2-6 points

You can see the main advantage of such responses. They allow you to show a modest hand with a long suit. When the opener's hand is nothing special, he will honor the transfer and the bidding can stop in two of your suit. A second benefit is that the opening hand, usually with the greater strength, will play the contract. This method worked well on the following deal:



West led the ♠K and Espen Lindqvist ended with nine tricks.

Some players achieve similar results by playing a $2\clubsuit$ response as non-forcing over a double. Yes, but that makes life more difficult when you hold a strong hand with clubs. By launching club hands with a 1NT transfer, you can deal well with both weak and strong hands.

Most bidding conventions involve giving up something to make way for the bids that are to be used in an artificial way. Here you are acquiring several new bids and the sacrifice to be made is the surrender of the natural 1NT response over a double. This is quite a useful bid, it has to be admitted. Nevertheless, the use of transfers over a double is becoming increasingly popular. Remember too that you are getting several useful transfer bids by giving up just one natural response.

After a start of $1 \spadesuit$ - dbl, the responses are similar:

1NT	shows clubs
24	shows diamonds
^	

- 2 shows hearts
- 2♥ shows a good raise to 2♠ (7-9 points)
- 2 shows a weaker raise to 2 (2-6 points)

Again you have the chance to differentiate between a garbage raise to the two-level and a sounder raise.

TRANSFERS OPPOSITE PARTNER'S OVERCALL

As we have just seen, nearly all conventions require you to sacrifice the natural use of one or more bids. You trade the value of the previous usage for the (supposedly wonderful) advantage of the new convention. We will end this chapter with a convention that has no downside whatsoever and will buy you a considerable advantage when responding to partner's overcalls.

Look at this situation:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
1♥	2♦	pass	Ś

There are three suit bids between the overcall and a raise of the overcall. These are their traditional meanings:

- 2♥ cuebid, showing a strong diamond raise
- 2 natural
- 3**4** natural

When you use 'transfers opposite an overcall', you jumble these three bids with no loss whatsoever:

- 2♥ transfer to spades
- 2 transfer to clubs
- 3 showing a strong diamond raise

So, the bid that would be a transfer to partner's suit shows a strong raise of that suit. 3• is still available for the weaker raise.

Great method, isn't it? If you have a moderate hand with a spade suit, you can bid 2Ψ . Partner will rebid $2\clubsuit$ on most hands and you can stop there. If you happen to hold a stronger hand, you will have the opportunity to bid again.

Whatever the opening bid and the overcall, there will always be three suit bids available and you can re-order these from the traditional meanings to give you two transfer bids and a cuebid strong raise. Look at this, much higher, situation:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
3♠	4♥	pass	Ś

The three available suit bids will now have these meanings:



It is unlikely that you would want to correct the contract from 4 to 5, it is true. A much more likely scenario is that you want to make a fit-bid raise to 5, inviting a slam:



One cooked-up sample hand proves nothing, you are right, but you get the idea. It makes no difference what meanings you would normally have assigned to the three available suit bids in a particular situation. You will benefit by changing their order, thereby switching two of the three bids into transfers.

TRAIN OFF THE RAILS!

They say that mistakes can be just as instructive as excellent play. Yes indeed, and in this chapter we will take a close look at some unsuccessful plays and defenses made by Boye, his teammates and their opponents. Sometimes there was a good reason for the 'wrong' play; sometimes it was an out-and-out mistake from which we may all be able to benefit.

The first deal features defense:



Boye led the $\diamond Q$, drawing the $\diamond 10$, $\diamond 4$ and $\diamond 3$. Aiming to prevent a diamond ruff if that suit was 5-2-3-3 around the table, he switched to his singleton trump. Dummy followed low and declarer won East's king with the ace.

The defenders did not enjoy what happened next! Declarer crossed to dummy's $\bullet 6$ and discarded his $\bullet 7$ on the $\bullet A$. He lost three diamond tricks subsequently but the contract was his.

As you will have noticed, the contract goes down if Erik plays the $\mathbf{9}5$ on the first round of trumps, retaining his $\mathbf{9}K$ to deal with dummy's lowly $\mathbf{9}6$.

At another table, the defenders went even further astray:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Bertheau	Sørensen	Nyström	Møller	
			5♥	
pass	pass	dbl	all pass	

West led the $\diamond Q$ again but at this table declarer covered with dummy's king. East won with the ace and returned a second diamond to West's jack. Continuing diamonds will result in two overruffs by East and three down. No, West diagnosed a spade switch. Declarer won with dummy's $\diamond A$, discarding his club loser, and then picked up the trumps with a finesse. Declarer's remaining $\diamond 98$ were good so it was $5 \forall$ doubled and made!

Boye is a firm believer in following his judgment rather than playing safe. This policy pays off handsomely in the long run but it cost him a packet when defending on this deal:



Erik Sælensminde led the \bigstar K and continued with a second spade, ruffed in the dummy. When Mike Passell led dummy's singleton heart, Boye rose with the \clubsuit A and switched to a trump, won in the dummy. Now came the key moment. Declarer called for the \bigstar 2. What would your reaction have been in the East seat?

It may seem obvious to rise with the A, ensuring the defeat of the contract. However, Boye could not believe that declarer held a singleton A. Surely he would have led a club instead of a heart at Trick 3 in that case? If West held A he would be able to win this trick and return a second round of trumps, putting the game two down. Few defenders would have the bravery to back their judgment in such a situation but Boye followed with the $\clubsuit7$. Passell won with the \clubsuitK , ruffed his last spade and led the \clubsuitQ , covered and ruffed. He was then able to ruff the \$10 with the \bigstarK , reach his hand with a high club ruff and draw West's remaining trumps. Contract made!

Something different now: both sides bid to an apparently hopeless slam on the South cards and you have to guess how the contract was allowed to make at one table. Was it the result of some gargantuan defensive mistake? It's possible, but the deal does come from the Bermuda Bowl!



A word or two on the bidding first: at this time Boye and Erik used $3\clubsuit$ as a relay, asking for further information. When the Stayman response was $2\clubsuit$, the opener responded according to this scheme:

- 3 four-card diamonds
- 3♥ four-card clubs
- 3♠ five spades
- 3NT 4-3-3-3 shape

So, Boye discovered that North was 4-3-3-3, set diamonds as trumps and heard a club cuebid, denying a heart or spade control. He then bid the slam, hoping that a heart trick would be the only loser.

On to the play! At both tables West led the ♥A against the dubious contract of 6♥. Can you imagine how Boye was allowed to make the contract?

Perhaps your first idea is that the defenders allowed themselves to be squeezed in some way. There is no chance of a squeeze, however, since the squeeze card would have to come from the South hand (in one of the minor suits) and dummy has no entry in either of the major suits.

No, the answer is much more straightforward than that. The Brazilian East signaled his enthusiasm for the heart lead by playing the \P J at Trick 1! West continued with a heart (saving declarer the trouble of taking a ruffing finesse later) and this established dummy's \P Q for a spade discard.

Fact is stranger than fiction. If a monk in the St. Titus monastery series were to make such a mistake, the readers would dismiss it as absurd. 'No-one would defend like that,' they would say. But this happened in the Bermuda Bowl. We do not mention the defender's name because he is a great player with many championships to his credit. (At the other table Tor Helness assigned the ♥8 to the first trick and the slam went one down.)

Let's continue with a deal where the kibitzers could hardly believe that a contract had been allowed to make. Norway faced Israel in the 2008 European Championship in Pau and this time it was Boye and Espen Lindqvist at the defensive controls. Let's follow the deal from Boye's point of view. Only the opponents are vulnerable and his right-hand opponent opens 5. What action would you take on Boye's hand?

♠AKQ10862 ♥K63 ♦K8 ♣A

These were Boye's thoughts:

My spinal reflex is to bid 5. But that is the bid I would have chosen with none of the side-suit honors. After all, we are white against red, and the Israeli player certainly expects to come close to his bid. I might also jump to 6° , but that would be a wild guess. On a sunny day, I might find Espen with an ace, or even two, but that is pure speculation. The aces are just as likely with West and then I risk a double. Coming from Norway I am more accustomed to grey weather than an abundance of sunrays.

I find what I consider a middle of the road solution: I double. Espen knows too that opener has a truck-load of clubs and at least nine tricks in his own hand. I believe I have made something close to a takeout double, and that Espen will bid with a decent suit. Over 5 or 5 I plan to follow up with 5, showing a very good hand. Brilliant reasoning, I say to myself as I place the red bidding card on the tray. Everyone passes, and I have to find an opening lead. You get to try first, while I think.

Decide what you would have led before reading further.

If declarer has ten or eleven clubs we must cash our tricks directly. If I start with the A and declarer ruffs, he may have no problem finessing one of my red kings and discarding a loser in the other red suit. Accordingly, I lead the ace of trumps to take a look at dummy. This is what I see:



Partner plays the \clubsuit 8. Decide your next move before reading further.

This is embarrassing. If declarer has nine clubs and two hearts, I have no idea whether to find the undertrick in spades or diamonds. Switching to the A would cost if declarer is O-2-2-9; he would be able to ruff his hearts good and enter dummy with the A9. A diamond exit may be wrong in several ways. I would love to take a step back in time and lead what any normal person would, a high spade. Then I would not be in this agonizing predicament.

Why did Espen pass? If he takes my double as takeout, his pass implies no five-card suit. If he has 4-4-4-1 shape my top spade will be ruffed. He may also be 4-3-5-1 with the A as his only value, thinking it is safer to take a penalty rather than bid at the five-level. I continue to explore every angle I can imagine. I turn. I pant. I puff. I suffer. After a few more excruciating minutes, I hardly know whether I am in Jerusalem, Mecca or Pau.

But stop. Is not this championship supposed to be mine? Have I not led the A because it had a divine significance? I will not be led into temptation just because everybody else will say they would have led a spade. No, my faith is still pure and strong. Solemnly, I lead the K. This was the full deal:



Minus 750! Indeed, it could have been minus 950 if declarer had cashed his diamonds before crossing to the \clubsuit 9. The result is even more galling after the good view to double rather than bid the failing 5.

One of Boye's worst bridge memories arose at the 1994 European Junior Championship. He was partnering Geir Helgemo, a big name even then, and had a black moment when playing this spade grand slam against Austria (who were in last place by a big margin).



The bidding need not concern us. Boye arrived in $7\clubsuit$ and West led the \clubsuit Q. How would you play the contract?

There are twelve tricks on top and a thirteenth might come from ruffing a diamond in dummy, finessing the \blacklozenge J or setting up an extra heart trick. Entering the confessional with head bowed, Boye takes up the narrative:

It looks so simple, doesn't it? How is it possible to go down? Well, I let the \mathbf{Q} lead go to my hand as I thought I needed the maximum number of entries to set up hearts. Then I cashed the \mathbf{A} (playing a spade to the queen would be much better) and found out about the 4-O break. Suddenly I couldn't play the percentage line (at this point) of ruffing a diamond in dummy, since my only entry to my hand to draw trumps subsequently was a heart ruff. Nervous as I was for screwing up this hand, I started with a heart to the ace and a heart ruff low. West overruffed! Looking at it in retrospect, I should definitely have pulled trumps before going after hearts, as I can fall back on a diamond finesse (or a heart-diamond showup squeeze) if hearts are 5-1. I more or less collapsed after going down in this grand slam and we lost the match 5-25 in VP, eventually finishing in 4th position.

All bridge players have moments like this, tucked away in the back of their memories. The fear of losing a close match, or of making some ghastly mistake, is one of the ingredients of the game that makes it so exciting.

What would your reaction be if you and your partner bid to a small slam in a major event, missing the ace and king of trumps? Some players would look for a way to blame the disaster on partner's bidding. Others would grit their teeth and never mention the hand again. That's not the way! Once the event is over, you should discuss the deal with your partner and see — without any recrimination — how the hand should have been bid. You will then stand a good chance of avoiding a similar misfortune in the future.

Let's take an in-depth look at one such bidding disaster and how an expert pair react to it. In the 2010 European Championship, playing against Germany, Boye and Odin Svendsen bid a slam missing the ace and king of trumps. This was the deal:


Two trump tricks were lost and that was 13 IMPs away. We mentioned the Norwegians' treatment of the Jacoby 2NT in Chapter 5. The 2NT bid announced a game-forcing raise in spades and 3◆ showed a non-minimum unbalanced opening bid. South's honors were all pulling hard, so that was a reasonable if optimistic description. Boye could have bid 3◆ next, asking partner if he held a side-suit singleton. Since he was well-stocked in both hearts and clubs, there was no direct benefit to be gained from that option. He preferred to bid 3NT, showing a balanced hand (often of around 14-15 points) with values in both of partner's possible singleton suits.

With a promising hand Svendsen would have made a cuebid now. His actual bid of 4^{A} showed that he was at the bottom end of the non-minimum range. This space-consuming response was not what Boye had been hoping for. What should he do next? RKCB would give some assurance about the trump position but the likely two-keycard response would say nothing about the vital A. If a keycard was missing, it was essential that partner held the A. Boye decided to cuebid 5^{A} and partner's 5^{A} confirmed that he held the A.

Boye takes over the story now:

Over 5•, I should probably have tried a 'last train' 5•. But would partner bid 6• with Axxxx-xx-Kxxx-Ax or KJxxx-xx-Kxxx-Ax? So I put him out of that agony, as I always like to when I think I know the right thing to do, by

bidding 6Φ myself. (I think his hand is borderline both to bid 3Φ over 2NT, and especially 5Φ over 5Φ .) So, that is the story from the table.

Afterwards, my teammate, Thomas Charlsen, suggested I should show a singleton club (!) by bidding $4 \clubsuit$ over $3 \blacklozenge$ (all new suits, also $4 \blacklozenge$, show a singleton — voids are shown directly by a double jump, including $1 \clubsuit - 4 \clubsuit$). He is right! Partner's hand would look good with two or three small clubs or the $\clubsuit A$ (only a singleton club might put him off cuebidding $4 \blacklozenge$, say with AKxxx-xxx-Kxxx-x), so he would normally cuebid $4 \blacklozenge$ if he has the king. Then I can check for keycards and settle for 5 or 6 accordingly. So there was a good answer over $3 \blacklozenge$, but I can't really find one over $4 \blacklozenge$.

You see how valuable such a discussion can be, after you and your partner have reached an awful contract.

Have you ever seen a freely bid slam go five down undoubled? 'It wouldn't happen at our local club,' you reply. 'None of our members bid that badly.' Not at your local club, let's agree with you, but perhaps it could happen in a Bermuda Bowl final!

E-W Vul. Dealer North	♠ AKJ ♥ 197	64 63	2007 Bermuda Bo Norway - USA	wl final
	♦ — ♣ QJ5			
 ◆ 5 ◆ K 5 ◆ K J 10 9 5 4 ◆ 9 8 4 3 	W E S	* *	Q 10 9 8 7 3 A 8 4 8 3 2 10	
	 ◆ 2 ♥ Q 10 ◆ A Q 1 ◆ A K 7 	2 7 6 7 6 2		
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Rosenberg	Sælensminde	Zia	Brogeland	
	1♠	pass	2♣	
pass	2♥	pass	2NT	
pass	3♣	pass	3♦	
pass	3♥	pass	3♠	
pass all pass	4♥	pass	6 4	

Boye's $2\clubsuit$ was forcing to game unless followed by $3\clubsuit$, so the bidding was more or less pre-ordained up to $3\clubsuit$. Boye was a bit too strong to sign off in 3NT next, so $3\blacklozenge$ looks the right move. The train is still on the track at this stage, but... what does

3 mean? Erik intended it as showing extra length in hearts, in case there was a 5-3 fit there. Boye took it as a control-showing cuebid. He cuebid in spades himself and liked the sound of the further 'cuebid' in hearts, leaping to $6^{\text{+}}$.

You may be wondering how the slam went five down. Michael Rosenberg led a trump and dummy's queen collected the ten from East. With prospects hopeless, Boye led a heart from dummy. Zia rose with the \mathbf{A} and switched to the \mathbf{A} , declarer playing the ace. Hoping to throw his two remaining hearts, Boye finessed the \mathbf{A} . This lost to East's queen and back came another diamond ruffed in the dummy. When Boye discarded a heart on dummy's \mathbf{A} , Rosenberg ruffed and cashed the \mathbf{A} . A trump exit to the bare \mathbf{A} in dummy left declarer with no way to turn. He could not discard one of his diamonds on the \mathbf{A} K because West would ruff. If instead declarer overtook with the \mathbf{A} K and drew West's last trump, he would have two further losers in the diamond suit. Five down for minus 250!

It turned out that Katz and Jacobs had also reached $6\clubsuit$, going three down for minus 150. Only 3 IMPs were lost — not so bad!

We will continue with an exciting grand slam deal. The first problem to be tackled was... which grand slam to bid.



How should Espen Lindqvist interpret Boye's 5 RKCB response? On the face of it, this showed two keycards (the A and K) and the Q. Since Lindqvist held

the $\diamond Q$, he knew that Boye had decided that his diamonds were long enough for the partnership not to worry about the trump queen. How many diamonds would North need to take this view?

Since 4◆ might be bid on only doubleton support, as indeed it had been, ◆AK10xxxx might be viewed as inadequate for a 5◆ response. Lindqvist was therefore inclined to place Boye with eight diamonds, in which case there would be thirteen top tricks in 7NT. If Boye held only seven diamonds, then the heart suit might provide a thirteenth trick anyway.

Lindqvist discovered that Boye had no side-suit king and bid 7NT anyway. West led the \diamond 8 and down went the dummy with only twelve top tricks on view. Lindqvist won with the \diamond Q and cashed both the black aces. He then ran the diamonds, hoping to add some squeeze possibilities to the main chance that the hearts would yield an extra trick. This was the position:



The last diamond was led, joined on the table by the AK, AJ and AQ. How should declarer read the cards? East would not throw the AK from AK10, since declarer might hold the AQ. So West was known to hold the AI0. There was no apparent clue as to the location of the AK. If East held that card, hearts would break 3-3; if West held the AK, East would hold four hearts and the odds would favor a heart finesse.

Lindqvist played the hearts from the top. The $\blacktriangleleft J$ did not fall and that was a 16 IMP loss compared with the 7 \bullet that was bid and made at the other table. Playing with diamonds as trumps, of course, declarer could establish a thirteenth trick in hearts by ruffing. It seems that Lindqvist took the right line of play on the information available. If East held the $\clubsuit K$ he would make the contract 100% of the time; if West held the $\clubsuit K$ he would make it 33% of the time (when the $\blacklozenge J$ lay with the doubleton holding). That was around a 67% line of play. A heart finesse would succeed 50% of the time when East held the $\clubsuit K$ and 67% of the time when West held the $\blacklozenge K$, a total chance of only 58%.

After failing to win a major US pairs title at his first 25 attempts, Boye and his partner Erik Sælensminde found themselves in the lead of the 2010 Von Zedtwitz Life Master Pairs in New Orleans, with only one set of the final to play. Midway through the session this deal arose:



How would you play 4♠ on a low heart lead? These were Boye's thoughts:

3NT looks a better contract — this could be a bad one. Should I have rebid $3\P$ instead of $3\P$? No point worrying about that now. I win with the \P K, call for the \P 2 (in case East has a stiff queen or ten) and put in the \P 9. This forces West's \P A!

It is incredible how emotions can change during a hand. Suddenly I feel like a million dollars. I am going to make this contract and win my first big pairs event after so many near misses — many of them roller-coasters where I had been leading going into the last session.

I win the heart continuation and play the 49 to dummy's 410. This wins and I picture myself making twelve tricks with East holding 4010x and West 4x or 4x. When I play the 48 from dummy, East contributes the 10 and I play the 4. Unfortunately West pitches a heart. But I still feel close to a million dollars, since I should be able to ditch my heart loser.

I cash the A and play the J, overtaking with dummy's A. Oh no, East starts thinking and must be out of diamonds. How unlucky! East will ruff the A and cross to West's A for him to cash the setting trick in hearts. Meanwhile, a bundle of pairs will be making 3NT. For some reason East keeps on thinking. Can he have missed his partner's count signal and be thinking that I hold three diamonds? In that case he may decide to delay his ruff until the next round of diamonds. I pray for this to happen, since I could then pitch my heart loser.

Eventually East ruffs with his master trump and the million-dollar man suddenly feels like he has only a dime in his pocket. Back comes a low club, presumably to West's ace. As a hopeless gesture I play the R from my hand. If West wins with the A and fails to cash a heart, by some miracle, I can cross to dummy's Q and take a discard. What's this? My K wins!

The horrible truth dawns on me. West wasn't certain to hold the A, even though it was highly likely after his vulnerable overcall. Since I was down anyway if West held the A, I should have played the 10 instead. I could then have won with dummy's Q and pitched my heart. Playing the 10 was not even a difficult play — it was the normal one. Being 110% sure, for some weird reason, that West held the A, playing the 10 had seemed a zero percent chance. It was careless, silly, stupid, you name it, but it's the way my mind works at bridge. I can't help blushing and it doesn't make me feel better that we have a lot of kibitzers, Geir Helgemo among them.

What lesson can be drawn from this? When you encounter an unlucky break, or a defender finds the one play that you were dreading, somehow you must try to keep calm and think with a clear head about the rest of the play. It is all too easy for us to give such advice and very much harder to follow it — even for top international players.

Did the sad story have a happy ending? We will now see. Boye and Erik avoided any further misadventure and rated themselves still with a chance of winning when the last board of the event was placed on the table. Sitting South, with both sides vulnerable, Boye picked up:

♠Q753 ♥— ♦A93 ♣AQ8642

Boye will resume the narrative:

West passed, Erik opened 1♥ (playing five-card majors) and the next player passed. What do you bid?

If you start with 1^{\bullet} , it could get awkward when partner bids 2^{\bullet} or 3^{\bullet} . So I think it is right to respond 2^{\bullet} . This is game-forcing in our methods unless you continue with 3^{\bullet} . Not surprisingly, partner bids 2^{\bullet} . What now?

It is tempting to hope for a misfit and bid a non-forcing $3\clubsuit$. It is a big risk, though. If partner has 4-5 or 4-6 shape in the majors, we may miss

an easy game and end the event with a near-zero board. I decide to 'go with the room' and bid a natural 2Φ , checking for a fit.

Not so good. Partner follows up with 3, making me want to go back and bid 3. Can you make the winning bid after this start?

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Sælensminde		Brogeland
pass	1 🎔	pass	2♣
pass	27	pass	2♠
pass	37	pass	Ś

It doesn't look promising. With no fit and probably at most 27 high-card points between us (partner could have jumped to $3 \checkmark$ over $2 \clubsuit$ with 16+ and a good suit) neither 3NT nor $4 \checkmark$ seems likely to make. I know I have forced to game and it will be a breach of discipline if I pass now, but there is no law in bridge against reconsidering. The rest of the field for sure won't reconsider; they will stick with their game plan. I can't bring myself to do that, even on the last board where we might just need an average score to win the event. It's too ugly. I know I won't forgive myself if bidding is wrong and a further move now costs us the victory. So, game-forcing situation or not, I decide to pass!

This action can gain in two ways. Game in any denomination may be a bad contract. Alternatively, it may be a good contract but go down on a bad lie of the cards. I can imagine Erik's surprise when he sees my green Pass card. I hope I have made the right decision. This was the full deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Sælensminde		Brogeland
	1 🎔	pass	2♣
pass	2♥	pass	2♠
pass	3♥	all pass	

No game is good, as you see. Erik held the precious ♣K, but 3NT would fail even if the clubs broke 3-2. Playing in hearts, even 3♥ is too high. However, Erik recovered from the shock of being left in a partscore and managed to make nine tricks. We scored 33.5 out of 38 matchpoints and won the Von Zedtwitz Life Master Pairs, just 6 matchpoints ahead of Italy's Norberto Bocchi and Guido Ferraro. A wonderful moment!

IN THE FAST LANE

We are close to the end of the book and it is time to have some fun! Let's enjoy some deals where Boye and his partner took a risk or two and, as a consequence, large numbers of IMPs or matchpoints changed hands.

The first deal features an electrifying 3NT bid:



After Ishmael Del'Monte's heart raise, Boye could visualize eight top tricks. A diamond lead would set up the \mathbf{A} for a ninth trick, so why not bid 3NT?

East doubled and Boye bravely stuck his ground. The \blacklozenge Q lead was allowed to win and West continued with the \blacklozenge J, covered by the king and ace. East switched to the \blacklozenge J and Boye's \blacklozenge K won the trick. That was two doubled overtricks and a score of +1150 for North-South — good going, even for regular occupants of the fast lane.

The play in 4 is interesting. A minor-suit lead would defeat the contract, but how would you tackle the play if the AQ is led?

Suppose you 'do what comes naturally' and cover with the A. East can win with the A and switch to the A, setting up a club trick for his partner. When West wins the second round of spades, he will cash a club trick for one down. To make the heart game, you must play low from dummy on the first trick. West is welcome to switch to a club because East will have no club to play when he gains the lead subsequently with the A! You will eventually discard your club loser on dummy's spades.

Textbooks will tell you that around 25 points are needed to attempt 3NT. When they issue this learned advice they are not referring to players in the fast lane, of course. For them, a combined total of 20 points is enough:



	pass	pass	dbl	all pass
sually, West's	2♥ was natu	ral rather than	a transfer.	North doubled for ta

Unusually, West's 2Ψ was natural rather than a transfer. North doubled for takeout and Boye made an adventurous leap to 3NT. West, who had an unexpected opening lead in diamonds up his sleeve, ventured a double.

Let's think about the play in 3NT for a moment. A heart lead will give the contract no chance because declarer cannot set up the spades before the defenders are able to claim three heart tricks to go with their AK. What would happen on West's intended diamond lead, though?

The answer is that declarer can make the contract provided he rises with the A on the first trick. This prevents East from winning with the Q and switching to hearts; at the same time it also blocks the diamond suit. Declarer can set up the spades, losing two spades and two diamonds at most.

After West's double Boye reconsidered the situation. Perhaps 3NT was not such an inviting spot after all. He amended the contract to 4 and this time it was East who doubled. West led a low diamond, ducked to the queen, and East switched to a heart. Boye rose with the ace and played a trump to the jack, East playing three rounds of the suit.

With only one heart ruff now available, Boye needed a full four club tricks. He led a low club to the ten and continued with ace and another diamond, ruffing in his hand. A second low club saw West's A hit the table. Boye could now win with dummy's A, cross to his J and return to dummy with a heart ruff. He was then able to ditch his remaining heart loser on the Q for +790. At the other table Groethe and Tundal sacrificed in 5 doubled, against 4, and went 500 down, Norway gaining 7 IMPs.

Sometimes 20 points are enough not just for a game but for a slam. Boye, who bid adventurously on this deal, will describe the action.



It was probably a new experience for Tor Helness to watch his opponents rocketing into slam with him having a 2NT opening!

For lead purposes I decided to bid my stronger rather than my lowerranked four-card suit after the double, and I was pleased to see partner jump to 4, which promised a diamond void with spade support. Pumped up by my strong trump holding and the J, I used Keycard Blackwood. Erik's 5 response told me that only one keycard was missing (the A is not relevant since partner has a diamond void), so I gambled on a small slam.

Helgemo led the \$8, which I feared was a singleton. Luckily, Helness followed with an honor under dummy's ace and from there on it was easy. Trump finesse, heart to dummy, another trump finesse, cash the ace of trumps and give away a club trick. Two hearts and one diamond disappeared on the good clubs and my other diamond could be ruffed in dummy. Lucky break, and happy make!

We will continue with a bidding problem. Listen to the auction and see whether you would find a bid on this South hand:

♠K104 ♥K94 ♦107 ♣J7643

Only the opponents are vulnerable. East passes, you pass and West opens $1 \blacklozenge$. The bidding continues:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
		pass	pass
1 🔶	pass	1♥	pass
2♦	pass	pass	Ś

They have stopped in 2♦. Do you feel called upon to make a contribution?

Boye held the South cards and reasoned that the opponents' lack of ambition marked his partner with around 10 points or so. He had not found a bid over 1, white against red, and was therefore likely to have some length in clubs. Surprising as some would find it, on such a moderate suit, Boye protected with 3. This was the full deal:



WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	Sælensminde		Brogeland
		pass	pass
1♦	pass	1♥	pass
2♦ all pass	pass	pass	3♣ (!)

How would you play the contract when West leads ace and another heart?

Boye won with the \forall K and saw that he would need an endplay to avoid losing a spade trick. His first move was to lead a diamond, preparing to eliminate that suit. West rose with the ace and returned the \diamond Q to dummy's king. Ace and another trump put West on lead and he exited with the \diamond J, ruffed by declarer. These cards remained:



Boye threw East on lead with a heart, forcing him to open the spades or concede a ruff-and-sluff. East did the best that he could, returning the $\mathbf{A}Q$, but Boye played for split honors. He won with the $\mathbf{A}K$ and finessed dummy's $\mathbf{A}9$ successfully. That was nine tricks and the contract.

Boye saw red when he picked up the South cards on the next deal — six hearts and seven diamonds!



The first two bids were the same at the other table but South then opened his account with a negative double. This would be fine with something like 4-5 in the red suits, but negative doubles do not tend to work well with more shapely hands — there is so little chance that partner will respond in one of your suits. Boye preferred to bid his suits directly and showed the six-card major first. When the bidding returned to him, the opponents were in 5. Boye then showed his second suit, bidding 5. This ran back to East, who persisted with 6. If declarer makes the most of his cards, he can escape for two down in this contract. Boye was not willing to let it play, however, and competed with 6. West's double brought an eventful auction to a close.

How would you play 6♦ doubled when West leads the ♦3?

West had shown good values with his cuebid raise and Boye placed him with the A. He called for dummy's K, an essential first move, and East showed out. A finesse of the Q proved successful and Boye continued with the A and a third heart, ruffing in the dummy. He could then draw trumps and claim the slam. Thanks to dummy's mighty 5, the contract would have made even if West had started with a doubleton heart!

Look at this bidding problem next. Only the opponents are vulnerable and they start with a multi 2 (usually based on a weak-two in one of the majors). Partner passes and your right-hand opponent makes a 2NT relay response. What would you bid on Boye's hand in the fourth seat?

♠A98764 ♥108 ♦K98 ♣AK

The A was likely to be with the 2NT bidder and Boye could visualize that a diamond lead might be needed to defeat 4. How could he tell partner to lead a diamond? There was only one answer. Boye overcalled 3.

Perhaps you think this is rather dangerous and that, on a bad day, partner may sacrifice in 5. That is exactly what happened. This was the full deal:



As you see, a diamond lead was indeed needed to beat a contract of 4. Meanwhile, Boye landed in 5 doubled. Best defense, which involves removing South's trump holding, would pick up an 1100 penalty. West led the AQ, Boye winning and playing another spade. The defenders cashed two heart tricks and switched to clubs. Boye played the AK, ruffed a spade in dummy, ruffed a club and ruffed another spade. These cards remained:



Boye ruffed dummy's last club with the $\blacklozenge 9$ and exited with the $\blacklozenge K$. East had to give the last trick to dummy's $\blacklozenge J$ and the penalty had been held to just 500. That was a 3-IMP pick-up against the other table's 620 for $4 \clubsuit$.

Perhaps you think that Boye picks up more than his fair share of good hands. The next deal, where he sat South, will not persuade you otherwise.



Have you ever heard of a reverse at the five-level? You have now!

A spade lead would make life easy for declarer, who could then take three heart ruffs. Seeing little future in spades, West made the stronger lead of a club. East won with the A and returned the 10. Take the South cards after this start. How would you play the slam?

Only two heart ruffs were possible now, so declarer's best chance was to take either a straight finesse or a ruffing finesse in hearts. Boye made East favorite (on the bidding) to hold the missing $\P K$. He won the trump switch in dummy and finessed the $\P Q$. Breathing freely again when the queen won, he ruffed a heart and returned to his hand with a spade ruff. All followed when a second heart ruff was taken, so Boye could claim the contract.

You are itching for another bidding problem? Right, you're sitting South in the Cavendish tournament in Las Vegas and only the opponents are vulnerable. This is your hand:

♠952 ♥A104 ♦K975 ♣A62

You pass and West opens 1♠. Your partner overcalls 3♦ (weak) and East passes. You bid 3♠ to show a good diamond fit and West rebids 4♥. Pass from the next two players. What do you do now?

Boye's length in diamonds suggested that there might be no defensive trick in that suit. The favorable vulnerability strongly suggested that a sacrifice was in order. Did you come to the same conclusion, bidding 5° ?

Boye's choice was a natural 4NT! The fact that East had chosen hearts as trumps left some hope that North would hold a spade stopper. Even if the defenders could run five spade tricks, declarer would have every chance of scoring the remainder (six diamonds and two aces). That would be two down doubled for a penalty of just 300. This was the full layout:



A contract of 4NT doubled on a combined count of 18 points. Life in the fast lane, indeed! West led a top spade and switched to the $\forall K$, Boye winning with the $\forall A$. Only one player could hold $\diamond Qxx$ after West's strong bidding in the majors, so Boye continued with a low diamond to dummy's ace. It was then a simple matter to score six diamond tricks and two aces.

The outcome was as Boye had predicted — only two down against a vulnerable game that would easily have been made. On the cross-IMPing used at the Cavendish, Boye and Espen scored 100 IMPs more than they would have done by going three down in 5 doubled.

Have you ever seen a deal where East-West are cold for 3NT, on any lead, but North-South bid unopposed to the same contract? It happened on this deal:



When his partner opened 1, Boye could guess that the opponents had a major-suit game. He decided to psyche a 2 \pm response, which was forcing to game unless he rebid 3 \pm . East was sufficiently impressed to pass, rather than double, and Espen Lindqvist's 2NT rebid showed 12-14 points. This was exactly the continuation Boye would have chosen. He could now bid a non-forcing 3 \pm with every hope that it would conclude the auction.

Had Lindqvist passed, 3♠ would actually have been made, combining nicely with the 3♠ made with an overtrick by the Norwegian West at the other table. He looked favorably at his ♠AK, however, and had visions of a low point-count notrump game being available. 3NT was indeed made... by the defenders. They scored five hearts, three diamonds and the ♠A to collect +250 and a swing of 3 IMPs.

One of the most difficult areas of bidding is displaying good judgment at the five-level. Look at the problem Boye faced, holding these cards:

♠A6 ♥AQJ9874 ♦J1094 ♣—

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Sælensminde		Brogeland	
			1 🛧
pass	2♣	4♥	pass
pass	5♣	Ś	

North's 2⁺ was inverted and only North-South were vulnerable. What action would you take on Boye's cards now? This was the full deal:



On the second round Boye made an 'action double'. He could visualize a cheap save on the East-West cards. The double asked partner to decide whether to defend or sacrifice. Erik Sælensminde was not delighted to be asked such a question, particularly when South announced a strong hand with his redouble. He had no support for hearts and very little defense against the opponents' club contract. Hoping that a heart ruff might come his way, he decided to defend.

Sitting East, you win the \P 6 lead with the \P A and South follows with the \P 10. How will you defend? Many defenders would return the \P Q; West would ruff and a subsequent spade trick would put the contract one down. Although it made no difference as the cards lay, Boye defended more accurately. He cashed the \clubsuit A at Trick 2. If West held the \clubsuit K, and a doubleton heart, he would give an encouraging attitude signal on the spade switch. A spade continuation would then defeat the contract, even if declarer held \diamondsuit Axx and would otherwise have been able to discard one of dummy's spade losers. Erik played a discouraging card on the \clubsuit A and ruffed Boye's switch back to hearts. East-West scored a nervy +400 for one redoubled undertrick.

We will present the next deal as a bidding problem. Sitting South, with both sides vulnerable, you hold this hand:

♠K8 ♥AK842 ♦K7432 ♣J

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
pass	1♠	pass	2♥
pass	2NT	pass	3♦
pass	3♥	pass	3♠
pass	3NT	pass	Ś

The bidding (at both tables, in fact) starts like this:

Partner's 2NT suggests 12-14 points. What, if anything, will you do next?

The auction had shown that the partnership held a 5-2 fit in each of the majors — not usually enough to furnish a satisfactory trump suit. Boye reasoned that his partner would have not have shown his doubleton heart support if he had a double stopper in clubs. Consequently there was some risk that the clubs would be underprotected in 3NT.

Boye continued with $4\clubsuit$, requesting a choice of games. When partner bid $4\blacklozenge$ next, Boye raised to $5\diamondsuit$. Did that end the bidding? No, you will recall that this chapter is called 'In the Fast Lane'. Erik Sælensminde raised to $6\diamondsuit$! This was the full deal:



4
d

How would you play 6♦ when West leads the ♣2?

Boye won with dummy's A, played the two top hearts and ruffed a heart with the 10. When hearts broke 3-3 he just needed to escape for one trump loser. Any play is good enough when trumps break 3-2 or West holds a singleton Q. When East holds four trumps including the queen, you cannot make the contract. What if West holds four trumps?

Cashing the A first would allow you to pick up the trumps for one loser when East has a singleton Q. It would cost the contract in the four-times-more-likely situation where East has a low singleton trump. Boye therefore returned to his hand with the A and finessed the J. Unless there was a freak ruff, this would cost nothing when trumps were 3-2 anyway.

Twelve tricks were duly landed and this was worth 16 IMPs when the Irish South passed 3NT and the contract went down on a club lead. Declarer finessed West for the $\diamond Q$ and lost four clubs and a diamond.

One good bidding problem deserves another. Sitting East, Boye holds:

♠98 ♥AQ1074 ♦KJ93 ♣74

With only North-South vulnerable, the auction unfolds like this:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
	1 🛧	1♥	1NT
2♠	3NT	Ś	

Would you say anything more on that East hand? The North-South auction was confident and Boye expected the opponents to make 3NT, aided by a long club suit in the North hand. His answer to the bidding problem was the same as that for the preceding problem: 4. This passed the message: 'I am happy to sacrifice in any of the other three suits. You choose.'

This was the full deal:



West led the AQ. Give the East cards back to Boye now and pick up the South hand. How would you play 4NT?

One idea is to lead the \P K at Trick 2, intending to lead towards the \P J later. As the cards lie, Boye would have had to switch to a diamond after winning with the \P A. Bas Drijver tried something different. After winning the spade lead, he led a low diamond from dummy. Boye went in with the \P K and returned his remaining spade, South winning with the \P A. Hoping to endplay East eventually, Drijver played six rounds of clubs. When he subsequently played ace and another diamond, West was able to win the trick and the contract went one down. Twelve IMPs to Norway had been conjured from thin air! At all the other seven tables of the Bermuda Bowl and Venice Cup quarter-finals, the contract was 3NT — bid and made.

Later in the match, vulnerable against not, Boye (West) picked up:

♠A854 ♥5 ♦A97652 ♣62

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
			1♥	
pass ?	4♥	pass	pass	

You passed over 1, but perhaps some contribution is expected over 4. What do you reckon?

Visualizing a good fit somewhere, Boye stepped into the fast lane and doubled! If partner chose to defend, that would be fine; his two aces would play a role. Erik Sælensminde did pass, in fact, and this was the layout:



The defenders claimed the A and K and Erik returned a spade to Boye's ace. Two club tricks brought the penalty to 300.

At the other table Sjoert Brink sat West and overcalled 1NT over 1♥, showing four spades and a longer minor in his system. Tor Helness raised to 3♥ on the North cards and Bas Drijver (East) bid 4♠. Take Geir Helgemo's South cards now. How would you defend against the spade game?

Geir led a top heart and found the only winning continuation, a second top heart to force a trump from the dummy. Drijver ruffed in the dummy and led a low trump, North winning with the A. Declarer won the club switch, ruffed his last heart in dummy and cashed the A. He could not avoid two further trump losers and was one down, giving Norway 9 IMPs.

What would happen if declarer led the \blacklozenge J after winning the club switch? If South covers with the \blacklozenge Q the contract will be made. Declarer can win with the \blacklozenge A, return to his hand and ruff the last heart. He can then play a club to the ace, draw another trump and claim ten tricks when diamonds break 2-2. We can be sure that Helgemo would not have covered the \blacklozenge J. An increasingly popular convention nowadays is the support double:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
			1♦
pass	1♠	24	Ś

If South has any hand containing three-card spade support, he doubles now. A direct raise to $2\clubsuit$ would promise four-card support. You can see how useful it is to distinguish between the cases. If North holds only four spades, for example, he may be able to rebid $2\clubsuit$. South starts with a support double when holding three-card support, however weak or strong he may be. The level of the contract can be sorted out on a subsequent round.

What's that to do with life in the fast lane? Well, on the next deal Boye discovered a previously hidden advantage of the method:



With the vulnerability in his favour, Boye decided that the moment was right for a psychic 1♠ response. Simon de Wijs entered with 2♠ and Erik doubled to show his three-card spade support. North passed and, trying to look casual about it, Boye passed too. Declarer scored four black-suit tricks and two trumps to go 500 down.

At the other table East chose to respond 1NT instead. Ulf Tundal passed on the South cards, West bid $2 \clubsuit$ and East closed the auction with $2 \diamondsuit$. That went three down and the innocuous-looking deal produced a 12-IMP swing.

We will end the chapter with an amazing bidding deal — the very last played in the 2008 NABC Spring Nationals.



West's 2♣ was a transfer to 2♦. Boye and Espen Lindqvist had passed five times between them. However, the bidding was not yet over...

	27	3♦	44
pass	4♦	pass	4♠
pass	4NT	pass	54
pass	6🕈 (!)		

Boye protected with 2♥ and Espen's 4♣ was natural (fortified by the knowledge that partner was very short in diamonds). After two cuebids Boye bid 4NT, a Last Train slam invitation. Espen signed off in 5♣ but Boye could not resist bidding 6♣. East won the spade lead and switched to a trump, resolving the guess there. A diamond ruff then brought the total to twelve. Would Espen have guessed the clubs without East's helpful switch? We will never know!

BACK-TO-BACK GRAND SLAMS IN PAU

The 2008 European Championships were held in Pau, high in the French Pyrenees. When the last round started, four teams had a good chance of winning the gold medal: Bulgaria, Germany, Norway and Russia. In the last 20-board match Norway faced Denmark, who had every prospect of finishing in the top six themselves, thereby qualifying for the Bermuda Bowl. This final chapter of the book tells the tale of Boards 14 and 15, where two grand slams were bid.

Neither Vul.	♠ A		2008 Euro Champ	pionship
Dealer East	♥ AQJ ♦ 542 ♣ AKJ	96 4	Norway - Denmar	k, Board 14
 ★ KQ92 ♥ K2 ◆ J8 ◆ 108752 	N W E S 5 ◆ J 10 7 ♥ 8 3 ◆ A K G ◆ 3	↑ 7 4 2 10 9 7	8 6 5 3 10 7 5 4 6 3 Q 9 6	
WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH	
Hansen	Lindqvist	Bilde pass	Brogeland 1 ◆	
1♠	2♣	3♠	4♦	
pass	4♠	pass	5 +	
pass	5♠	pass	5NT	
pass	7♦	all pass		

Boye takes up the narrative:

Espen's $2\clubsuit$ was a switch bid, as we described in Chapter 18, showing at least five hearts. Over $3\clubsuit$ I admit that for a second I had my hand on

the 3NT card in the bidding box. However, I pulled myself together. With a probable spade void in Espen's hand (the overcall suggested five cards and East's preemptive raise showed four-card support), a notrump contract could hardly be right. On the contrary, if partner held diamond support, we might go a long way together in that suit.

I rebid 4 \blacklozenge instead and Espen's 4 \blacklozenge showed a spade control, confirming diamonds as trumps. I cooperated by showing my club control and partner's 5 \blacklozenge then suggested a grand slam. With such great trumps, I could not sign off in 6 \blacklozenge . Since I had no outside values, however, it would be too much to jump to 7 \blacklozenge . I took a middle path by bidding 5NT.

When Espen bid the grand, he knew that 13 tricks might be lay-down, or it might need a finesse. This combination made the grand slam a good proposition at the time we contracted for it. Too many players look at the hands afterwards and say that bidding seven must be wrong, as a grand slam needs better odds than 50%. The point is that the odds were around 75% on the information that Espen had when he made his last bid. To bid the grand was therefore a correct risk to take.

Boye won the \blacklozenge 8 lead in his hand. There was more than one way to play the slam but he decided to take the simple line of a heart finesse through the overcaller. He led a heart at Trick 2, held his breath and finessed the \PQ . It won! He played dummy's \blacklozenge A and returned to his hand with another round of trumps, the suit breaking 2-2. When he led a second round of hearts, the \PK appeared from West and he was able to claim the grand slam.

This was the auction at the other table:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Helgemo	Caspersen	Lund	Kroejgaard
		pass	1♦
1 🛧	27	3♠	3NT
pass	4♦	pass	4NT
pass	6NT	all pass	

Mads Kroejgaard did make the 3NT rebid that Boye had contemplated. When his partner advanced to 4, he declined the slam invitation with a retreat to 4NT, raised to 6NT. So, not without a degree of good fortune, Norway gained 11 IMPs.

On the next board Boye picked up this hand:

♠KQ96 ♥94 ♦AQ3 ♣AKQJ

Once again, the 'main man' will give you his thoughts at the time.

I open 2NT, showing 20-21 points, and Espen responds with a transfer bid of 3Ψ . I super-accept by bidding $4\clubsuit$, which shows a maximum opening and four spades. Espen continues with $4\diamondsuit$, which is a further slam try showing a shortage, and the next player doubles this.

I now value my hand even more highly. East presumably has the A or A, sitting under my AQ. There is no need to worry about a heart control, with partner bidding so strongly and the other suits so well held in my own hand. I continue with Roman Keycard Blackwood and partner's 5° response shows both major aces. Now, how do I go from here?

If I bid 5NT, this is not only a quest for kings; it is a grand slam try, promising that we have four aces and the king-queen of trumps. Is that my right bid? It certainly feels natural and I continue with 5NT. Espen has nothing more of value to tell me and he rejects my invitation, bidding 6. This had been the bidding so far:

WEST	NORTH	EAST	SOUTH
Hansen	Lindqvist	Bilde	Brogeland
			2NT
pass	3♥	pass	4 ♣
pass	4♦	dbl	4NT
pass	5♥	pass	5NT
pass	6♠	pass	Ś

As partner denied the $\mathbf{A}Q$, he probably has only five spades. With ten trumps together with me, Espen would have lied about the missing $\mathbf{A}Q$ (responding 5 \mathbf{A}) as the card would probably drop. If Espen has another suit it is probably hearts, where I am short. Maybe he has the $\mathbf{A}Q$? No, I am not bidding another grand on a heart finesse! This finesse would be different from the one on the previous board. It now would represent a 50% chance as a best-case scenario, whereas the heart finesse was 50% as a worst-case scenario on the last board. The difference is huge.

So, I should pass?

Suddenly inspiration strikes me. Wait a minute, there is a great grand available with clubs as trumps! I can take the diamond finesse, as East's double more or less guarantees that he has the king. Then I can ruff my last diamond and throw my heart loser on the fifth spade! Wow! I can make 74 even if Espen has only two clubs.

I know that $7^{\$ is the right bid in theory. But will it work in practice? Will Espen pass with two or three or even four small clubs? Can he be sure that I have a four-card royal flush draw in a suit I only mention at the seven level? Also, it may not be necessary to bid seven. How likely is it that the Danes have found $7^{\}?$ These are substantial arguments against bidding 7. However, I cannot bear to put up the green pass card. It is against my nature to be satisfied with the nine when I know I should aim steadily at the bull's eye. Bridge is primarily a game, an incredibly entertaining game, regardless of whether one participates in a club tournament on Thursday evening or in the European championship. I will be able to forgive myself if we lose the gold because I bid 7. but I will forever bear a grudge against myself if we lose because I chicken out in 6^{4} .

I take the plunge and bid 7^{\bullet} . Espen thinks for a long time on the other side of the screen. My heart beats faster all the time. He cannot figure out what my 7^{\bullet} means! At last the bidding tray is returned and the color drains from my face. He has corrected to 7^{\bullet} . This was the full deal:



The spade grand slam has no play and goes one down. I cannot understand how Espen interpreted 7⁺ as anything else than a proposition to play that contract, but this is neither the time nor the place for a system discussion. We lose 19 IMPs as Caspersen-Krøjgaard were one of only three pairs in the championship that managed to bid 7⁺ (and stop there!)

I take a break to collect a glass of water. I pass by Espen and try to calm him down. This match is still going our way. We have lots of good

boards below the belt. Let us just forget the last board, I say. Espen seems to be in shock, halfway lying in his chair, looking emptily into the air. I have never seen him like this before.

'Why did you not jump to 7♣ directly over 5♥?' he asks quietly.

I probably should have, because that bid would have been easily understandable. The fact that I did not bid 7 \clubsuit on the previous round created a doubt in Espen's mind when I finally got around to bidding it. However, 7 \clubsuit would have been the safest contract if Espen held the heart king. That was my reason for bidding 5NT. Anyway, I am not going to spend any more energy thinking about it.

Boye and Espen recovered well from this disastrous misadventure, picking up several useful scores including an 800 with a speculative double of a 2 contract. Boye will now describe the conclusion of the championship:

A short while ago, Ron Tacchi, who is the official photographer at all major championships, came into our room to take a number of pictures. He may of course only be doing his duty, but I take it as a sign that we are at least participating in the gold finish. Otherwise, he would be occupied with snapping photos of Bulgarians, Germans or Russians.

After two more good results on the last boards, we rush out of the TV room in the basement to find out what the final standings are. In the doorway, I bump into a top bureaucrat of the EBL, Jean-Claude Beineix of France. I am looking for a sign. He smiles in a friendly way. I am no longer sure if he said 'Congratulations', 'Well played' or 'You did it', but I realize that we have won.

Norway had beaten Denmark by 24 VPs to 6 and these were the final leading scores:

- 1. Norway 299
- 2. Russia 287
- 3. Germany 286
- 4. Bulgaria 285

This is the moment. In the style of Björn Borg, I run a couple of steps before I throw myself on the concrete floor of the basement in Palais Beaumont. My tears are flowing. To win the Bermuda Bowl is of course incredibly great, but this feels even better. Not only because it may be a more difficult competition to win, but also because Espen and I managed to play above ourselves in our first major tournament together.

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BRIDGE SHOULD BE FUN!

So says Norway's Boye Brogeland, and he's a World Champion. If he didn't enjoy the game so much, he wouldn't play it. And he has his own ideas about how it should be played. He'd rather lose the world title by bidding a grand that goes down than be branded a chicken.

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BOYE BROGELAND (Norway) has won both the World and European Championships, and is a regular participant in top-level North American tournaments.

DAVID BIRD (Southampton, UK) is the author of more than 100 books on bridge. His most recent include *Defensive Signaling* and the award-winning *Planning the Play* of a Bridge Hand (with Barbara Seagram).

